

# RELIGION IN LIFE

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A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY

WINTER  
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1950-1951

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# RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY

22

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## Fifteenth Century Carol

Make we joy now in this feast  
*In quo Christus natus est:*

*A Patre unigenitus*  
Through a maiden is come to us:  
Sing we of him and say, "Welcome,  
*Veni Redemptor gentium."*

*Agnoscat omne seculum:*  
A bright star made three Kingès come,  
For to seek with their présents  
*Verbum supernum prodiens:*

*A solis ortus cardine,*  
So mighty a Lord was none as he:  
He on our kind his peace hath set,  
*Adam parens quod polluit:*

*Maria ventre concipit,*  
The Holy Ghost was ay her with:  
In Bethlehem yborn he is,  
*Consors paterni luminis:*

*O lux beata, Trinitas!*  
He lay between an ox and ass,  
And by his mother, maiden free.  
*Gloria tibi, Domine!*

—Carol 23 in *The Oxford Book of Carols*.  
London: Oxford University Press, 1928.

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# Neo-Orthodoxy Goes to Kindergarten

EDITH HUNTER

NEO-ORTHODOXY HAS STRAYED out of the seminaries into the colleges, into the local pastorates, and now even into the church schools. Many people have wondered just how the neo-orthodox diagnosis of the human situation and of God's relation to man could be incorporated into the churches' program of religious education. The ambitious New Curriculum of the Presbyterian Church is supplying us with one answer to this query.

A study of the preparatory brochures for this Curriculum<sup>1</sup> makes it abundantly clear that the undergirding theology is neo-orthodox.<sup>2</sup> But the Presbyterian program is not the only one that shows evidence of the neo-orthodoxy so strong in the seminaries. The fact that the new curriculum of the Congregational Christian Churches and the Evangelical and Reformed Church, launched in the fall of 1950, draws heavily on Presbyterian material is indicative. The Episcopalians have also made rather extensive use of the new Presbyterian books.

In so far as these and other denominational Boards of Education affirm the new orthodoxy, they must face up to a perplexing dilemma. The dilemma is particularly striking as it appears in the Presbyterian New Curriculum because, in this case, there has been a thoroughgoing attempt to state explicitly the basic theological assumptions behind the Curriculum, and then to write or use only materials that implement these basic assumptions. It is in terms of this Curriculum that I shall analyze the dilemma.

On the kindergarten level the problem arises in its most interesting form. One would expect that the application of such a highly sophisticated theology as neo-orthodoxy might run into difficulty in the kindergarten. But the editor has warned that "the simplest kindergarten story has a certain doctrine implicit in it, and it is of the greatest importance that it

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<sup>1</sup> These were prepared by the former Editor-in-chief, Dr. James Smart.

<sup>2</sup> Edith Hunter, "Two Approaches to the Church School Curriculum," in *Religious Education*, July-August, 1949.

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EDITH HUNTER (MRS. ARMSTRONG HUNTER), B.A., B.D., is wife and mother, speaker and writer. She raises the question whether our religious educators are involved in a vain attempt to serve two masters.

should be the right doctrine. At each age level there must be building up a consistent interpretation of God."

An examination of the children's reading books and of *Growing*, the magazine for the parents and teachers of kindergarten children, reveals that neo-orthodoxy is there, but in conjunction with an unexpected partner, the most recent findings in the field of child psychology and the science of human development. One brochure on the New Curriculum specifically states the importance of using these findings, but explicitly repudiates "the humanistic premises" from which the scientists start. It rejects their naturalistic premises and "dogmatic conclusions" about the child for the traditional Christian theological premises, including the orthodox interpretation of man as sinner. Having carefully declared the premises of the scientists anathema, the editor feels free, indeed obligated, to use their findings.

# I

Perhaps the neatest symbol of this alliance between orthodox Christian premises and naturalistically grounded facts and methodologies is contained in the July-September 1949 issue of *Growing*. The first article is by Joseph Haroutunian, a proponent of the neo-orthodox point of view. It is entitled, "God's Way With Our Willfulness." The second article is by Rowena Shoemaker, Assistant Director of the Play School Association, a group that bases its procedures on the naturalistic premises common to all progressive education. No doubt, in the minds of the editors of the magazine, we read the first article for a reassertion of our basic Christian premises; the second, to discover some practical techniques, recommended by the psychologists, for carrying out these premises.

Any curriculum based on such an alliance will necessarily be rent by many subtle and some not so subtle confusions. To assume that we can adopt the findings of the naturalistically grounded science of human development without altering our orthodox Christian premises about man, is to fail to understand the relation of premises to those very complex and highly subjective phenomena, observable facts.

Our intellectual premises, whether explicit or implicit, are the mental ground that we stand on as we experience life and try to make sense out of it. Our premises supply us with the basic terms we use in interpreting our experience, and apart from them experience is meaningless. For two people with different premises, a "common" event can be experienced as two factually different events. What is more important, and very hard to grasp, is the fact that our premises, to an often unrecognized degree,

actually determine what we can experience as facts. A new set of premises "lets in" new kinds of experience.

It is *because* of their humanistic premises that the scientists have been able to discover the data and techniques that these religious educators are intent on using. For the entire scientific revolution has been primarily a revolution in premises. With the change in their major premises about man, caused by a variety of factors, the attention of the scientists has been increasingly directed toward the facts of human development. The enormous practical corroboration of the scientific vision has made it more and more persuasive, and at the same time brought about a weakening in the hold of the Christian world view.

There has always been a quarrel between the scientific vision and the Christian vision where they have explicitly overlapped. In our time the controversy is most intense on the subject of man. Increasingly, the scientists have urged that man himself, all of him, being a part of nature, is a legitimate object for scientific observation and analysis. As scientists, many of them are eager to study man, not only as an intricate physical organism, but also as symbol user, appreciator of meaning, dreamer of dreams, the most fascinating object of study in a miraculously contrived universe.

Because man is so complex, the scientists of human development have logically enough devoted a good deal of time to man at his simplest, the infant and young child. At present, the complicated task of separating, on an analytical level, the woof of nature from the warp of nurture in the human personality in various cultures, is being pursued by teams of psychiatrists and cultural anthropologists. The field has still hardly been touched.

Even so, there is already an impressive body of scientific data about apparently necessary patterns of normal personality development, at least within a segment of our culture, in the first few years of life. These data, though still in rough form, do measure up to scientific standards, i.e., they make some human action predictable. The intricacies of normal and abnormal child behavior are increasingly understandable and capable of manipulation under scientific guidance.

For example, child guidance experts tell us that the normally developing two-year-old enters a very negative period as he reaches two and a half. He is, for biological and psychological reasons, unable to choose among several possible alternatives. But he wants very much to choose, and "all by himself." More often than not, he will choose two mutually exclusive avenues of advance, and then find himself completely at odds with society and with himself.

If this "fact of normal negativism" is recognized for what it is, a healthy, necessary step in the development of a self that *can* choose, it can be handled by well-worked-out techniques. The child can be diverted, not presented with too many alternatives, or too many choosing situations in a day, etc. In this way, the two-and-a-half-year-old and the adults in charge can be helped through a difficult period, so that a happy three-year-old emerges: one who delights in choosing, and does so capably.

If, however, this negativism is labeled rebellion, willfulness, temper, stubbornness, or even sin, and handled as such, with strict discipline, iron-bound taking of the consequences, blaming, shaming, and adult temper, then besides daily battles there will develop an abnormal, unhealthy three-year-old. These experts suggest that child development is not a smooth, steady progression, but a complicated system of rises, plateaus, and backward slips. But, they warn, if the adults in charge are aware of the basic patterns involved, they will be wiser in their methods of education; growing up can then be more a process of unfolding, and less a deforming, distorting experience.

These are the type of data that the editors of the kindergarten materials in the Presbyterian New Curriculum have been impressed by and have incorporated into their parent-teacher magazine. But to admit their impressiveness and importance, and to assign them the status of fact, implies the acceptance of the naturalistic premises that fairly shout out their presence in the midst of the facts. For these scientific data are shot through with value judgments that are the direct result of the naturalistic premises that have been so carefully called anathema.

In one issue of *Growing*, there is an article called "Jealousy Is Normal." If we assert that jealousy is normal, what definition of "normal" are we accepting? The psychologists at present are saying that some jealousy is an inevitable part of growing up, and to be accepted as healthy, a developmental fact, and therefore not to be condemned. If we go along with this statement, we are accepting their naturalistically grounded definition of the normal and healthy. We accept the related conviction that guilt feelings ought to be kept at a minimum, that excessive frustration is deforming. We find ourselves asserting that unimpeded growth will do much toward producing good people. Moreover, if we speak of normal negativism and normal jealousy, we will not speak of sin.

The scientists would probably assert that our cultural demands should be fitted to developmental facts, the "given" should be respected. But orthodox and neo-orthodox theologians would assert that it is normal,



necessary, or at least inevitable, that the developing human soul will exhibit fruits of the original sin that is in us all. This is a "developmental fact" that the theologians would urge us not to respect, but to admit and repent of. This difference between the scientists and the theologians is not just a difference in terminology, it is a difference in basic assumptions about human nature.

## II

Let me give an example of what happens when the naturalistic premises dormant in scientific facts come into open conflict with the announced theological premises on which the new Presbyterian curriculum is built. One of the kindergarten home reading books is called *Davie Decides*. This book is also to be used by the Congregationalists and the Evangelical and Reformed Church. It has aroused a lot of discussion and I believe this is not an accident, but rather because the book deals with a crucial issue, "self-will" in the four- and five-year-old. Is the very strong urge to self-assertion and "bossiness" in the four- and five-year-old, observed by the scientists and most parents, normal and healthy, as defined by the scientist, or normal and sinful, as defined by the theologian? The book, *Davie Decides*, follows five-year-old Davie through one stormy week, day by day. Each story centers around the unpleasant incident that occurred on that day, as a result of Davie's "wanting his own way."

This book was written to be used first in the summer quarter of 1949, in the Presbyterian curriculum. The July-September 1949 issue of *Growing* supplies helps in using *Davie Decides* in the home. This is the issue of *Growing* mentioned earlier, which opens with Dr. Haroutunian's article on "God's Way With Our Willfulness." Dr. Haroutunian tells us that we are all disobedient children to our Father God. But God, in Christ, can save us from the sin of willfulness. He says, "We resist our parents or companions or teachers, simply because we do not want to subject our wills to theirs . . . in the same spirit of self-assertion we refuse to obey God. . . ." The premise is, of course, that we should submit our wills to our parents, teachers, and God.

Although Dr. Haroutunian does not mention the book, *Davie Decides*, would not the parent or teacher reading his article reason somewhat as follows: since the "problem" for the quarter is self-will, as depicted in Davie, Davie is to be thought of as willful, disobedient, rebellious, sinful, in short a bad little boy?

But no! The writers of the children's materials nowhere say that Davie is sinful and a bad little boy because of this self-will. Quite the

contrary; after Dr. Haroutunian's article we read Mrs. Shoemaker's, which though on an unrelated subject, gets us into the "child guidance" atmosphere. Then occurs a very interesting two-page spread. In an editor's note at the bottom of those pages we read, "*Davie Decides . . .* has been the basis for much discussion by people well versed in child guidance." Among other things, these experts have been critical of the way Davie's parents handled his displays of normal five-year-old self-assertiveness. They feel that because the parents haven't used the proper, i.e., scientifically sound, techniques, this normal urge has reached rather abnormal proportions.

So on these two pages, the editors present six short articles dealing with such matters as feelings of guilt, methods of discipline, and other topics, all gathered together under the heading of "child psychology." In one of the articles the story is told of a little boy who hits another boy with a block. A little girl observing this action says, "Is Jimmy bad?" The teacher answers, "No, Jimmy is a fine boy, Jimmy forgot the rule." The writer warns that "bad" is a rather strong word to use about a four- or five-year-old. By implication, then, the bewildered parent or teacher who just a few pages back read Dr. Haroutunian's article, and decided that five-year-old Davie was an early example of rebellion against God, is now urged not to think of Jimmy or Davie as bad, but rather as normal, growing boys.

In another of these articles we read, ". . . if guilt feelings in young children are not emphasized, by adults, those children will grow up *normally*, blessed by a belief in God, who expects them to do their best, but who also forgives their sins." Here, I am convinced, we have in a single sentence the conflict—not clearly recognized by the writers of the materials—between naturalistic premises and their practical implications in the field of child guidance, and orthodox theological premises and their implications on these same practical questions.

Just how is "normally" being defined in the sentence quoted above? As one reads the first part of the sentence, it would seem that the scientists' definition has been accepted, in which case the normal child will be the one who is helped to recognize his antisocial urges as, in part, an inevitable aspect of the growing-up process. He will be helped to handle them, but not made to feel ashamed of them. The abnormal child, according to this definition, will be the one who is made to feel guilty about these urges.

But in the last part of the sentence quoted, where the writer speaks



of a "God . . . who also forgives their sins . . ." it is evident that an attempt is being made to maintain an orthodox Christian theological position on what constitutes normalcy in human beings, along with the scientific definition. A Christian knows, by revelation, that a normal human is a sinning human, and a healthy human soul is one that feels guilty because of this sin.

Can the methods of handling children and guiding them to maturity, recommended by the psychologists, with their implied judgments as to what is normal and healthy, be brought into any kind of harmony with the view of human nature presented in Dr. Haroutunian's article? Rather than playing down guilt feelings, is it not essential to the Christian drama of salvation that even in the four-year-old, and especially in the four-year-old, strong guilt feelings should be encouraged? Are not such feelings the only adequate psychological groundwork for the acute awareness of a need for repentance which is the *summum bonum* of this point of view? Is there not a direct ratio, rather than an inverse one, between guilt feelings and a feeling of the need to repent?

Many religious educators and intelligent parents have been convinced of the soundness of the scientific approach in the area of nursery and kindergarten education. The "Bible" of many of the younger parents, in and out of the church, is *Infant and Child in the Culture of Today*, by Gesell and Ilg. The book embodies a developmental philosophy. Now that a second volume has appeared, *The Child From Five to Ten*, by the same authors, many of these religious educators and parents are beginning to wonder a bit uneasily at just what age the other Bible, the Judeo-Christian Bible, will begin to be relevant. When does orthodox Christian doctrine become applicable to human nature and human behavior? In the January-March 1950 issue of *Growing*, we read in an article by W. Carson Ryan, "Even more important is the fact that today we are applying the nursery school principles of growth and development to all stages of childhood and youth." If there is no sin in the four-year-old, and there is no sin in the fourteen-year old, can there be any sin in the forty-year-old?

This is the quarrel that Conrad Bergendoff was highlighting in his article in *The Christian Century* for July 13, 1949. In this article he argued that there is an impassable chasm between Christians who still teach the doctrine of original sin, and the scientists, such as Dr. Brock Chisholm of the World Health Organization, who consider the concept of original sin a "dreadfully damaging concept." I am not concerned here with the very real problem of how the scientists arrive at their definitions of health and

normalcy, but rather to point out the danger of trying to hold onto mutually exclusive definitions.

### III

The simultaneous adoption of scientifically sound data and methods and theologically orthodox first principles leads to real problems in another important area. The Presbyterian New Curriculum again gives us the most clear-cut examples, but there is evidence of an uneasy confusion on the same issue in the curricula of other liberal evangelical denominations. What part can Jesus have in the religious life of modern four- and five-year-olds? Turning to the child psychologists and secular educationalists, the curriculum builders have learned that children of this age group live almost completely in the here and now. Last week and next week, my house and your house are pretty much the limits of their space-time world. It is an ever-expanding world, but it grows slowly, out from the child's own context. It has been found that these children are delighted and intrigued with the living world of nature, growing seeds, bursting buds, and their own growing bodies. They are deeply involved, emotionally, in problems dealing with their relations with Mother and Father, big sister and baby brother, and the new boy next door. They attach tremendous importance to their own next birthday or the death of a dearly loved cat.

For a religious naturalist such data present no problem, since God is known in and through nature, through every difficult choice that is well made, through every experience that brings personal growth and widened perspectives. The religious life of the little child can be cultivated and deepened by increased sensitivity to these important experiences that take place in the here and now in which he lives. The religious-education curriculum of the Unitarian Church frankly follows this approach, and in their materials for three-to-six-year-olds, religion is taught through these media. Jesus is not presented at all.

But a curriculum that is based on neo-orthodox first principles can make no such peace with these developmental facts. The theological fact that God entered history uniquely, once for all, in Jesus, this fact makes the primary demand on these Christian educators. They have tried not to disregard the scientific facts, but have sought to discover how to best introduce a figure of the long ago and far away, the historic Jesus, to these here-and-now-bound kindergarten children. They want Jesus to be a real person to these children, and his life to be meaningful and important to them. Would not the educational psychologists be forced to say, nonetheless, in the light of their facts, "Wait until the child is older, since that

alone is meaningful, important and real, which is a part of his everyday experience?"

But neo-orthodoxy teaches that because Jesus lived, died and rose again from the dead, a new dimension has been added to our knowledge of God, a new relationship is possible with him. Even the smallest child should know Jesus, for the truest knowledge of God comes when we know him in Jesus. Because of such assertions these religious educators cannot accept the rather obvious solution; let the fours and fives discover God in nature and everyday living, and present Jesus at an age when historic figures can be made meaningful. Neo-orthodox theologians are very wary of the suggestion that the true God can be known through nature, even though this doctrine has had a long and respectable history, from the early psalmist who looked at the stars down through many orthodox Christian thinkers.

In the January-April 1949 issue of *Growing*, there is an article on helping kindergarten children appreciate God through nature. In the body of this article a careful distinction is drawn between knowing God and knowing God's plan. It is God's *plan* that the child is supposed to see in nature. Even though this distinction is drawn by the author of the article, as a guard against pantheism, the editor has added a few prefatory remarks to the article as perhaps a further safeguard. In one section he says, "It is one thing to say that the whole world of nature is God's, but quite another to say that one has only to look to nature to know God." He goes further and says, "But this is a very different matter from glorifying nature, as if there were a path through nature and apart from Christ into the very heart and mind of God." This is radical doctrine, so radical that it really makes irrelevant the nice distinction between God and God's plan. To the non-Christian or to the child who does not yet know Jesus, is even God's plan really visible in the created universe?

The way in which this extreme doctrine has been allied with scientifically sound facts and methodologies in the actual curriculum materials is very interesting. Some of the children's reading books are here-and-now stories. *Davie Decides* and *God's World and Johnny* teach religious values through the real problems and experiences of modern five-year-old boys. In *Davie Decides* the central problem, as pointed out earlier, is how a little five-year-old can be helped to handle successfully his own urges and conflicts. The premise here would seem to be that there are religious values in these real experiences. In *God's World and Johnny* the theme is the religious values that are latent in a child's experiences with nature, given

the proper safeguards against pantheism. These books are, generally speaking, not far out of line with a broadly naturalistic approach, since they respect the here-and-now context of the children and make no reference to Jesus.

But along with books like these the curriculum also contains books dealing specifically with biblical stories, and with the life and teaching of Jesus. The premise here is the orthodox one, that there is unique religious value in the Bible and in the person of Jesus. But even in this area these curriculum writers have tried to respect the psychologists' advice, and the result is necessarily a kind of subtle confusion.

Two of the books about Jesus are *A Star Shone* and *My Book About Jesus*. In these books Jesus is shown in two roles. One role emphasizes the fact that Jesus was first of all a real little baby. He had to learn to crawl and walk and talk, just like us. Growing up was difficult, and Jesus had all the problems that we all do. By showing that Jesus went through all the developmental stages that a modern child does, birthday by birthday, the writers probably feel that they have made Jesus very *real*. How is "real" defined here? Does not "real" here mean like us, understandable, convincing to a child, who even at five, in our world, is already seeing life with the vision and premises of the scientists?

But Jesus is also shown as one whose birth was announced by angels. At his birth he was called "King of God's people," and the shepherds were told, "God has sent Baby Jesus to be your Savior and Friend." When Jesus is grown up, he is depicted as one who could, by putting out his hand, cure the lepers that no doctor could cure. This is the real Jesus of orthodox theology, where "real" is defined, not in terms of the scientific vision, but in terms of the orthodox Christian vision. In this vision there is a higher reality that makes possible miracles as real events, and angels as real persons.

A good example of these two mutually exclusive definitions of the real can be found in *A Star Shone*. One story tells how the angels appeared to the shepherds and told them where to go and find the baby. The shepherds decided to go, but, the book explains, one shepherd probably stayed to take care of the sheep. Thinking, no doubt, of her modern four- and five-year-old readers, the author has added this touch of "realism," lest the children worry about what happened to the sheep who were left behind. But surely, if these realistic children, realistic by our first definition of real, are worried about who took care of the sheep, they are also very much mystified by the angels. Yet no attempt is made to make

the angels realistic and acceptable. In a world in which God sends angels, surely he provides for the sheep. In which of these worlds do we want Jesus to appear as a real person?

Another example of the confusion that results from the interchange of two standards of the real and important can be suggested. One point of emphasis in *God's World and Johnny* is that the patterns and laws that are found in nature are part of God's plan, they awaken in the child a sense of wonder and religious awe. On this level, the true miracle is the miracle of an orderly universe, and miracles so defined are a part of the real world of nature. But in the books about Jesus, "miracle" is defined in terms of the supernatural, that which is above and contrary to nature. Instead of sensing the miraculous in every birth, the child is encouraged to sense the miraculous in one particular birth. It would seem to me that a choice must be made here. What are the religious values to which we wish to expose the children, those of the natural world, our "real" world, or those of a supernatural world, a world that has for some people a reality that far surpasses the other?

According to neo-orthodoxy when Jesus, in the moments of clearest revelation, made his true nature known to his contemporaries, he awed them, brought them to their knees, and caused them to declare themselves sinners. His miracles helped to heighten this sense of the awful and the supernatural. Neo-orthodoxy on the adult level repudiates the picture of Jesus that shows him as one we should try to be like, a good man whom we may emulate. Jesus is not the great example, but he who convicts us of our own sin, and who, because of our repentance, brings us our salvation. Can this Jesus be made known to little children? It would seem that the curriculum is attempting to present this Jesus along with another Jesus who is psychologically more acceptable. This may seem to fit the demands of the ancient creeds, and speak to the condition of the more sophisticated religious intellectuals, but can it cause anything but confusion in the kindergarten?

#### IV

It is relevant to point out here that it is not only the denominations influenced by neo-orthodoxy that are involved in many of these problems. The Methodists, for instance, who when they are not liberal tend to be conservative rather than neo-orthodox, use a manual in their nursery classes entitled *Religious Nurture in Nursery Class and Home*. This manual contains excellent progressive nursery-school techniques. The author's premises clearly repudiate any suggestion that the nursery-school



child is a sinner. She has a deep faith in the "growth process." Use of biblical material is recommended for a later age. How can conservatives reconcile this beginning for the religious life with the later emphasis on conversion?

Many liberal religious educators, in the evangelical denominations, have watched uneasily as the Bible has disappeared from the nursery and kindergarten curricula and retreated to a decorative but practically functionless place on the table in the "worship center." By many of them, the Presbyterian New Curriculum has been greeted with enthusiasm because of the claim that it restores biblical material to its proper place in the curriculum, while at the same time incorporating the best of the most recent scientific findings. By embracing such an alliance, it seems to me evident that religious educators are not aware of the seriousness of the choice that the new science of man has forced upon us.

By means of dialectical thinking neo-orthodoxy resolves contradictions of many kinds. Here, however, is a conflict that defies this sophisticated method of dispensing with contradiction. On the level of action it is impossible to handle a four-year-old as both a sinner and not a sinner. It is impossible to minimize feelings of guilt and at the same time to lay the foundation for a deep need for repentance. It is impossible to present Jesus as one bound, in his own growth, by the developmental process, and at the same time to present him as a supernatural Savior.

Are we not confronted by an Either-Or? Is not a decision needed?

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**EDITORIAL NOTE:** Feeling that the above article would lend itself to discussion and comment from different points of view, we have secured "replies" from three specialists in this or related fields, which appear on the following pages.

## From Dr. Brightman

The question before the house does not concern the popularity or the teachability of neo-orthodoxy. The real question is whether it is Christian truth. To deny that it is Christian truth is not to assert that the neo-orthodox are unchristian. It is to assert difference of opinion on a fundamental issue.

Before developing this difference it would be well to state that on which all Christians agree. To be a Christian of any sort is to love and follow Jesus, and to find in him the basic inspiration of religious life. This does not, for all, mean an acceptance of the literal truth of every record about Jesus. It means devotion to him and his basic teachings. The basic Either-Or is this: Do I love and accept Jesus? Here Roman Catholics, neo-orthodox, and liberals would all answer: Yes, I do.

There are, however, important differences among Christians. What are those differences? In listing them, I shall stress those between the neo-orthodox and the liberal Christian.

1. What is the most fundamental issue for the Christian? The liberal answer is: The existence and nature of God as Eternal Person, as loving heavenly Father, both reasonable and righteous. For the neo-orthodox, the basic issue is sin. The loving Father almost vanishes in favor of the Judge who condemns infants for their hereditary sin until they acknowledge Jesus. But the great question for the modern naturalistic world is whether God exists at all. The God of the neo-orthodox has revealed himself, and proud man sins if he doubts. The liberal believes that by sincere inquiry we may find reasonable grounds for belief.

2. What is the nature of sin? Fundamentally, for the neo-orthodox, it is something inherited, for which "Adam" (a myth, to be sure, although a reality of human experience) was originally responsible. For the liberal Christian, heredity provides both obstacles and incentives; but the obstacles cannot be called sin. The liberal agrees with the writer of James that "to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." It is unfortunate that anything hereditary has ever been called sin, whether by Paul or by Barth. In any case, hereditary "sin" is a very different thing from actual sin, which is a conscious choice of what one knows to be wrong. To ascribe to a newborn infant any actual sin is contrary to the facts of psychology and the principles of ethics. To call "original sin" sinful tends to weaken the sense of responsibility while strengthening the sense of guilt. "Little Davie" is not sinful, but needs guidance. The liberal

regards "original sin" as a misfortune, not a moral fault. The problem for liberal religious educators is to distinguish between hereditary tendencies and actual sin. Confusion between these two is the source of Mrs. Hunter's problem. Is a child born blind a sinner? Jesus thought not.

3. What is normative in the Bible? The neo-orthodox, as presented in Mrs. Hunter's article, would answer: Everything, including all angels and miracles—although many neo-orthodox are more discriminating. Liberals would answer: The basic teachings of Jesus. The neo-orthodox find more in Paul than in Jesus. They evade Jesus' advice to see God in nature ("consider the lilies"), the nature psalms, and Paul's plain teaching in Romans 1:19-20: "for the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." The neo-orthodox pick and choose as much as the liberals do! Liberalism at this point can lay claim to being more broadly biblical as well as more scientific and philosophical, in its emphasis on God's immanence in nature. Liberalism freely grants God's transcendence, too, but not at the expense of his immanence or at the cost of denying the observed scientific facts.

4. Is Christianity paradoxical? The neo-orthodox will answer: Yea, verily. The liberal will answer: Never, if paradox means that facts must be denied or contradictions believed by a Christian. The liberal, with his confidence in a reasonable God, while granting that truth is many-sided, will never grant that truth is self-contradictory.

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## From Dr. Haroutunian

Must we choose?

Mrs. Hunter's article poses a question which is at once difficult and serious: Is it possible to combine naturalism and Christianity in our attitude toward children? By naturalism, in this connection, she understands the doctrine that "negativism" in children is "a healthy, necessary step in the development of a self . . . ." By Christianity, also in this connection, she understands the doctrine that negativism is "rebellion, temper, stubbornness, or even sin . . . ." Her answer to the above question is that it is not possible to combine these two contradictory points of view. For her part, she chooses naturalism on the very good ground that it has given us much new and valuable insight into the behavior of children.

"Neo-orthodox" though I am supposed to be, I agree with the positive element in Mrs. Hunter's attitude. I for one do not think my children are "bad" every time they "try my soul." They are negative especially when they are tired, or hungry, or sick. Besides, I realize that much of their negativism, which seems to be a rather mild way of putting it, is their way of learning to act as persons. I am willing to admit that I myself am sometimes provoked at them because I also feel tired, or hungry, or at odds with the world. I wish it were clear to me that I too were undergoing a healthy and necessary process of growth. This would make it much easier to accept my own negativism.

I am not prepared to attribute my own failures to act with proper understanding and justice to my "nature." When I envy or belittle, when I resent criticism, or wish someone evil, or insist on having my way, I am not able to view such and similar goings on within me from a naturalistic point of view, that is, as healthy and necessary expressions of my nature. I know very well that there are "reasons" for my negativities, but I also know that they do not emerge from my nature as heat from fire. I am not sure that I have a "free will"; I am not even able to think it. Nevertheless, I am a person, and free in that I am responsible, for instance, not to misunderstand Mrs. Hunter. Were I to do it, as doubtless I am doing it, no healthy necessity would leave me without blame in the matter.

The fact is that we are ambiguous creatures. We can and cannot objectify ourselves to ourselves. We distinguish between right and wrong as inevitably as we do between truth and error. We feel guilty as readily as we feel foolish. We do not always feel guilty where we should, as we

do not always feel foolish properly. But a man who does not feel guilty when he has violated a fellow man is not an innocent child of nature. He is a monster. And a man who does not feel foolish is a fool nevertheless; the more so for not feeling his folly. We do act according to our nature, but we are not therefore guiltless. This situation is embarrassing to the naturalist, but it is real. And what is real must be thought out and not denied at one's intellectual convenience.

I do not know when children begin to share this ambiguity. But they do share it. It is a subtle business to know how to combine science and ethics in dealing with them. But we must do it. I for one would not insult and injure my children by assuming that they are not persons and will never become persons.

As to just what a child should be presented with at a given age, I am not certain. I rather agree that Christianity is too much for my children. But it seems to be too much also for some who are presumably grown up. Perhaps a four-year-old should not be considered as one who sins. But it does not follow that the same is true of the fourteen-year-old, or of the forty-year-old. "The principle of continuity" should not make us blind to the differences between a child and a mature person. That kind of thing is not "scientific."

The more I understand Jesus and myself, the less I find it "psychologically acceptable" that he is our example. I think it does take conversion, lifelong conversion, to have the "mind of Christ." But let that pass.

It is extremely easy for the neo-orthodox who are trying to be scientific to be only confused. I hope they will take Mrs. Hunter's strictures to heart. It is no joke to combine science and faith. But for a Christian it is no solution of the difficulty to sacrifice the one for the other. I find choosing no substitute for thinking, not even for the sake of being "scientific."

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### From Dr. Sherrill

Edith Hunter's article is to be heartily welcomed because of the issues raised, the insight with which they are treated, and the spirit in which the article is written. "Neo-orthodoxy" has exerted profound influence upon modern religious thought, and Mrs. Hunter seems to me quite correct in implying that the issues it raises are to be seen in some of their sharpest forms when it comes to dealing with young children in home and church. I offer the following observations in the hope that they will be found relevant to the major points in the article.

Perhaps it is well to recognize at the outset that certain philosophies of life are so profoundly different that no compromise between them can be satisfactory, and in any amalgamation which is attempted the seams will show. Neo-orthodoxy and naturalism can be taken as examples of two such extremes.

"Scientific method" is not necessarily to be equated with a philosophy of life, although John Dewey virtually does so in his *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, and perhaps Mrs. Hunter is favorably attracted to a similar point of view. But it is better to regard scientific method as a way of arriving at *knowledge of facts*. The interpretation of the meaning of these facts is a philosophy, and that philosophy may be, let us say, either naturalistic or neo-orthodox.

Naturalism leans heavily on scientific method, and feels very awkward in the presence of any problem or fact which does not lend itself readily to scientific method as a means of arriving at an understanding of the data. Neo-orthodoxy relies principally on revelation, and while not disavowing scientific method seems to be about as awkward in using it as naturalism is in dealing with the "more."

The problems and dilemmas found as a consequence are especially acute in such areas as human nature, human will, human conflict (strife, hostility, etc.), and the nature of Jesus Christ. Mrs. Hunter has unerringly put her finger on such areas as scenes of conflict between neo-orthodoxy and naturalism.

What then? First of all, it might be well to face the possibility that no one curriculum series, as a whole or in its particular units, can satisfy both neo-orthodoxy and naturalism. That is to say, we must be prepared to see widely different philosophies of life interpreted to the young with exactly the same attitude which we take upon discovering that equally profound differences exist between the philosophies of life set forth, say, in

preaching to the mature. In other words, we have no more ground to look for one religious curriculum which is universally acceptable than to look for one theology which will satisfy all people.

Second, it seems to me incumbent on the neo-orthodox to correct the understanding of revelation, as far as human nature is concerned, by scientific method and its findings in the same realm. Mrs. Hunter is probably quite correct in urging that this need shows up in glaring form in some of the newer curriculum materials. My colleague, Professor David Roberts, has shown in his recent book, *Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man*, that the same need exists with equal urgency in the field of theology and pastoral care. Until this corrective is applied, we must expect to see exactly the kind of seams, in theology, in Christian education, and in pastoral counseling, which Mrs. Hunter has called to attention.

Third, it is fair to ask whether naturalism is not equally vulnerable in that on the basis of scientific method it (1) constructs a philosophy which it confuses with scientific method, and (2) is then unable to admit that its philosophy is bankrupt in the face of the world which confronts us today.

Fourth, few care to be called either neo-orthodox or naturalistic; but a great many feel the tension between the points of view represented by these two extremes. It begins to look as if this tension might be resolved by a more adequate concept of, and a more profound experience of, the church. I am ready to believe that this is the direction in which to seek the next great development in Christian education. It may well be slow, for we who work in Christian education will, in that event, be the first who have to relearn. However, all that is much too large a subject for the present context.

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## "The Lord Is the Spirit"

MONTGOMERY J. SHROYER

THE FAMILIAR WORDS OF ST. PAUL, "The Lord is the Spirit," are set like a jewel in the biblical doctrine of the Holy Spirit. They are not the first statement, neither are they the last. They are found in the midst of a development of doctrine. If they are a vast improvement over the Old Testament incidents of occasional appearance of the Spirit in power, as when Samson inspired slew a thousand Philistines, they are still far short of the later New Testament and Christian church development. Early Christian art gives us a church window creed which is painstakingly and exactly worked out. On a shield the propositions are set forth: *Deus est Pater, Deus est Filius, Deus est Spiritus. Pater non est Filius, Filius non est Spiritus, Spiritus non est Pater.* And that just about sums up and differentiates the persons of the Trinity.

We shall always have with us those who object to the use of the word "development" in this connection. They say that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, like all biblical doctrine, is one and the same wherever you find it. A great deal of assurance has been given this company in recent years by the renewed emphasis on the Bible as a whole. We have been warned against a piecemeal study of Scriptures, and we have been called to consider the great truth of God's revelation which is found in Hebrew and Christian Scriptures alike. Nevertheless, when we consider a particular doctrine like that of the Trinity, we had just as well be prepared for some development and changing emphasis.

### I. THE OLD TESTAMENT

There is a Spirit of God at work in the Old Testament, and one needs only to look into a concordance for the passages on "Spirit." Luke must have got his formula, "full of the Holy Spirit," from the Old Testament. The Spirit was in Joshua (Nu. 27:18) just as much later in Peter, Stephen, Barnabas, and Paul. Pharaoh commended Joseph as one "in whom the Spirit of God is" (Gen. 41:38). The Spirit came upon men and gave them

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unusual abilities. Thus Bezaleel became a skilled craftsman by the power of the Spirit and he turned out artistic metal work for use in the tabernacle (Ex. 31:3). The coming of the Spirit on Israel would help in the transformation of the wilderness (Isa. 32:15). The Spirit gave David the pattern for the temple, which he in turn handed over to Solomon for the actual construction (I Chron. 28:12).

The Spirit of God was responsible for the breaking out of prophecy. Even Balaam delivered a prophetic parable favorable to Israel when the Spirit came upon him (Nu. 24:2). How in the world Balaam slipped so low in the esteem of later writers, becoming so terrible in the Book of Revelation, is a first-rate problem. The Spirit came upon the seventy elders and they prophesied, then on two outside the seventy, Eldad and Medad, and they prophesied also (Nu. 11:25, 26). Joshua thought this was carrying it too far, and he wanted to stop them, but Moses rebuked him and wished that all might prophesy. The Spirit came upon Zechariah the son of Jehoiada the priest (II Chron. 24:20), and this priestly son delivered a prophetic judgment against the sins of the people, which resulted in his stoning, just as if he were an ordinary prophet! Let the priest be careful how he comes under the spell of the Spirit of God!

The Spirit of God in the Old Testament is the creative power. The Spirit brooded upon the face of the waters and creation began (Gen. 1:2). God sent forth his Spirit and all the creatures of the earth were created (Ps. 104:30). The Spirit of God decorated the heavens (Job 26:13). Job also says, "The Spirit of God is in my nostrils," quite likely a reference to the Genesis story of creation in chapter two. Job uses two terms in a beautiful poetic parallel: "The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty giveth me life" (Job 33:4).

From these scattered references in the Old Testament it hardly seems necessary to say that it takes considerable straining to find the Christian trinitarian doctrine. Was it the third Person of the Trinity at work when Samson slew the Philistines? Was it the third Person who helped Bezaleel with the molten metal fixtures in the tabernacle? And could Job possibly have the third Person of the Trinity in mind when he speaks of the Spirit of God in his nostrils?

A recent London publication, George A. F. Knight's *From Moses to Paul*, undertakes to call us back to a rather simple understanding of God in the Old Testament, free from the entanglements of late Christian speculations on the Trinity. What did the Hebrews themselves think about God? There was a very close connection with their thinking about



themselves. They knew human personality, that it was tied up with flesh, or body, and that there was also the element of spirit. The human personality was not anchored to a spot simply because it had body. Man could exert quite an influence on other people without physical contacts at all. He could develop a "community spirit" of either good character or bad. Man could project his thought and live in a world far off from that in which his body moved. Man could dream and have visions, go out on excursions and not take his body with him at all.

So, says Knight, the early Hebrew began to speculate about the nature of God and concluded that God was very much like man, that God had a *nephesh*, or personality, which he could project. God, living in the heavens, could come into the realm of men on earth. There was no need at all to say that one God stayed in the heavens and another came to earth. Please, let's keep to our monotheism! This projection of the divine personality we may call God's word, God's mind, God's thought, even God's angel. The most familiar term is God's Spirit. And that Spirit appears in the mighty works of man, in the ecstatic utterances of the prophet, in the keen discernment which men show when they are mightily used of God.

And it is not strange that these Hebrew thinkers should give God a body. Why not, since they themselves felt a body to be so essential? Of course, it was not just like man's body, but sometimes too much like it for the comfort of the modern thinker who is very much given to developments of Greek thought. They spoke of the hands and feet of God, they saw him walking in the garden, doing things with his hands, and they heard his voice. This anthropomorphism makes us very uncomfortable at times. But it never ceases, and when the Old Testament quits, the poet takes it up. The poet never hesitates to say something like this:

I saw God walking abroad in my garden,  
With careful step lest he tread upon the tender growing things;  
He stooped and touched my iris and my rose,  
And lo, the beauty of the rainbow and the setting sun.

And was it not a Methodist, a poet sober and in his right mind, who solemnly declared that he saw God putting the world into the bathtub last night? Well, it has been going on a long time, and God has learned to love these children who talk about his hands and feet. Let him who is without sin first cast a stone at these users of symbols, for who is sufficient to the attainment of naked truth? So God has a body, even though it must be described as a body of glory, of light, of trailing clouds, of smoke in the temple. God is a Person, and not so hard to understand. Let

the philosophers and theologians bring in a stack of books from the Greek libraries to prove that it is belittling to God to speak of him in terms of personality. The Old Testament writer will merely remark, "As I was saying before, God has personality just like the rest of us, and he can extend that personality into our world."

## II. THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

One of the great contributions in this field is that of Hans Windisch, published as a monograph in the book edited by Case, *Studies in Early Christianity*. The title of the article is "Jesus und der Geist nach Synoptischer Überlieferung." Windisch belongs to that company of scholars who doggedly and persistently dig into the facts of the New Testament. He offers in this article a mild criticism of B. W. Bacon, and the interesting thing is that the volume containing his article was published as a recognition of the two great Yale scholars, Porter and Bacon. Bacon had said that "the article of the Holy Spirit is the really distinctive and therefore the capital article of the Christian creed. From the very start Christianity was 'a religion of the Spirit.'" To which Windisch replies, "That is true, if by Christianity you mean apostolic, and particularly, Pauline Christianity." But he contends that it is less true of Luke, much less of John and the Epistle of James, and as for the Synoptics Matthew and Mark, the treatment of the subject is really scant.

Windisch speculates on the reason for this scantiness of reference to the Holy Spirit in the Synoptic Gospels. He finds some four or five references each in Mark and Matthew, and about a dozen in Luke, the Gospel which seems to be veering off in the direction of Hellenism and the doctrine of the apostolic church. His conclusion is that at a very early date in the Synoptic tradition there was more emphasis on Spirit manifestations, but that they were removed, then some of them reintroduced with apostolic emphasis. Another view is set forth in that excellent work of Barrett, *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition*. Barrett thinks there was never much interest in the Spirit shown by the Synoptic writers. They were all too much concerned with Jesus. Since he appeared to them as the Messiah, the one who had come to usher in the Kingdom, he was sufficient in himself. Jesus was silent as to his own relation to the Spirit. Just as he refrained from open statements about his Messiahship, so he kept silent about pneumatic powers, for that would have been equivalent to announcement of Messiahship.

These references to the Spirit in the Synoptic Gospels are not only



few in number, but they are lacking in Christian dogmatic significance. The Gospels belong to the Palestinian tradition, and the Old Testament is the foundation. What we have said previously about the Spirit of God as extension of the divine Personality can be said again in the Gospels. The trinitarian distinctions will not be found unless one looks hard for them. Of course, if one has the answer before he starts to read, he will find everything he wants right in the Synoptics. But Barrett is sound in his statement that *τὸ πνεῦμα* in the Gospels is used for "an impersonal, divine force, not a divine being."

In the account of the virgin birth, Barrett sees the typical Gospel idea of the "impersonal, divine force" called the Holy Spirit. There may be no exact parallels, and Barrett searches the Old Testament stories of the births of Isaac, Samson, Samuel, and the child to be born to the "young woman" of Isaiah 7, as well as the near approaches to virgin birth which are found in Philo. But even so, Matthew and Luke have only an Old Testament idea of the power of God which overshadowed Mary and made her conceive. Quite obviously, we cannot make the Spirit personal in this situation. Matthew and Luke would never have done that, for it would take them out of the realm of Judaism over into the pagan, where conceptions were known because a male god consorted with a woman of the earth. No, the virgin birth account, as far as Spirit influence is concerned, is typically Old Testament.

The words of John the Baptist relative to baptism and the coming of the Messiah suggest the possibility of later church interpretation to make the Spirit prominent in baptism. John invited sinners to repent and come to the Jordan for baptism in water. There is very good reason to believe, according to Windisch and others, that the original message was a dire warning, appropriate to the eschatological theme. Sinners could take their choice—repent and be baptized in water, or risk the baptism of fire in the Messianic day. Not the inspirational tongues of fire as at Pentecost, but the consuming fire which burns up the chaff from the threshing floor!

The three accounts of the temptation of Jesus also illustrate the primitive state of doctrine of the Spirit in the Synoptics. Mark has a blunt statement that the Spirit "drove" Jesus into the wilderness where he was tempted by Satan. It seems that Matthew must have tried to improve on this rough wording; he has Jesus being "led" by the Spirit into the wilderness. There is a difference between being driven and being led, and Matthew thought he had improved the text. Then came Luke, who did not exactly like the wording of either Matthew or Mark. And, by the way,

the King James translators did not know just what to do with Mark. They were certain it was the Spirit which descended like a dove on Jesus at the baptism, and they spelled the word with a capital letter. But they hesitated in the temptation scene, they just couldn't see the same Holy Spirit driving Jesus into the temptation. So they translated τὸ πνεῦμα, the same Greek word, as "spirit," using a small letter, and they did not commit themselves as to which spirit it was.

In the King James there is the interesting statement in Luke that the "Holy Ghost" descended on Jesus at the baptism, that he was "full of the Holy Ghost." But he was led by the "Holy Spirit" into the wilderness. There is a question of translation here. The Greek *ἐν* with dative case can be means or instrument, and the word "led" might call for a leader. But I see no real reason for not saying "he was led in the Spirit in the wilderness," just as a little later Luke says Jesus went "in the power of the Spirit" into Galilee to preach. Jesus was fortified by the Spirit in the place of temptation, and I see no attempt on Luke's part to make the Spirit responsible for getting him into the wilderness. And again this is just very simple Old Testament doctrine of God's extension of his personality to one who is in distress.

Other passages are pointed out by both Windisch and Barrett to show the possibility that the Spirit has been introduced at a later date. Jesus is said by Matthew to cast out demons by the Spirit of God, but Luke says "finger of God," and there is a possibility that the anthropomorphic form is the original. And then we have the warning on blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, with suggestions by Windisch, quoting Leisegang, that the original was not τὸ πνεῦμα but τὸ ὄνομα, not "Spirit" but "Name." This is again the common idea of the Old Testament, that one must not blaspheme the Name of God, and stoning is the penalty (Lev. 24:15, 16). All other sins sink into insignificance beside this one, for the Name of God is the same as his very character, his essential being. Jesus was merely saying that he as Son of Man could put up with any indignity, but the blasphemy of the Name of God is beyond forgiveness. Certainly he was speaking as a Jew of his day, not as a trinitarian dogmatist of the fourth century.

We find, then, very few references to the Spirit in the Synoptics, and the ones which we do find are more in keeping with the Old Testament, or else they are importations from the pneumatic ideas of the later church. The essential Christian idea, that the Spirit comes into the world because of Jesus, is very little stressed. Jesus appears in the prophetic order

and the Spirit of God is upon him. And like the best of the prophets, he did not make many claims about his calling. He was not the one, like a member of some modern "spirit" cult, to be forever saying, "Look at me, I am full of the Spirit of God." Certainly we have very little in the Synoptics even to suggest a "third person of the Trinity." We have the simple belief that the personality of God is projected into man's world in a most acute form, that it is the eschatological age, and the Spirit of God is abroad in the land.

### III. ACTS AND JOHN

A very brief notice of the Book of Acts shows multiplication of references to the Holy Spirit. I counted in short order forty-six references, and I thought for a while the book was going to average two to a chapter, but Luke began to let me down badly in his latter chapters. I was particularly interested in the speeches which Luke allows to Peter and Paul. Peter is permitted to speak of the Holy Spirit in every speech except one, that one delivered at Solomon's porch (Acts 3:11ff). In remarkable contrast, Luke lets Paul speak of the Holy Spirit in only two addresses out of nine, to the Ephesian elders and in the short remarks in Rome to those who came to him in his own hired house. Perhaps Luke thought Paul did not have the proper audience on most occasions. What would the Gentiles, hardened Jews, such Romans as Felix, and renegades like Agrippa know about the Holy Spirit?

But multiplicity of references does not mean highly developed doctrine. We have the advanced belief that the Spirit came into the world in some connection with Jesus crucified and risen. The Day of Pentecost was the cumulative effect of Christ's living, dying, and rising. But for the most part, we have no functions of the Spirit much in advance of the Old Testament. Luke tells us of a great company of good men who were "full of the Holy Spirit." The Spirit of God moved these men to prophecy, exactly as in the Old Testament. Peter went to Cornelius on a rather prophetic mission because the Spirit sent him. Agabus prophesied "in the Spirit" on two occasions. Even the Day of Pentecost revealed nothing new about the work of the Spirit, for the very essence of Peter's speech is that things were working out just as an Old Testament prophet, Joel, said they would. We are not even clear that a new Christian formula has been established for the relation of baptism to the coming of the Spirit. In one instance (10:47), the Spirit comes first, then Peter argues that since they have the Spirit, there is no reason why they should not be baptized.

In another case (19:5, 6), we are told that they were baptized first, then Paul laid hands on them and they received the Holy Spirit. It seems that the Spirit had no set rules of appearance, and it would not be fitting for the church to lay down the rules too dogmatically.

Still we have not reached the Pauline jewel of doctrine of the Spirit. We must look further at some of the setting, this time the contribution of John in the Fourth Gospel. Windisch does not see a great deal of Spirit manifestation in this Gospel, nor in the Johannine Epistles. It is true that there is a Johannine mysticism very much like that of Paul, in which Christ himself is the central reality. It is found in the discourse on the Vine and the Branches. We must abide in Christ the Vine, or lose our life and its fruitfulness. This falls far short of the splendid mystery of Ephesians, where the "abiding" is much more fully expressed. There we begin with God whose πλήρωμα, or fullness, is found in Christ who in turn imparts it to his Body, the Church, and in the Church every believer may partake of that transmitted πλήρωμα. The same mystery in John's allegory would call for God to play more than the part of a mere husbandman. Perhaps God should be the root in which Christ abides as the vine, and from which he draws the divine life.

But, even so, John has made a great step forward in the doctrine of the Spirit. He has a carefully worked out economy which is at the very foundation of our trinitarian distinctions. First, of course, there was God. The Logos was with God, but it was in history that the Logos became active, not in the vague eternity. The Logos created the world, all things were made by him. Then in time it became necessary for God to send the Logos into the world to save a very important part of the creation from ruin, the world of mankind. The Logos came, became flesh, and dwelt among us. But it could not be forever. Jesus, the Logos in the flesh, had to explain to his earthly followers the necessity of going away, going back to the Father. He had to tell them the plan of the Father, and it was a clearly worked out plan. With the departure of Christ from the earth, God would send "another Comforter," the παράκλητος, perhaps better translated as "Counselor" or "Helper." And thus the going away of Jesus would be to the advantage of all believers, for Jesus said plainly that if he did not go away, the Counselor would not come. A great new day was opening up. The limitations so evident in the process of instruction would be removed. The disciples had been slow of heart to learn and to believe. Under the instruction of the Spirit their eyes would be opened, the Spirit would guide them into all truth.

John did much to establish a sort of dispensationalism in our trinitarian doctrine. He gave us the age of God, the age of Christ, and the age of the Spirit. He opened the way for later Christians to choose one Person or other of the Trinity for special devotion. Human nature being what it is, if values are set before us that have the appearance of separateness, we are going to use the selective process. There are those, and not all of them Jews, who feel that we ought to adhere to the primitive faith, give our whole devotion to the One God who was before the mountains and hills were brought forth, and is from everlasting to everlasting. Others are enraptured over the Incarnation, or without going too deeply into that doctrine, are carried away with the attractiveness of the Man of Galilee. They can sing with their own understanding, "Thou, O Christ, art all I want." These devoted souls are irked sometimes over sermons which give too much attention to God. They say that is Old Testament religion. They have departed from the all-terrible God who once slaughtered whole tribes to punish a single sinner, and they are carried away in their devotion to the Jesus of the Gospels. Still others have caught the meaning of John, that the age of the Spirit is a vast improvement. So they have dismissed both the unethic God and the too-ethic Jesus and have entered into the new religion of mystery, the religion of the Spirit.

#### IV. ST. PAUL

At long last we come to St. Paul's doctrine of the Spirit, the jewel set so attractively that we can hardly take our eyes from the setting. If we look into the letters of Paul we can discover conceptions of the working of the Spirit which sound very much like the Old Testament. This ought not to surprise us, or if it does, we need to be reminded again that these New Testament writers were ever so much closer to the Old Testament than we are, and they drew on it without the least hesitation. Paul speaks of his ministry among the Gentiles, how the power of the Spirit was seen in signs and wonders, how the Gentiles were won to obedience (Rom. 15: 18-20). The gospel came in the power of the Holy Spirit (I Thess. 1:5). Paul expresses the very familiar idea that it is the Spirit which gives life (Rom. 8:6; 7:6; II Cor. 3:6). We are reminded at once of the Genesis passages on creation, and the famous chapter of Ezekiel in which the Spirit moves over the valley of dry bones and Israel is made to live again. We are told that the Spirit helps us to pray when we do not know how to formulate our prayers (Rom. 8:26). Here the Spirit is doing almost what it did for the prophet, the Spirit gives words to the man of God.



But there is a surprise in Paul's letters. The passages are not abundant in which Paul expresses his doctrine of the Spirit. That comes as a shock after we have heard Hans Windisch say that the doctrine of the Spirit is scarce in the Synoptics, but abundant in Paul. Take a great letter, that to the Romans. If it were not for the eighth chapter, I doubt whether anyone would comment on the doctrine in that letter. The same is true of the companion writing, the letter to the Galatians, where the Spirit hardly appears until the fifth chapter in which Paul is discussing the fruit of the Spirit. There are one or two references in Philippians, and one of them significantly is to "the Spirit of Jesus Christ." The Spirit is scarcely mentioned in Colossians. There are some distinctive references in the Pastorals, if we could be sure they are Pauline, and if we could with confidence add Ephesians to the body of Pauline writings, we should discover a gold mine indeed.

But the passages which are found in Paul are very significant and show his unique contribution. Some have referred to the "ethicizing of the doctrine" by Paul. The doctrine of the Spirit does not appear in the section of Romans dealing with justification, but in the section on moral renewal. That is decidedly the work of the Spirit. Being reconciled by the death of Christ, "much more" we are to be regenerated by the "life of Christ," that is, by the power of the indwelling, living Lord. The fruit of the Spirit is ethical—love, joy, peace, patience, and all the other good qualities. We have passed from the old realm of the sensational visitation of the Spirit, even though some of the saints at Corinth were not aware of it and were still coveting the fantastic work of the Spirit. No more taking up of serpents just to see if the Spirit is with us. No more speaking in tongues as the chief evidence of the presence of the Spirit. No more slaughtering of Philistines with the jaw-bones of asses. No, the Spirit must get within us as a power of moral renewal.

Paul also sees the work of the Spirit in the making of a community. Davies in his excellent book, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, observes that this is also a well-known working of the Spirit in the Old Testament. Joel looks to the coming of the Spirit on all flesh, and a great community outbreak. Ezekiel sees the Spirit at work in the reviving of dead Israel. Paul exhorts the church at Corinth to the unity of the Spirit. There is one Lord, one Spirit, and the diversity of the church can be brought into a state of unity if the Spirit be present.

But the real contribution of Paul is the identification of the Spirit with Jesus the Risen Lord. Sometimes he refers to the Holy Spirit as

"the Spirit of God," but almost in the same verse he can say "Spirit of Christ." He also uses the terms, "Spirit of his Son," "Spirit of Jesus Christ," and most striking of all, he says "Now the Lord is the Spirit" (II Cor. 3:17). If we could show that Paul means the God of the Old Testament when he says "Lord," we might have only a primitive Hebrew doctrine of Spirit. But there is no doubt about his meaning. The word Lord is his most characteristic title for Christ, and we are in the midst of a development of Christian doctrine.

It is a bold venture indeed for Paul to make such a statement. He could not have had the interests of future creed-makers at heart, and he was not very diplomatic among his fellow Jews. Look at our church window again: *Pater non est Filius, Filius non est Spiritus, Spiritus non est Pater*. But Paul can say without a blush: ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν, "the Lord (Christ, the Son) is the Spirit." He is most explicit. John left us somewhat in doubt by the omission of the definite article, so that we still debate whether he said "God is Spirit," or "God is a spirit." But Paul uses the definite article, and there is little doubt as to what he meant. We should be used to these bold ventures of Paul by this time. Remember what the Colossians pushed him into. They flaunted their wild astrological cult before him. He was exasperated more over the spirits that rule stars and planets than when he saw the city of Athens full of idols. He swept the astrological cobwebs from the heavens. He declared that Christ was creator and Lord of even the stars, and if there were any spirits in the stars, they would have to bow down and call him Lord of all. So we have the most highly developed Christology of the New Testament. Paul did not take the theologians into his confidence at all, and he certainly did not consider the feelings of his fellow Jews. It sounds like simon-pure Hellenism, with Christ coming between God and the world in the act of creation.

Perhaps Paul was driven to his untheological identification of the Spirit with Christ by some of the wild spirit cults of his time. Remember what he went through with in Corinth over the cult of tongues. But I rather think Paul was just trying to bring together two most sensational developments of his time. Within his own experience he had seen the mighty working of God which had well-nigh turned the world upside down. It did turn Paul upside down. He did not need to refer to the Day of Pentecost, which was before his identification with the new movement. Strange things had taken place in his own conversion. He was "shut up" to the gospel, and he witnessed the mighty working of God all the way

from Damascus to Rome. He had the profound conviction that the present evil age was hastening to a close.

The other event which was associated with this outpouring of God's mighty power was the death and resurrection of Christ. The two events tended to merge in Paul's thinking. He spoke of his own lateness in coming into the apostolic fellowship. He missed what the disciples had seen of the earthly life of Jesus. When Christ did come to him it was in mighty power. He never doubted that it was the Lord. He must have had contact with those who were witnesses of the earthly life of Jesus. The same Jesus who had impressed them had now returned in the Spirit form, and had made himself known to Paul.

In all of this we see Paul's view of the resurrection. There is no reason to think that he viewed the resurrection of Christ as wholly unlike that of the saints. The body of flesh must be laid down, then appears the spiritual body which is fitted for eternity. Paul is quite certain that Jesus in the form of man gave up his body when he was exalted on high. There's no use looking around in the garden, examining the tomb, asking what became of the body of Jesus. Paul is just silent, but we can imagine what he meant. It is most significant that he records the first appearance as being made to Peter, not to the women, and it is most likely not in the vicinity of the tomb at all. Paul never attempts to tell us about the appearance of the risen Lord with an earthly body. We wonder what he would have said about Luke's Gospel had he been able to see it. His good friend Luke had made statements that Paul never ventured to make, about the hands and feet, bones and flesh of Jesus in his appearance to the disciples. These are the very materials which Paul said should never enter the Kingdom of God. But Christ is risen, he is the life-giving Spirit, and in that form he can enter into any who are spiritual, and they can abide in him. In Christ the great purpose of God is being worked out, in him is the fulfillment of all the ages. This is the essence of bold, Christian thinking. Paul will make Christ the center of all God's work in the world.

The identification of the Spirit with Christ is a most refreshing sign. It shows that Paul has a definite connection with the historic Jesus. He has been accused too often of setting up a new religion, one that has nothing in common with the Synoptic Gospels. To some schools of thought, that is all to the good, for they are fearful of the Christianity which rests too much on the Sermon on the Mount. There is a feeling in some quarters that the center of New Testament religion is in the letter to the Ephesians, where we find a most mystical presentation. Another school sees danger



in the abandonment of the Jesus of the Gospels. E. F. Scott has written a very helpful book, *The Purpose of the Gospels*. He tries to answer the question why the Gospels with their historic emphasis should follow such high theological developments as are found in Paul's letters, especially such a Christology as that of Colossians. Scott concludes that there was a feeling of real need, that the Gospel writers sensed what might take place if the mystical and the theological interests took over completely. It should not be forgotten that essential to the Christian faith was the fact that God had manifested himself on earth in a person. We ought to keep our feet on the ground, and not fly off into mystical space.

We discover, then, that Paul is in line with this historical development. He knows something about the historic Jesus. The evidence is in his twelfth chapter of Romans. Before the Gospels were written, Paul was setting down the very essence of the teaching of Jesus—the humble spirit, the forgiving spirit, the spirit of renunciation. And whenever Paul talked about the fruit of the Spirit, he merely went over the virtues which we have so long associated with Jesus. Paul knew Jesus to be the one who had renounced self-seeking, and who had humbled himself to take on the form of man, and who had yielded to death on the cross in humble obedience.

Adolph Deissmann has set this forth for us very clearly in his book under the title *Paulus*. He says:<sup>1</sup>

This Christ, the Spirit and the Lord, however, retains the essential features of the Man Jesus, the poor, humiliated Jesus of the Gospel tradition, who served in love, who commanded with power, and at last obediently suffered and was crucified. . . . During well-nigh two thousand years of Christian thinking upon Christ, the words of Jesus and the cross of Jesus have constantly been the sign-posts visible from afar, which have prevented the all-too-subtle Christologists from completely losing their way. The identity insisted upon by Paul of the Crucified with the Living One and of the Living One with the Crucified, of the earthly with the heavenly and of the heavenly with the earthly, imparts to Christ-mysticism and the Christ-cult two things: ethical sobriety and enthusiastic fervor.

Just recently we have an excellent contribution from E. Stanley Jones along the same line. In his latest devotional book he is showing what it means to call the Lord the Spirit. If our spirit cults only understood that term, it would from many a blunder free them and foolish notion! Dr. Jones says, "Mysticism unanchored in the historical revelation of God in Christ is liable to go off on tangents."<sup>2</sup> The "tongues" movement,

<sup>1</sup> *Paul*, translated by William E. Wilson. Harper & Brothers, 1927, p. 256.

<sup>2</sup> E. Stanley Jones, *The Way to Power and Poise*, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1949, p. 118.

ancient and modern, is a good illustration. But when did we ever see Jesus in that mood, or where do we have from him any teaching that would give encouragement to such expression? Paul would call all of these glossolalia addicts back to the simple expressions of righteousness and virtue that are found in the Lord who is also the Spirit. Pentecost appeals to others as a good time to pick up rattlesnakes, to prove that the Spirit is in their midst. But what authority have they in Jesus? The answer is easier in this case, for there is the ending of the Gospel of Mark with this test of apostleship. It will do little good to tell them that on critical grounds this ending of Mark is suspect. But really they ought to read the Gospels again, or just read the Gospels! They have missed the truth entirely if they think this strange ending of Mark represents the thought of Jesus on the credentials of apostles. The ethical demands of Jesus are plain, to be read by all. Jesus calls the meek, the humble, the pure in heart, the sincerely devoted, the forgiving, the ones who turn from violence to self-renunciation. Of such is the kingdom of heaven, and Jesus would send forth such men on his apostolic missions.

The essence of Paul's thinking is that there is a continuation of the life of Jesus. He was here on the earth all too short a time. Paul himself did not get to know him in the disciple-and-master relation. But the reports which he had from his brethren confirmed the highest hopes he had ever had of the revelation of God. The brethren of the church helped Paul to put together his faith. He knew the strange power, not of himself, working for righteousness. He saw the Risen Lord, and all within him, supported by the testimony of the church, proclaimed that the Jesus of history had become the Christ of experience. The Spirit of God was abroad in the land—not a strange, fantastic Spirit, but it was Jesus, the Christ and Lord.

#### V. OUR CONCEPTION OF THE SPIRIT

Paul once tried to call his generation back from hazy speculation about God and his law. Critics have assailed his use of the Old Testament at this point, but Paul's objective is beyond reproach. He cited a passage of Deuteronomy (30), in which Moses tried to bring Israel down to earth. Skeptics were saying then that nobody could keep the commandment of God, for it was too hard. But Moses would have none of this lame excuse. It was not too hard, not something beyond them, "but the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it."

Paul saw a very close analogy, so close that he reinterpreted the Old Testament passage to fit the new situation. This righteousness of God is not far off. It is brought very close in Christ, and Christ is available. We are not to think of him any more as being in heaven or in the abyss. Faith brings him right into our midst, and with him come righteousness and salvation (Rom. 10:1-10).

So it is with our conception of the Spirit. The long history of religion, including the beginnings of Christianity, might lead us into the realms of mystery, into fruitless search in far places. Some will give up the quest as hopeless and settle down to the life of the earth, which is not too hard. The spirit cults, the esoteric minorities, will claim to have established contact with both heaven and abyss, but they cannot tell us how to do it, and they really do not wish to share their high privilege. But Paul speaks again. We are not to stand gazing into the heavens. The life of the Spirit is open to all. The Christ who came to mingle so freely with humanity and to minister to the lowliest and the most needy, is with us yet. Everything which the poet has said is also true about Christ in the Pauline sense. The Lord is the Spirit, and "Spirit with spirit can meet."

This vivid sense of Christ-nearness in the Spirit also determines the effect of the indwelling. We must draw on the historic record to discover what kind of persons we ought to become under Spirit domination. It is the mind which was in Christ that must prevail in us. The Spirit moves us to humility, sincerity, courage, and love, for these are the virtues so clearly lived and taught by the Lord. Thus the individual brings forth the fruit of the Spirit. And when we talk about a spiritual awakening, about bringing our world order under the sway of God's Spirit, what else could we mean than a surrender to the meekness and gentleness and righteousness of Christ? Peace on earth, peace in our own times? The Spirit speaks to us of great possibilities, but it means surrender to a wisdom that is higher than our wisdom, as the heavens are higher than the earth. The Spirit would lead us to ponder the wisdom uttered by the same St. Paul concerning the peace which comes by the blood of the cross of Christ. "Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> From the Revised Standard Version.

# "Church and State in The United States"

*A Featured Review*

SIDNEY E. MEAD

NATHANIEL WILLIAM TAYLOR, Professor of Theology in Yale Divinity School, 1822-1857, an ardent but recondite controversialist, used mournfully to tell his students that no one would understand him until he published his book, and then it would be so long that no one would read it. The author of the present three-volume work, which adds up to nearly 3,000 pages, may well feel the same way about his subject. Apparently enough people will read three- or four-thousand-page historical novels—lured on perhaps by the promise suggested on the dust jackets—to make their publication profitable. But it is doubtful that many will tackle three huge volumes on *Church and State in the United States* with the intention of reading them straight through.

And this is most unfortunate, for, contrary to my own belief when I first took up Volume One with exactly that intention, the sheer bulk of the work is of the essence of its value and convincing quality. I note that other reviewers have stressed that the primary value of this work consists in the enormous collection of source materials that it brings together. It is true that it does, and the work might be justified solely for its value as an encyclopedia of apt references and quotations for controversialists on both sides of every related issue.

But I think it should also be stressed that the presentation, with all its faults, some of which will be noted below, adds up to a convincing picture of what "religious freedom" has meant and means in the United States, and what are the immediate problems associated with it. And if below I lament a lack of clarity of definition of the issues and other defects which make the presentation stumble, wander, and retrace its steps in places, still I must admit that the lack of such clarity is inherent in the nature of the great experiment itself. That experiment grew out of a revolutionary

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situation which reversed the currents of almost fourteen hundred years, and at times it has had the appearance of an accepted practice searching for principles upon which to base itself for theoretical justification. Hence, finally, one's belief in the American way of "religious freedom" will depend in part—and perhaps primarily—upon his belief in the ability in the long run of America's constitutional democracy with its legislative and judicial systems to muddle through (if you wish) to truth, mercy, and justice regarding the problem of church and state. And, conversely, faith in that democracy hangs upon "faith in the spiritual nature of man."<sup>1</sup> The discussion of religious freedom is important because, as in the Bill of Rights, it is inextricably bound up with all our democratic freedoms.

The historical tracing of the practical application of the idea of religious freedom through innumerable pronouncements, wordy controversies, violent clashes, legislative acts, and court decisions is apt to lead one to Jefferson's conclusion that where "good sense has fair play" the "wall of separation between Church and State"<sup>2</sup> can and will be maintained "high and impregnable," as Justice Hugo Black put it in his decision on the McCollum case. Hence, in a peculiar way, no review can do justice to this work, and the reviewer must exhort his readers to nerve themselves to the task of reading it for themselves.

The author's intention and the scope of his work are best suggested by quoting the long subtitle he gives to the volumes:

A Historical Survey, Source Book, and Interpretation of Documents and Events Showing the Growth of Religious Freedom under the Friendly Constitutional Separation of Church and State, and the Resulting Influence of Religion in All Major Phases of National Development; also a Study of the Status of Churches, including Synagogues and Other Religious Groups under the Federal and State Constitutions, Statutes, and Judicial Decisions; Authoritative Opinions of Courts, Church Bodies, Statesmen, Religious Leaders, and Publicists on Matters at Issue; and a Discussion of Contemporary Problems of Adjustment.

The total work is about equally divided into two books, the first historical ("Foundations and Historic Adjustments Through the Civil War"), the second a discussion of "Modern and Contemporary Problems and Their Solution," but without any "hard and fast line of demarcation," since, wisely, the author believes that a wise solution of the various contemporary problems of Church-State adjustment cannot be reached without knowledge of the historic backgrounds; and that this is of only relatively minor importance unless it leads up to, and aids, a wise solution of the problems of religious freedom and Church-State relations which now face our country.

<sup>1</sup> III, 701.

<sup>2</sup> I, 335.



It is impossible to quote even the entire table of contents, which runs to twenty pages, although this would be the best way to indicate the material covered and the manner of presentation. Sufficient to say that the treatment is broadly topical and the presentation is tremendously complicated—perhaps unnecessarily so—involving numerous repetitions and an irritating system of cross references which requires constant turning back to the table of contents in Volume One.

Any historian who has even a slight inclination to pedantry (and what historian has not?) might have a field day in pointing out the errors in these volumes—some merely slight factual slips, some more serious questionable interpretations, some regrettable omissions. The limitations of space forbid even the inclusion of examples. But I note their existence because I know they will provide a stumbling block for some readers who merely sample the work to judge its total worth and reliability. To my mind, they do not greatly distort the over-all picture or fatally cripple the general conclusions.

A more serious stumbling block for those readers who expect a theoretical discussion of issues will be the author's seeming reluctance to deal with ideas as such. Such reluctance is inherent in his general theological position, and hence it is important to know where Dr. Stokes stands. He places himself among those who believe that:

When we study the progress made by man in overcoming difficulties since the earliest days when he was beginning to emerge from the brute state, and realize both his potentiality and the power of religion, education, art, science, and reason, we need not give up hope that the Kingdom of God—which, in addition to its eschatological significance, stands for the rule of the spirit of good will and justice which marked the Founder of Christianity—will one day be substantially realized in this world.<sup>3</sup>

And he quotes with apparent approval the dictum of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

This suggests a familiar kind of American liberalism, and indeed the work is a masterpiece of such "liberal" scholarship, exhibiting all of its best characteristics.

But it also exhibits that suspicion of "theology" which has characterized aspects of this liberalism, and which at times gives the appearance of a theological obtuseness which misses essential issues and distinctions. The suspicion of "theology" is made apparent, for example, when the author

<sup>3</sup> III, 725-726.

<sup>4</sup> III, 717.



says that originally he did not include Anne Hutchinson in "the list of American heroes of religious freedom . . ." because he "thought of Hutchinsonianism or Antinomianism as primarily a theological dispute," and hence, by implication, of no importance for the discussion. Later, he continues, he decided that she deserved to be included "as an example of early independence in courageously upholding views opposed by the State as well as the Church of her time, and because she made an important contribution to the cause of religious freedom"—apparently implying that the contribution can be assessed apart from the theological ideas involved.

This tendency to minimize or even to eliminate discussion of theological ideas permeates the whole work, but one further sample must suffice to illustrate the result. The discussion of "Puritan New England"<sup>5</sup> and its contribution to religious freedom has only a minimal and incidental reference to the Puritan theology, and the notes are striking for their omission of references to studies of "the New England mind," such as are found, for example, in the works of Perry Miller, Ralph Barton Perry, and H. W. Schneider. And this means that the really significant Puritan contributions are almost entirely by-passed.

Again, this ability to minimize the importance of theological distinctions enables the author to juxtapose what seem to me to be strange bed-fellows: for example, Jacques Maritain and Thomas Jefferson. Speaking of Maritain's *The Rights of Man and the Natural Law*<sup>6</sup> he says, "here is the whole philosophy of the truly Catholic interpretation of the natural law based on belief in man as a person, not a thing"; and adds "the founders of the republic held similar views and incorporated them in immortal language." This is apparently to miss the real significance of his immediately preceding characterization of Maritain as "an earnest believer both in democracy and in religion—*especially the religion of the Catholic Church*" (italics mine)!

But most serious of all in this connection is the failure, so far as I can see, anywhere clearly to make the distinction between freedom of conscience for all—even for those in error (the position, *e.g.*, of Roger Williams and "the founders")—and freedom only for conscience *rightly informed* (the position, *e.g.*, of John Cotton, the Massachusetts Bay Puritans, and the Roman Catholic Church). This distinction points to the gulf which separates the two great contending parties, and failure to make it clear is to blur and confuse the issues. Thus, in discussing the "interrelation

<sup>5</sup> I, 152-63.

<sup>6</sup> III, 698f.

of freedom and responsibility," the author quotes with seeming approval Monsignor Fulton Sheen: "Democracy relies not on force, but on freedom and liberty. But freedom and liberty are inseparable from responsibility, and responsibility is inseparable from conscience, and conscience is inseparable from religion."<sup>7</sup>—Without noting that the consistent Catholic would have to add, "and religion is inseparable from the Roman Catholic Church"—which gives quite a different complexion both to freedom and to responsibility.

In fairness to the author it must be added that if he does not himself clearly make the distinction in so many words, he does indicate at least indirectly its significance. For example, he notes, with characteristic and charming understatement, that "it is manifestly difficult for all religious bodies to unite on a definition of religious freedom" partly because the Roman Catholic Church "claims that it is the sole authorized depository of religious truth and that consequently it has the right to be accorded special treatment in its attitude toward some matters connected with faith and morals."<sup>8</sup> And on the following page he quotes the clear statement of that position from "the official organ of the Jesuits in Rome [1948]":

The Roman Catholic Church, convinced, through its divine prerogatives, of being the only true church, must demand the right of freedom for herself alone, because such a right can only be possessed by truth, never by error. As to other religions, the Church will certainly never draw the sword, but she will require that by legitimate means they shall not be allowed to propagate false doctrine. Consequently in a state where the majority of the people are Catholic, the Church will require that legal existence be denied to error, and that if religious minorities actually exist, they shall have only a *de facto* existence without opportunity to spread their beliefs. . . . In some countries, Catholics will be obliged to ask full religious freedom for all, resigned at being forced to cohabitate where they alone should rightfully be allowed to live. But in doing this the Church does not renounce her thesis, which remains the most imperative of her laws, but merely adapts herself to *de facto* conditions which must be taken into account in practical affairs. . . .<sup>9</sup>

To this statement we shall refer in another context below.

But first it should be noted that Dr. Stokes' reluctance to deal with ideas as such, together with its somewhat deplorable results which we have been discussing, is not a characteristic peculiar to the author, but is something quite characteristic of American Protestantism in general, and especially in the discussion of religious freedom. The author notes quite correctly that "few of the more representative Protestant churches, except

<sup>7</sup> III, 720.

<sup>8</sup> I, 17.

<sup>9</sup> I, 18.

Baptists and Lutherans, have a very clearly defined and consistent doctrine of the respective spheres of Church and State. . . ."<sup>10</sup> This serious lack has become apparent time and time again when Protestants have taken up the discussion of religious freedom with Roman Catholics, who never lose sight of the theological basis of the discussion. The paucity of positive Protestant theological pronouncements on religious freedom in Stokes' work reflects the actual paucity which exists.

One rather obvious explanation of why Protestants have had difficulty in finding theological orientation for their practice of religious freedom should be noted, because it throws light upon some important historical developments and present events. There is no getting around the fact that the basic documents of American religious freedom are James Madison's *Memorial and Remonstrance on the Religious Rights of Man* of 1784<sup>11</sup> and Thomas Jefferson's *An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom*, written in 1779 and enacted in 1786.<sup>12</sup> Both of these documents are clearly oriented in what may be called a Lockean type of theological rationalism. Hence, when Protestantism, by and large, vigorously rejected eighteenth-century rationalism at the opening of the nineteenth century, it cut itself off from the theoretical basis for the religious freedom it accepted in practice. Always since, it has exhibited a genuine difficulty in giving the practice acceptable theological orientation. Only now, with Protestantism apparently becoming theologically conscious again, is there some hope that a truly Protestant orientation for that practice may be enunciated. And if this means, as I suspect it does, that Protestantism must digest the Enlightenment in theory, then Protestant thinkers had better prepare themselves for the task. Thus far, the Enlightenment has been for them a great misery inside, for they could neither digest its theology nor regurgitate its practice. But until Protestant theologians do digest the Enlightenment theoretically, they will continue to appear many times to be offering modern man a choice between Christianity and democracy.

Again, in fairness to the author, it should be noted that he did not propose to write a theoretical discussion of religious freedom. He proposed rather to "bring together in one work source material from hundreds of different books, reports, and pamphlets" bearing upon the subject, and can truly say that "if, as a result, any severe critic should feel that I have done little more than provide the necessary basis for a study of religious freedom

<sup>10</sup> III, 454.

<sup>11</sup> See I, 341-43, 391.

<sup>12</sup> I, 392-394.

in this country, instead of producing a philosophical history of the subject, I shall not complain unduly . . . ." <sup>13</sup> The "necessary basis" for such a study is here certainly provided and will be widely used.

Finally, as I suggested in the third paragraph, the study leads almost inescapably to some very important general conclusions. These can be given only very brief mention, but I wish to emphasize that they represent the impact of the total work.

First, as to the meaning of "religious freedom" and of "separation of church and state" as used in America—the full meaning of these phrases cannot be condensed into any one brief formula. Broadly speaking, Dr. Stokes notes that religious freedom "is the basic *principle* involved in the Bill of Rights" and separation of church and state describes the "political *policy* to assure both religious freedom and political freedom" which was "virtually implicit in the original Constitution." <sup>14</sup> The best brief statements of the meaning of religious freedom are found in the two documents by Madison and Jefferson, respectively, which were mentioned above. But the full meaning is embodied in the living texture of the hundreds of state and federal constitutional provisions, legislative acts, court decisions, statements by official bodies and individuals, and so on, as Dr. Stokes suggests in his long subtitle. Therefore, in a real sense, the important thing is not the definition of a principle but the delineation of a historical tendency—and one concludes that the author's approach is essentially right.

This is to emphasize what the founders stressed again and again, namely, the experimental nature of this American way, especially in the borderline areas. Jefferson asked only that America "give this experiment fair play," <sup>15</sup> and the history indicates that by and large this has been done.

In feeling its way through to a definition of the essential meaning as applied to specific cases, "fair play" has sometimes meant a Supreme Court reversal of itself and within a relatively short time—as, for example, in the cases involving the Jehovah's Witnesses and the salute to the flag. <sup>16</sup> Perhaps even more important was the reversal over a longer period in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to religious freedom in the states. As late as 1891, the courts decided that "the States may establish a Church or creed and maintain them, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned." <sup>17</sup> But in 1923 the Supreme Court held that the amendment

<sup>13</sup> I, lviii, lix.

<sup>14</sup> III, 446.

<sup>15</sup> Padover, Saul K., ed., *The Complete Jefferson*, p. 676.

<sup>16</sup> II, 607-16.

<sup>17</sup> I, 580.

guarantees the right of every citizen "to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,"<sup>18</sup> and in May, 1940, the court's decision on the matter was specific and definitive.<sup>19</sup> This reversal was little short of revolutionary and perhaps indicates a tendency that may have important implications for other controversial and associated matters, for example, divorce and education.

Second, the declaration for religious liberty in the Constitution did not come because any group of religious leaders or people in the "respectable" churches saw its value or wanted it. Here Philip Schaff's statement is final: "Congress was shut up to this course by the previous history of the American colonies, and the actual condition of things at the time of the formation of the national government."<sup>20</sup> The historical part of Dr. Stokes' study bears this out, and it is very important because many Protestants are inclined to think that the Protestant Reformation itself is to be directly credited with the rise of religious liberty—a notion which Professor Bainton of Yale has said can be held "only with distinct reserve."<sup>21</sup>

Third, "the major lines of demarcation between political and ecclesiastical authority are now fairly well recognized by the public at large," and "in spite of the serious discussions over Supreme Court decisions in 1947-48 . . . there appears to be little likelihood of serious conflict between the two historic 'powers' in the United States."<sup>22</sup>

Fourth, the only immediate and serious threat of crossing that line comes from the attempts of the Roman Catholic Church to gain direct aid for its parochial schools<sup>23</sup> and "to secure full diplomatic representation from this country at the Vatican."<sup>24</sup>

Fifth, these attempts are symptomatic of the fact that the Roman Catholic Church has never accepted the basic theoretical foundations of religious liberty and separation of church and state as practiced in the United States.<sup>25</sup> The clinching argument for this is readily found in the much-discussed work by Ryan and Boland, in which the authors hold that "the Catholic . . . supports existing provisions for complete religious freedom in this country because of 'rational expediency,' " but if and when the majority become Catholic, the non-Catholics may be suppressed.<sup>26</sup>

Sixth, Dr. Stokes concludes that "undoubtedly this difficulty will be largely overcome in the future" even though this "will have to be by dis-

<sup>18</sup> I, 581.

<sup>19</sup> I, 585-88.

<sup>20</sup> Schaff, Philip, *Church and State*, p. 23.

<sup>21</sup> See article in *Church History*, X (June 1941).

<sup>22</sup> III, 449-50.

<sup>23</sup> II, 643.

<sup>24</sup> II, 412 and 85-112.

<sup>25</sup> See, e.g., I, 28; 784-853; 812-13; III, 454-85.

<sup>26</sup> III, 459.



regarding, or virtually explaining away, some of the early teachings of the Church on its ultimate authority in matters political as not applicable to existing conditions in the United States."<sup>27</sup> The basis for his seeming optimism in this regard is suggested in the statement:

But the practical view, as distinct from the theoretical one generally accepted today by the Roman Catholic Church in America, based on that of the most liberal canonists of Europe, is fortunately not inconsistent with American principles of the separation of Church and State and with the religious freedom that goes with it.<sup>28</sup>

And, he adds, in discussing the problem of divided allegiance, "there are difficulties, at least in theory, due to the necessity of accepting a twofold sovereignty, namely, the sovereignty of the State, and the sovereignty of the Church as summed up in the authority of the pope." But "in practice these apparent difficulties are of relatively little significance, and are likely to become less so" as the Roman Catholic Church continues to adjust itself to the American situation.<sup>29</sup>

Admittedly, at first sight, Dr. Stokes' optimism regarding the power of accepted American practice to overcome even Roman Catholic tradition and theory seems a bit naïve. And yet the total impact of his work inclines one to accept at least the conclusion that in spite of some disquieting signs, "probably the American ideal . . . is having a larger influence on the [Roman Catholic] Church in this country than is generally realized . . . ." <sup>30</sup> Hence, for example, Dr. Stokes would modify the conclusions suggested by Paul Blanshard in his *American Freedom and Catholic Power*,<sup>31</sup> his reasons for so doing adding up to the suggestion (of which Mr. Blanshard was not unaware) that many American Catholics would not follow the hierarchy.

Dr. Stokes' position is at least tenable. It is based partly upon the apparently dissenting voices within the Roman Catholic Church itself,<sup>32</sup> but largely upon the sense of the overwhelming power, momentum, and general direction of the historical American experiment. After noting this, for example, one is inclined to agree that "it is most unlikely that any law proposing to give direct aid to other than the regular public schools would pass the courts—both state and Federal."<sup>33</sup>

Protestants and others who are contemptuous of the acceptance of the ideal and practice because of expediency and necessity need to be reminded

<sup>27</sup> III, 457.

<sup>28</sup> III, 466.

<sup>29</sup> III, 474.

<sup>30</sup> III, 466.

<sup>31</sup> III, 480-83.

<sup>32</sup> These cannot be cited here, but see, e.g., II, 653-54; III, 460, 483.

<sup>33</sup> II, 492.



that that is exactly the reason why most of their ancestors accepted it. Perry Miller was reasonably correct in saying that "by and large [right-wing] Protestants did not contribute to religious liberty, they stumbled into it, they were compelled into it, they accepted it at last because they had to, or because they saw its strategic value."<sup>84</sup> These churches in their day adapted themselves "to *de facto* conditions, which must be taken into account in practical affairs," in the words of the Jesuit author quoted above. And in a real sense the Roman Catholic Church today stands on this matter about where the great majority of the Protestant churches stood 200 to 250 years ago—not a long time in the total span of Christian history. Their general difficulty down to the present in giving religious freedom positive theological orientation, which was noted above, reflects this historical situation.

Dr. Stokes' work may thus be a source of hope and courage to all believers in the American democratic way of religious freedom and the friendly separation of church and state, for it indicates beyond quibble that the basic idea and practice are plowed deeply into the American way of life until the great majority of the people are satisfied. We have more reason than did Jefferson to say, "We have solved by fair experiment, the great and interesting question whether freedom of religion is compatible with order in government, and obedience to the laws."<sup>85</sup> To be sure, there are borderline areas which continue to demand Patrick Henry's "eternal vigilance," but probably not the degree of alarm and hysteria sometimes exhibited even today. Personally I am inclined to think that the Roman Catholic theory has become practically untenable today because it has become preposterous in America, and every time a dignitary of the church with more zeal than wisdom climbs out on a limb and saws it off behind him—as did Cardinal Spellman in his exchange with Mrs. Roosevelt<sup>86</sup>—this becomes more obvious. Time and history are on the side of religious freedom.

But here this review must close with a somber note. I cannot say exactly why, but again and again while reading this truly great work I was oppressed by the feeling that such a study of religious freedom in America could appear only when there was a widespread, though perhaps seldom expressed, sense among religious leaders themselves that true religious faith had departed. Perhaps the feeling was communicated

<sup>84</sup> See article in *Church History*, IV (March 1935).

<sup>85</sup> Padover, *op. cit.*, p. 538.

<sup>86</sup> II, 744-58.

through Dr. Stokes' reiteration that religion "*can* be of the greatest service" to men, that religion *should* play a "vital part . . . in the maintenance of political freedom," that religion *is* of "importance . . . to the nation," and so on. For is not this a way of speaking about something that ought to be but isn't? Men have emphasized the importance of religion and the "function" of religion in human life until some seem to have persuaded themselves that they can manipulate it. But the sobering fact is that religious faith cannot be conjured up like the ghost of Samuel because some modern Sauls would like to know its advice and comfort.

Our sad predicament is forcibly suggested by the statement of the Federal Communications Commission in July, 1946, upholding the right of an atheist to broadcast. Said the commission, "so diverse are these conceptions [of God] that it may be fairly said, even as to professed believers, that the God of one man does not exist for another."<sup>37</sup> For does not this indicate that practically, for many even nominally religious people, both "theism" and "atheism" have become such meaningless terms that officially the great foundational distinction is erased?

In the face of this situation Dr. Stokes is well aware that

the religious training of youth . . . is not merely a matter of formal instruction. . . . It needs to be inculcated gradually over the years as a spirit permeating all activities. True religious spirit is awakened and cultivated by the example of parents and friends; by contact with spiritually-minded people; by the observation of nature; by reading; by habits of prayer and worship; by the use of symbolism; by the customs of daily home life; by family tradition; and by other influences.<sup>38</sup>

But how, it may be asked, and where are these conditions to be met today? And yet, to close with Dr. Stokes' admonition, ". . . we need to remember that such [religious] freedom without the exercise of religion by our people is of relatively little value."<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> III, 246.

<sup>38</sup> II, 494.

<sup>39</sup> III, 719.

# A Christian Perspective on Pacifism

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

## I

TODAY'S CHURCH, if it is spiritually awake, cannot escape being concerned with the eradication of war. This is true at least insofar as it believes that creation sustains a purpose, for civilized life itself is now under the threat of doom from its own weapons of destruction. Yet even more important than the possibility of physical destruction is the spiritual malady which is revealed by it. War is sin, say ecumenical gatherings; but deeper goes the understanding that sin is war. Sin is the rejection in human life of personal and social peace through creative togetherness. Sin is the absence of positive harmony through the refusal of reconciliation. Only because sin as a totality threatens to destroy the world can it be readily threatened with destruction through war.

Every Christian, therefore, to be a Christian, must make peace. To be a Christian means to be an ambassador of Christ, offering reconciliation to a sinful world. All true Christians make peace by Jesus Christ. To be a Christian means by the grace of God to do away with, or at least to subdue or to overcome, the war in the members of the individual believer; to quell strife at home and in organized church life; to act as a cleansing and a cohesive element in communal decisions and togetherness; to prevent and to do away with conflict within the nation and war among the nations. Such a task is a common profession, accepted by all Christians. Nevertheless the church itself is sorely divided between "pacifists" and "nonpacifists."

Not only is the conscience of the modern church sore, moreover, because of division on the question of pacifism, and not only is it burdened by its impotence with regard to the major destructive threat of today's world, but it is also haunted by depth memories. It knows that the first few generations of Christians were thoroughgoing nonbelligerents because they believed themselves to have found a whole new dimension of community of which war was an almost direct denial.

The primary loyalty of the early Christians was to God in Christ as

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the creator of a new community above the divisions of men. Their task they did not conceive, to be sure, as the doing away with war among the nations, particularly on the political level. They were too realistic for that. Their task was rather to accept and to illustrate the kind of community which God has purposed eternally in Jesus Christ. Their task was to live the new order which came with the fullness of time.

Nor of their own perfection, furthermore, did they speak. Not to their own power to make things new did they testify. They spoke and they testified to the power of God in Christ to perfect his saints and to make all things new. By so living, however, and by so testifying, they began to change the world. Who knows what history would have been like if they had kept believing and enacting this communal grace of God, not accepting the ways of the world, in reign and in rule, until they had first transformed that world by the power of God and proclaimed the edicts of a new humanity instead of those of a perishing Roman Empire? Had the church remained the church, first of all in inner purity and power and, then, in outward work and witness, who can now tell what God might have done with his world?

Today, instead, a divided church, weak in faith, weak in life, weak in witness, wishes it could revitalize civilization, draw the world together, and not least of all find its own inner unity and strength. This is its plight. Where, then, do we Christians draw apart on this question of war?

## II

The question of means and ends, in the first place, should not divide us. Most of the division caused on this score is caused by non-Christian presuppositions which have been smuggled into or have struggled into pacifism. To say that the ends can be no better than the means is to deny the Christian faith outright. The Christian faith believes that in the light of the ends God has made this world imperfect, or uses imperfect means, while nevertheless using perfect means *as means* for the creation and redemption of the Christian fellowship.

To equate means and ends is to declare creation unnecessary as a pedagogical process. It is to deny the purpose of history. It is to revolt against the difference between the Eternal Purpose and the cosmic process. In the light of perfect health, for instance, an operation is bad. But in the light of a curable illness, an operation is the right means. Means are defined in terms of their relation to the ends. Whether they are good or bad depends upon whether or not they are appropriate to the ends.

God, similarly, uses this kind of world, with its genuine freedom of choice and definiteness of consequences, to effect his purpose. God, in the last analysis, exercises all force, however much he shares it, responsibly, for a purpose and for a time. God himself uses corrective physical force. For such pedagogical purposes, in fact, he created the physical universe. Precisely the Cross, if considered an end, exemplifies atrocious evil, but when seen as the proper means to realize that end, it becomes illumined instead as the best of all possible means. Nor may the Cross be looked at purely from the level of redemption, as passive suffering alone, for God is the sovereign Lord of all life, and the possibility of the conditions for the Cross are due to his kind of creation. However much abused was the governmental power under Pilate, God worked on the level of creation through the upholding of constructive force and the conditions for civilized living. Not to accept that fact is to sunder redemption from creation and thus far to refuse the sovereignty of God.

Pacifism, as the refusal of the use of all physical force, I believe, is certainly Christian in the larger sense of concerned peacemaking, but is not the understanding and acceptance of the full will of God for creation. A resolute reverence for life involves the acceptance of constructive force on the level of creation. God has created us free by the delegating to us of a certain measure of power over which we must exercise responsible stewardship. For us to refuse to handle such responsible power, individually and collectively, is to refuse to accept our total task as God's creatures and to allow (or even to make) others, who share not our vision and source of power, to exercise it in their way in our stead. Family discipline and police power are ours to use, as Christians, under God and for the common good. The Cross as the refusal to fight back, as the accepting rather than the inflicting of suffering, has nothing to do with the areas of our responsible exercise of power under God for the common good. Passive suffering in the place of constructive force is either misguided or prompted by a will to minority, by a will to rebellion against authority, by a subtle will to die. Certainly as Christians we ought not to divide on this point.

Nor ought we to divide on the question of compromise. To use imperfect means within an imperfect history is not, in and of itself, to compromise. Such thinking springs from a false purism which again refuses the Christian understanding of the pedagogical purpose of process. Informed Christian love always uses the most constructive means possible. If constructive, positive means are available, not to participate, provided



that the action falls within one's locus of ability and of responsibility, is to compromise. To use any means less than the best available is to compromise. Only when nonparticipation is the most constructive form of action is nonparticipation a legitimate response to social needs.

Let us, therefore, freely and humbly admit that men like Reinhold Niebuhr have had a just cause to criticize much pacifist thought as "perfectionist" and "Pharisaic," in the sense that it has not come realistically to grips with the kind of world in which we live, nor with the wider implications and involvements of the Christian faith; for some have actually spoken and written as though we always could and should use perfect means to a perfect end, without a deep understanding of the differences between ends and means. Some pacifist thought, besides, has been "utopian" in the sense that it has advocated world unity without a serious consideration of the cost involved in terms of constructive force to make this possible. And by all means, while we are confessing, let us not hide how far from the spirit of the Christian faith much of our pacifist analysis has been. To be defensive about pacifism, however, is not to be pacifist; it is to incarnate in pacifist argumentation the tensions which thwart reconciliation and frustrate our being perfected together in the same mind and judgment.

Other pacifist analysis never fathomed the actual sinfulness of man. Often it spoke as though education, common sense, or human good will was all that was necessary to change the world. Some of it actually advocated the nations' taking up a redemptive position, without realizing that nations are mostly the embodiment of a closed system of interests, cemented by self-interest from within and by invidious comparison, pride, and greed with relation to its neighbors. People who cannot even bring themselves to admit that the way of self-sacrifice for the common good is right certainly cannot commit their composite of collected selfishness to it. Selfishness as such can never genuinely sacrifice.

Why, the nation has been considered the effectual god to which alone self-sacrifice, as in war, was right! The nation can be transcended only by individuals with larger *intensive* loyalties, or by its own becoming transcended by a new and better system of self-interests. Certainly there have not been enough individuals in the first category to matter greatly; nor has the second category, up till very recently, been any kind of live option. The nation has represented a positive function in the development of history, and as an ultimate unit of historic togetherness it could be rivaled only by the world church, a religious transcendence, or by a



world government, a political transcendence. The first form of transcendence came with the redemptive fullness of time, with the coming of Christ. The second, as we shall see, is now coming with a new fullness of time on the level of creation. Apart from such concrete transcendence, however, political pacifism has been irresponsibly unrealistic.

Pacifists should not differ, therefore, from the rest of the church in the acceptance of constructive force as a necessary condition for civilized living in this kind of world. They agree, however, with the early church that neither totalitarian government nor war is representative of constructive force. The early Christians were often martyred for their conviction that Caesar had no right over the realm of the Spirit. Him they would not worship nor grant any right over their religious allegiance. The modern church may more and more face the same choice. Surrender to Caesar is disloyalty to God as sovereign and to the supremacy of the spiritual life. For a totalitarian government to suppress religious freedom is to use destructive force, preventing legitimate Christian acquiescence. A clear witness to God's sovereign reign is then required. When both witness and work are forbidden, abstention is not enough, not, at least, as a regular mode of living. Paul may appeal but not surrender to Caesar! The Christian can sin by not doing as well as by doing. How most wisely to witness and to work within a totalitarian regime may become for more and more Christians a life-and-death choice. Unless Christians are more expendable than soldiers in war, unless the cross is more ready to be in evidence than the sword, we have, in any case, neither the perspective nor the power of the Christian faith.

The Christian faith calls not for escape from the world in order to enjoy liberties within some ideal world, but the right to live and to die for God and for the world. This perspective was the power of the early Christians; without such convictions resulting in consequent living we cannot share either their faith or their victory. On this score we need to speak humbly and with no conviction as concerns our own courage. We may soon be tested by fire.

### III

The "pacifist" differs particularly from the rest of today's church because he agrees with the early church that war is not a constructive situation, but almost a direct denial of the new kind of community in Christ. At the point of war the community of the cross becomes concretely relevant. Instead of participating in war the Christian, in this our understanding of the perspective and power of the Christian faith, offers to

the world the new community in Christ. To this community he gives his ultimate historic allegiance. He thus enters the succession of the early Christians. They accepted constructive force. They obeyed men, even though never more than God. Their government, they believed, held not the sword in vain. Even though they themselves were not in responsible positions of government, they could and did recognize the necessity for law and order. Although they were in a minority, they lived and thought as a responsible minority. They were no thoughtless or unconcerned anarchists. Though the sons were free, they gave no offense, preferring, rather, to pay the temple tax. We have also no record, certainly, of their refusing to pay taxes because these would in large part support the Roman Legions. But when it came to their worshiping the emperor, their being forbidden to preach the gospel, or their joining in war, they refused point blank.

When the historic compromise later came on the question of Christians joining in war, it came *not* primarily because now, of a sudden, they were confronted with responsible power, but because already the full Christian perspective and power, beyond this world for this world, had been compromised into disintegrating desires on the part of the believers to have their hearts first satisfied on earth before they were finally to be satisfied in heaven. The salt had lost much of its saving saltiness.

The compromise came, therefore, not mostly with war as an institution, but, rather, with war as a way of life. The gospel gift, involving the total task of reconciling the world unto God, was no longer the carrying power of the ordinary Christian. The church had lost its first love and had, therefore, little to compromise in the acceptance of war as an institution. Today, similarly, pacifism as the mere opposition to war and to worldly discrimination will lack unity and power. On this level one cannot fight fire with fire, for the total war is still present, in fact if not in confession. Only pacifism as the new community in Christ, as a total approach to all of life, can hope to give saving meaning to individuals and salt to a corrupting world.

Mere opposition to war, consequently, is never enough; yet there is nevertheless a new relevance today for social solutions offered even on the level of political pacifism. Before our modern "one world" in commerce, communication, political interactions, and general knowledge, political pacifism was unrealistic because it did not constitute a live option. The nation was the only practical choice for the exercise of final constructive force, politically. Today we have a genuine option. On the positive side,

the period of preparation for world government has been fulfilled. There is a new fullness of time on the level of creation for political pacifism. Certainly this is not true in the sense that men are now generally ready to sacrifice themselves for a new world or to surrender their loyalty to the nation to world loyalty. But intelligent concern for the nation now calls for its fulfillment and protection within the wider context of world government.

In other words, there is now a live option for the transcending of collective self-interest on the national level in terms of another practically available choice of collective self-interest, namely, world government. The difficulty confronting this expanding of our collective self-interest is that it is not over-against, and cannot be over-against, another unit of collective self-interest. What is now needed is an inclusive, "open" society. Such a society will, no doubt, have to be attained by intense pressure from within its own needs, along with all possible direct response to God's pull from above. Maturation is now demanded by circumstance, and is also possible. This affirmation, moreover, is no utopianism, but a recognition that man, though he be more driven by fear than drawn by love, is altogether rather toughly centered on survival.

The negative side of the same question is also compelling. While up to now there has been no positive, concrete option over against nationalism as the largest center of collective self-interest, even so, up to now, war could be carried on without a predictably basic setback to civilization. History proves that. Just as now, *positively*, however, there is a live option in terms of supernational government, so now *negatively*, too, our technological advance has made impossible any sustained use of our destructive resources without major calamity to the world community. Study, for example, *Fluctuation of Social Relationships*, Volume Three of Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. Consider the pronouncements of our seemingly Cassandra scientists. What, moreover, has happened to increase this truth within the last five years!

#### IV

History has taken a turn. God has shifted the gears. We are forced to respond in a new way if we are to survive. We often hear that fear blinds us from finding the truth. This is partly true, to be sure, but a dangerous half-truth. The man who suddenly sees a cliff before him stiffens with fear, but his mind knows enough to caution his turning around. A boy who once skipped with youthful speed from tuft to tuft on a

swampy meadow well remembers his eye lighting upon a deadly European serpent on the next tuft. Fear became cold steel in his body, but it galvanized his strength and suppleness to stop in time. So negatively, we are faced by the death signs of civilization. The fear of this fact, where the atomic bomb is even now far from first in its deadly potential, should make us freeze stiff as to where we are going and compel our minds and lives to turn around. Thus both positively and negatively political pacifism has a new relevance due to a qualitatively different situation in today's history.

These facts should mean that for the Christian to work even on this level of creation is to work by all constructive means for the transcending of nationalism and the realizing of supernaturalism. Locally his witness must be clear and unfaltering, and his locus of concern must grow in himself and multiply through others. The church, above all, must not rest content to be idle. On the level of redemption it must, of course, accept its full task of peacemaking, being, as it is, another kind of community to which war is foreign in nature. The church should accept its original task and power for a new level of fellowship by the grace of God. But even on the level of creation the church can now proclaim the coming of a new era of history, where nations can no longer be the carriers of collective self-interest: that positively, a new, constructive option is now open in terms of world government, while negatively, the dead-end street of war's mounting destruction must be permanently closed to traffic, making necessary a real turning around from war.

This is a day for quiet confidence in the Christian faith to make peace, among ourselves and for the world. God knew when the fullness of time was at hand. Then he sent a new kind of fellowship. Constructive force was accepted by this fellowship as the responsibility of its members on the level of creation, but not totalitarian denial of freedom to worship and to serve God, nor war among the nations. Such a stand, I believe, should still be the standard Christian position. Now, however, there is also a constructive urgency on the level of creation to accept the live option which God has set before us, namely, to achieve effective world organization. We are confronted with a blessing or a curse *this day*. Without self-seriousness and without all judgment of others, we can, therefore, proclaim aloud the acceptable year of the Lord: the new community in Christ on the level of redemption; and some new government of one world on the level of creation. Ours is a serious gospel, but a gospel still, for our God is the Lord of history.

# The Ethics of Investment

HAROLD R. BUNCE

TWO DECADES AGO I saw the evils of the old order in American finance culminate in the unbridled speculation of the 1920's, which created a perfect setting for the reforms of the decade leading up to the Second World War. I observed by firsthand contact with financiers and securities brokers and traders their resistance to those reforms, and, more recently, how they have come to concede that the new code as established by law is superior to the old, even though it has restricted profit opportunities. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth was the essence of the reforms. If anyone now wishes to speculate, at least he proceeds with his eyes open, and with little to reckon with but the law of chance.

RELIGION IN LIFE has asked me for an interpretation of speculation and investment in the light of this changed order. Let us begin by discussing an epoch with which we are all familiar.

When the Second World War ended, it was obvious that in the succeeding few years millions of passenger cars and trucks would be built. Billions of dollars would be poured into housing construction. Public utilities would be required to spend many billions to keep ahead of the rapidly increasing demand for electricity and gas. The steel, oil, and electric equipment industries would have to expand. In short, it was apparent that industry generally, after beating swords into plowshares, would plunge into the greatest peacetime production in the history of the country.

It was equally apparent that, with wartime controls removed, this industrial expansion and production program would involve an element of inflation. As a hedge against this inflationary condition, it behooved the prudent man to buy a share in those industries most likely to profit by the whole program. He could go into the business for his own account or he could have a broker on one of the stock exchanges buy him some shares of stock in U. S. Steel, General Motors, Long Bell Lumber, American Radiator, General Electric, or any of the hundreds of long-established industrial units standing right in the path of the economic boom.

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Did the man gamble, speculate, or use plain American business judgment when he entered the stock market under these circumstances just after the war, or even later? It is a nice question, leading to a variety of answers depending on the motive of each individual when he put his spare funds into stocks. If the motive was to pool his individual savings with those of a multitude of investors in a sincere effort to help the economic readjustment—and profit by it—no one is justified in calling it gambling, or even speculation.

It certainly was an act of gambling if the original purpose was no sounder than to ride on the wave until it approached its crest and then to sell out to someone else who reasoned that the crest was still far off.

Some element of speculation is always present, no matter how lofty the motive may have been at the original stock purchase. The man was speculating on the duration of the boom, the type of industry most likely to take the lion's share of the profits, and the particular company within an industry most apt to get the business. In every period of exceptional prosperity, some industries start receding long before others have reached their peak. This rule held true in the first five years of the postwar boom. When the Korean affair blazed up as the possible beginning of another great world conflagration, the economic boom was being sustained mainly by the automobile and housing industries.

Let us consider the element of speculation involved in the prosperity of these industries. One needs look no further than the records on installment credit and mortgage debt to find proof that, year in and year out, the bulk of the speculating is done by the great mass of the country's population and not by the so-called Wall Street operator. The United States would not be so far ahead of the world's backward countries if everyone here waited until he had accumulated money in the bank before building a home or buying an automobile, electric appliances, television and radio sets, and the multitude of other things acquired on a credit basis.

The great mass of our people mortgage their future incomes to acquire all the things that go with a high standard of living. They speculate on remaining alive and retaining their income until the debts, many of them overlapping debts, are paid off. "Nothing down and three years to pay" is the slogan by which the distributors of television sets enticed buyers until recently, when restraints were imposed. In postwar housing it is "Five per cent down and twenty years to pay." Veterans, up to now, have been buying homes without putting up any margin at all.

Some Wall Street apologists stress the point that the stock market is



really just a sounding board for the individual speculations in which the country's millions of John Does and Jane Roes engage; that the primary phase of all this speculation begins far away from the various security markets and is entered into by millions of people who never dabble in stocks.

On that premise, which has its faults, they argue against the Federal Reserve's ruling just after the war that stock purchases must be carried out on a strictly cash basis. If the public generally can buy billions of dollars worth of housing on a five-per-cent margin, thus adding to the earnings and dividends of companies producing building materials and equipment, why shouldn't investors be given easy terms in the purchase of stocks in these companies?

The argument is merely plausible. It breaks down when the stock-trading apologists are reminded that the man who buys a home, on no matter how easy credit, intends to live in it with his family, and eventually own it. The man who buys stocks on a margin basis presumably has no serious intention of remaining a permanent investor in that stock. He will run to cover just as soon as it becomes apparent that the end of the boom is in sight. He is not an investor at all.

Look back a little more than two decades ago for the proof of this statement. The stock-market crash of 1929 wiped out a multitude of people who had been holding shares on a shoestring basis. A great many others, conservatives by comparison, were able to put up more margin and eventually took up their stock from the brokerage houses. These latter became what the market community called "involuntary investors."

Coming closer to the present, observe what happened abruptly early last summer when the Communist threat became a reality. The stock market crashed when the news of the Korean situation broke. Since then the market has been reflecting extensive switching from peace to war stocks. Possibly it is an act of prudence for a man to sell out his interest in a plumbing equipment company and switch into the airplane manufacturing business when a serious threat of major war impels the government to shift to a war economy.

A sea captain who retired right after the last war, in favor of a more domestic form of living, put some of his hard-earned money into the stock of a leading producer of heating and plumbing equipment. His line of reasoning was sound. The pent-up demand for housing would keep the building industry on a boom basis for a long period of years. This particular company would operate at capacity and the stock would receive larger dividends. More than 4,000,000 dwelling units were constructed be-

tween the end of the war and the development of the Korean trouble. The plumbing company's profits soared and higher dividends were paid. Yet this industry was particularly vulnerable to a change to war economy. The captain switched his investment to a less vulnerable industry. This, I believe, was an act of prudence, and it did not transform him from an investor to a speculator.

In the security markets, probably more than anywhere else, there is proof that the moral laws are being written gradually into the laws of the land. In the second day of the Korean market adjustment, when stock values were withering, an observer was heard to remark: "Can you imagine what bedlam this would have been if they hadn't curbed short selling?" The 1929 crash was intensified by short selling, which was legal enough but immoral under all but the lowest standards. In the so-called good old days, professional traders, by concerted action, could and did create panic and destroy stock values to the detriment of all who must sell without delay. The practice was particularly pernicious when bear raiding was accompanied by deliberately circulated false rumors.

Credit for reducing opportunities for speculation and pure gambling in the stock market goes to the Securities Exchange Act of the early 1930's. This is a federal statute regulating trading on all the exchanges. This act paved the way for the curb on short selling of stocks and circulation of false and misleading rumors. A man goes on the short side of the market when he sells stock which he does not own. Three days after he sells the stock on an exchange, he must deliver to the buyer. So he borrows the stock from some investment account. He intends eventually to buy the same amount of the same stock at a lower price, and he will then give back the stock he borrowed.

Federal statute has reduced this kind of operation greatly. In other ways also it has curbed professional gambling in securities. But no matter how much the rules are changed to confine stock trading to the free flow of capital into industry, there will always be an element of speculation in it.

Unfortunately, the same is true of the market for future deliveries of cotton, wheat, corn, sugar, coffee, and other commodities. Only when the world is perfect will these and other agencies in the economic system be free from gambling. In these fields, as in the stock market, the test of whether a man is contributing to the general economic welfare or is gambling, is his motive for putting money into the venture. If that motive is simply to sell out to someone else at a profit, if he has no interest in the free flow of capital into business enterprises or in the orderly move-

ment of commodities to the final consumers' market, the venture, judged by any moral concept, is a gamble.

During the French Revolution, the then existing head of the house of Rothschild was asked why he was buying French government bonds (*rentes*) when the "streets of Paris were running with blood." His reply was that he could buy French *rentes* at twenty-five cents on the dollar only *because* the streets of Paris were running with blood. Was the house of Rothschild taking advantage of the French terror to buy bonds at panic prices? Or was it expressing confidence in the ultimate restoration of sanity in France and, by this expression of confidence, stemming panic? Rothschild profited handsomely by that courageous venture. Was that gambling?

Big financial interests in this country did pretty much the same thing during the first few days of the 1929 stock-market collapse. They issued reassuring statements, backed by demonstrative purchases of stocks for the edification of the man in the street. Some observers gave them credit for lofty motives. Others of a more suspicious turn of mind insinuated that the motive was to stabilize the market long enough to permit big interests to unload. The leaders in this attempt were for the most part God-fearing Christian men, so history is apt to give them the benefit of the doubt.

Let us observe more closely how and why trading in commodities is conducted and how easy it is for the professional speculator to take unfair advantage of it. That a great deal of the buying and selling of cotton and grain futures on the organized exchanges is plain speculation or gambling, none can deny. But the cure for this perversion is not the complete elimination of trading in futures as legislators from time to time have suggested. This organized trading is a necessary part of the economic scheme because it just isn't practicable for the cotton planter to take his crop to the textile mill, or for the wheat farmer to deal directly with the flour mill.

Indeed, the system of trading in futures is designed to reduce the element of speculation in flour milling, textile manufacture, and all the other operations involved in readying farm crops for the consumer markets. Mr. X. who operates a cotton mill in Alabama close to the supply of the raw material, or in New England close to the largest textile-consuming area, can ill-afford to speculate on the trend of cotton prices. So he buys a contract for the delivery of 1,000 bales of cotton to his mill in a certain month. To guard against a slump in cotton in the meantime, he may also hedge by selling an equivalent amount of cotton.

The same type of operation is resorted to by Mr. A. who operates a

flour mill, Mr. B. who is a sugar refiner, Mr. C. who is a coffee roaster, and the multitude of other types of converters. The organized markets in futures evolved as a necessary precaution in the business of moving crops to consumers. Messrs. A., B., C., and X. assuredly are not speculating or gambling when they buy futures or do a reasonable amount of hedge selling.

It would be much better if this system could be made to operate without offering opportunities for pure gambling by people who have not the remotest interest in the economics of commodity distribution. But no matter what safeguards the authorities may throw around this or any other legitimate system, there will always be a loophole through which the gambler can find his opportunity.

The financial community—meaning not just Wall Street but the multitude of Main Streets which function as an over-all organization for raising new capital and for the exchange in ownership of old securities—offered strong resistance to the federal laws passed in the early 1930's to curb the evils of the old days. Now most men in those occupations not only are reconciled to the changed order, but also are glad that the changes came about. Many of them can be credited with qualms for operating under the old rules, even though they were legally entitled to do so.

Some of the best suggestions for plugging loopholes through which the less scrupulous make shady profits have come from the bankers and brokers themselves.

There is enough flexibility in the securities acts and in the laws regulating trading in commodities to insure progress in the steady reduction in opportunities for gambling and unscrupulous practices. It does not seem possible at this point that the laws themselves can be made more stringent without crippling the machinery used in the free flow of capital into industry and the orderly movement of crops from the farms and plantations into consumer markets.

# The Christian Devil

ALBION ROY KING

**W**HATEVER INFLUENCES may have emanated from the dualistic religion of Persia, the Satan which came to occupy a central place in Christian mythology achieves a stature and uniqueness unmatched by any other devil. He is the Satan of Job developed into a figure of epic and sometimes tragic proportions. Ahriman, the Persian devil, is a dark shadow across the landscape of the east. Satan is a cosmic person, concrete, dramatic, whose hand is in every catastrophe, whose guile is in every temptation, whose leer is in every failure. Late Jewish apocalypticism transmitted this devil to the New Testament and Christian thought, but he did not attain full eminence until Christian theology had reached its zenith. It takes a profound theology to create a magnificent rebel.

The Gnostic heresies were directly influenced by Persian dualism, and early Christian thought took shape in opposition to these. In none of them is the demonic realm personified and concrete. Evil is an abstraction identified in various ways with things, with darkness or materiality, with flesh as opposed to spirit. All such doctrines are heresies because the church doctrine is based, first of all, on the dogma of divine creation out of nothing. Nothing which God has created, not even darkness, can in itself be evil. Even demons exist by fiat and permission (Col. 1:16). Works of the flesh and deeds done in darkness are evil because of wills in rebellion. Even when the works of Satan have been most vivid and vicious, Christian theologians have taken care to say that divine permission alone makes them possible.

The picture of Satan taken from Job and Chronicles, in the first place, received definitive touches from apocalyptic writers. In the Book of Jubilees, about 100 B.C., he still comes into the councils of heaven, but in the Ethiopic Book of Enoch and the Slavonic Book of the Secrets of Enoch, both assigned to the century which spans the birth of Christ, Satan leads a rebellion in heaven and is cast down to earth with his minions, becoming ruler of its kingdoms and prince of the powers of the air. Satan was the corrupter of man in the Garden of Eden, and "the satans" seduced the

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daughters of men and spread evil in the world. In the Ethiopic Book, Sheol is turned into a fiery Gehenna for punishment of wicked men and angels, and a general resurrection and judgment for Israel is promised. The Slavonic Book is the earliest source for the idea of the millennium.

#### SATAN, CHRIST, AND LUCIFER

The New Testament mostly follows the apocalyptic world view and philosophy of history, and while Satan and the demons are never given the clear delineation which they acquired in subsequent Christian literature they have a significant role. Satan is named thirty-five times, and thirty-seven times he is called the devil, *diabolos*, seven times Beelzebub. Demons and devils are mentioned numerous times. Most of these passages ascribe certain events to diabolic agency or describe qualities which belong to Satan. He is a deceiver, father of lies, tempter; he will take advantage of weakness, he knows and perverts Scripture, and he loves to pose as an angel of light.

Only once does Satan appear as a person, and that is a passage to put beside the prologue to the Book of Job as decisive in forming the Christian concept. Satan confronts Christ as the tempter in the wilderness. And a very different being he is from the spirit which plagued the suffering patriarch. No longer is he in the courts of heaven as the prosecutor of pious hypocrisy; he is now the sworn enemy of the Son of God. This devil is prince and god of this world (John 14:30; II Cor. 4:4); all its glory and power are at his disposal, an authority which he confesses to be derived from a higher source (Luke 4:6). He has cosmic powers, so that he can appear out of nowhere, and he has miraculous facility at transportation; he can whisk Jesus off to the high mountain or set him on the pinnacle of the Temple—powers which came to figure greatly in medieval notions of the activities of devils. The Christ, on the other hand, is now Jesus of Nazareth, a human being, who is hungry after a forty-day fast and puzzled about his mission among men. Satan's weapon here is not to unloose the violence of nature upon man, but to make a subtle appeal to the basic weaknesses of the human heart in the effort to seduce him into the ways of sin. Job's Satan is a nature demon, purely; the Christian devil is a moral rebel. In the New Testament he figures chiefly as the cunning tempter, although suffering and disease are regarded as the direct work of demons connected with the satanic rule of the natural order. Satan is still the cynic; he does not himself change the stone to bread in order to demonstrate his powers to Jesus; he challenges the powers of the Son of God.

The final touch of Scripture is the fearful judgment passed upon Satan in the Book of Revelation: "And the devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where are also the beast and the false prophet; and they shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever" (Rev. 20:10). But the picture is not complete until Satan has been identified with the archangel light-bearer, Lucifer. The pattern was prepared in the story of a rebellion in heaven and given its biblical formulation in the Apocalypse of St. John (Rev. 9:1; 12:7-12): Satan and his minions battling with Michael and the angels for control of heaven; Satan defeated and cast headlong, falling like a star to earth, and the keys of the pit delivered unto him. But Lucifer is not in the biblical account; in fact, the word is actually applied to Christ in the Vulgate version of II Peter 1:19, where it is a Latin translation of the same Greek word which is used for Lucifer in the Septuagint version of Isaiah 14:12. In English it is rendered "day-star."

The earliest record I have been able to find for the identification of Satan with Lucifer is in Origen's *De Principiis*, V. The Satan which Christ saw falling from heaven (Luke 10:18) Origen identifies with Isaiah's Lucifer, and it is obvious that he has a theoretical reason for doing it. Origen is combating the current Gnostic notion that Satan is the ancient demon of darkness (Ahriman). He is expounding the doctrine of the fall. Satan now is the ruler of darkness—not darkness itself—but originally he was Lucifer, one of the bright lights of the heavenly constellation. His place in the abyss comes about from the fall described by the prophet Isaiah (14:12-20). Origen may have had some apocalyptic source now lost, but it may also be a fair sample of the unhistorical allegorizing common to the Fathers.

Historically, Lucifer, in the oracle of Isaiah, is a symbol for the Babylonian king who sought to exalt himself to heaven and came down with an awful crash. But Lucifer, for Christians, will always mean the archangel, one of the brightest luminaries of heaven, who rebelled through pride and arrogance against the rule of God, and after a battle, was pitched over the battlements to fall into the pit, where he reigns forever as Satan. From there he has access to earth. At the beginning of sacred history he sneaked into the Garden of Eden, changed himself into a serpent, and achieved the seduction of Eve and the fall of man. With this, the myth of Satanism is complete. It received its authoritative formulation in the eleventh century with the circulation of St. Anselm's *Dialogus de Casu diaboli*.

The fall of Satan and the fall of Adam put together formulate the

mythos of the origin of evil. Theologians have always insisted that sin belongs to the freedom of man alone, but they put a very heavy burden on such a frail instrument. Even for the strict rationalists it has its paradoxical aspect. Puny man was caught in some powerful forces. God was in the Garden with a thundering prohibition, a psychological problem in itself; and a snake was in the grass with cunning deceit, because a prior rebellion among the spirits had already taken place.

#### THE MEDIEVAL DEVIL

One who digs into the great theological works of the Fathers and the Middle Ages finds them remarkably free from demonolatry. The most curious relic is the ransom theory of the atonement. It may be found as early as the writings of Irenaeus, and it was given rather undogmatic credence by St. Augustine. Satan, as ruler of this world, holds all souls under bondage, and having failed in the attempt to seduce the Son of God by temptations, required his blood as a ransom for all other souls. The blood of Christ shed on Calvary became the redemption price paid to the devil for man's salvation. This doctrine was not replaced until the eleventh century, and again by that definitive thinker, St. Anselm. He substituted the doctrine of the "substitutionary atonement." Man's sin is an infinite affront to the divine majesty, requiring an infinite sacrifice for propitiation which man himself cannot provide. The infinite Son of God is the substitute. Actually, Satan is replaced in the picture by a monotheistic Judge who rules both heaven and earth with an abstract justice. But "substitute" is not nearly so poetic a word as "ransom," so it is the latter which clings in hymnology, if not in theology.

For sheer hideousness, no picture of Satan is quite the equal of Dante's Lucifer, frozen in the ice at the center of the ninth circle of the *Inferno*. "To describe the bottom of the universe is not an enterprise," says Dante, "for a tongue that cries mamma and papa." In the fall, Satan plowed through the earth to the center, which is the bottom of hell, half on one side and half on the other of an ice barrier. Great batlike wings ceaselessly fan the air into a gale up through the caverns of the damned. His head presents three ogre faces, dripping with tears and blood, representing a satanic trinity of hatred, impotence, and ignorance. Being a rebel, he has landed in the place of torment for all traitors, so, while the eternal ice gnaws at his groin, he chews on Judas Iscariot in one mouth, and on Brutus and Cassius in the other two. The artistic portrayal of the supremely ugly is complete; but, aside from this, the conception is disappointing. Satan is not the archi-

tect of hell, nor even its ruler. God is both of these, and all the supernal bliss of the *Paradiso* can hardly resolve the question of why a good God should design such a place and the creatures to inhabit it.

The medieval Satan roams the earth; he is not frozen in hell, and in popular folklore he acquired his full denouement. Two factors contributed to his prominence and personification. First, no new faith ever actually exterminated the gods it opposed; they survive in the superstitions of the masses. Second, the stronger the official opposition became to Satan and his kingdom, the clearer became his reality. So the biblical Satan was invested with all the characteristics condemned in rival pagan deities of Europe. Satyr and nymph, maiad and dryad, kelpie and nixie, daeva and jinn, wraith and hobgoblin, all combine their picturesque qualities with such ugly and vicious ancient demons as Moloch, Beelzebub, and Belial to make the devil and his demons what they became for our forefathers.

#### SATANISM AND REVOLT

The story of medieval witchcraft is a complicated and cloudy picture. The author of *Job* has surely had many an immortal shiver at what finally happened to his poetic Satan. It is a tale of horror, but perhaps not more horrible than the problem of evil itself. Recent historians recognize Satanism as an institution of revolt against totalitarian ideology. After the thirteenth century, the devil often took on the form of champion of the oppressed, a rebel leader of rebels. Heresy is always a normal expression of minority groups. Witchcraft, as such, was not heresy, but doctors of the Inquisition often had difficulty distinguishing the two; but the distinction was not decisive, since the penalty was the same in either case, death at the stake.

It is not surprising that Protestant sectarians were associated with the sons of Belial, because when orthodoxy assumes the infallibility of its position all else must belong to the kingdom of Satan. But turning to the records of reformers we find that Satan was never in concert with them. Yet he was very real, and always, in some mysterious way, in league with the powers ruling in Rome. There doubtless was never a more genuine devil than the one which gave Martin Luther the leer of discouragement from behind his stove in the Wartburg as he strove with the Scriptures, trying to "make God talk *Deutsch*."<sup>1</sup> Where the devil's accomplices lie depends on which side of the argument we happen to be.

<sup>1</sup> The legend is typical of those which cluster about famous men of the time. When Luther started on his famous trip to the Diet of Worms he declared that he would go if a devil lurked under every roof tile, but he made no mistake about who the devils were he had to confront.

Witchcraft was a sort of third center of belief and practice, outside the church and outside the reforming sects, but cutting across the lines of both, and centering in the vast promethean mass struggling for a place in European culture. Christianity never actually became heaven for that mass. Satanism was a religion, too, but its roots were deeper in the primitive libido than the rationalism which produced scholasticism. It attained the status of an underworld institution which at times became a formidable threat as much to Protestants as to Catholics. Persecutions were even more ferocious among the self-appointed inquisitors in the Protestant countries than in the Catholic Inquisition.

It is amazing that the Church had nothing better to offer than a counter-system of exorcism and a threat of torture, fire, and the gibbet. It actually believed and fostered the myth, and at times punished any doubts of it as heresy. The most important document of the church's campaign is now available to English readers, and it has the greatest interest for the historical scholar, the *Malleus Maleficarum*, published at Cologne in 1489.<sup>2</sup> The first part argues at length the existence of devils and the powers of witches against the skepticism of certain physicians and clerics which were obstructing the Inquisition. So it is evident that a wiser counsel was available. Part Two reviews the works of witchcraft and the remedies prescribed for those who are bewitched. Part Three outlines the procedure of an examination—it must not be identified with a trial as that word is used among us today—and the forms of condemnation.

How many thousands were poisoned by witches' brew and how many unbaptized babies were sacrificed in diabolic rites can never be estimated, but it is certainly probable that the number is not so large as the scores of thousands who were tortured and burned at the stake, garroted, or hung, in one of the blackest pages of human history. The prosecutors seem never to have been primarily bent on discovering these acts against humanity as such. Their objective was to uncover what a culprit believed. It was a war of ideologies. The procedure was designed to wring a confession out of the accused, both for the sake of his punishment and to offer to him the salvation of orthodoxy for his soul. One who reads the account will find a clue to the way modern police states secure their mysterious confessions. "Judicial" procedure is the same; methods of torture are said to be more subtle.

Here is the picture which emerges: devils appear in human form, not

<sup>2</sup> Translated by the Rev. Montague Summers and published in a limited edition in England, 1928. I am indebted to Columbia University Library for use of their copy.



real body (for body is the creation of God, and good), but condensed air and vapors. Usually they are black or red with horns and a tail, always with cloven feet. They can transport people to distant places, which they do for night revels. They engage in sexual copulation both with men and women, though nearly always it is with women. By a devious logic, it is proved that children can be born of such unions (with women), and they can be dedicated to Satan by midwives before baptism; hence numerous children went to the flames with their elders. Devils can transmute themselves and people into animal forms. Favorite disguises are a dog, a goat, or fiery dragon; but often they appear as a cat, a horse, mice, or even vermin. All this is in the book: didn't Satan turn into a serpent in the Garden and transport Jesus in the temptation story? And the demons cohabited with the daughters of men in the days of Noah. Then there is the compact with Satan, signed in blood; the devil offered such a contract to Jesus. By this means a sorcerer gets the help of Satan, with a little black magic, to do marvelous things: he conjures the ancients, such as Helen of Troy, harms his enemies, raises a hailstorm, or makes a cow go dry.

As the campaign proceeded, the doctrine of Satan acquired the solidity of dogma. The learned doctors had to formulate clearly what they were looking for. It would be difficult to decide whether these lurid tales of traffic with demons, the black mass, the witch's sabbath, were based on what witnesses actually experienced, or rather that what was tortured out of their victims was molded by what the officers were looking for; probably both! But bringing the devil out of the shadows and endowing him with definable personality and program was the final step in the rejection of the myth.

#### MILTON'S SATAN

David Masson has developed an instructive contrast between the devils of Luther, Milton, and Goethe, spanning a little more than three centuries of literary history. Luther's devil was experimental and scriptural, and actually existing, the common devil of sixteenth-century educated men. Milton's Satan is an epic hero. Milton's poems are the most complete literary statement of the myth, though it is not quite certain whether he regarded it as mythical. In Goethe the "scheming, enthusiastic Archangel has been soured and civilized into the clever cold-hearted Mephistopheles"; he is "the spirit of evil in modern society," the Cosmic Satan become a personal devil, and he is a purely dramatic character.<sup>3</sup>

*Paradise Lost* gives us a portrait of the Evil One which for grandeur

<sup>3</sup> David Masson, *The Three Devils*. London: Macmillan, 1874. Quotations from p. 39.

and pathos, dignity and degradation, is not equaled by any other hero in literature. Milton's Satan is the orthodox devil at his best, stripped of all fantastic caricatures which belong to popular fancy, and drawn in terms of self-conscious evil, pride, jealousy, and the will to rebellion, combined with tragic despair; the personification of what one might call the higher or at least the more refined forms of evil, not that they are on that account any less evil. He is not the gross and malicious devil, but the studious and reflective psychological devil. Milton reflects, in the care with which he details the "magnificent rebel," something of the struggle in his own breast, and in his own society, against the absolutistic pretensions of the Stuart dynasty.

With all the Puritan's devotion to Scripture it is remarkable that Milton did not seem to realize how much he was embellishing the biblical text, and modern readers have often been misled into thinking that his hero is the biblical Satan. But Milton faithfully presents the traditional Christian position on the nature and origin of evil. Paradise is lost, both for Satan and for man, by the rebellion of the will, by its weakness in resisting the inner temptations of pride, vanity, and self-interest. The possibility of *Paradise Regained* is awakened by the coming of one whom all the subtle arts of Satan cannot reduce to servitude. Milton's epic power reaches its height in the first poem, but from the point of view of modern religion the second deserves a larger consideration. It is a masterful portrayal of the subjective struggle with evil. For many moderns the evolutionary philosophy has set aside the notion of a paradise lost. One cannot lose what he has never had; but he might gain it; and if paradise is ever to be gained, man must take the path of moral victory fully achieved by Jesus in the wilderness.

#### MEPHISTOPHELES

No one seems to know the origin of the name for the devil which plagued the legendary Dr. Faustus, but under the pen of Goethe he became a very modern devil. Mephistopheles is no fallen Lucifer or brimstone-scented Satan. He is the cultured devil, for

Culture, which smooth the whole world licks,  
Also unto the Devil sticks.  
The days of that old Northern phantom now are over:  
Where canst thou horns and tail and claws discover? <sup>4</sup>

Mephistopheles is neither the proud rebel against an intolerable divine autocracy, nor the jealous seducer of man whose high position in the cosmos

<sup>4</sup> Quotations are from the Bayard Taylor translation of *Faust*, The Modern Library edition.

threatens his own self-conceit. Rather, he is the fully painted figure of the cynical Satan of the Book of Job, but with one difference. For Goethe, the modern romanticist, not nature but man's mismanagement of life is the source of evil. The speeches of Mephisto are all replete with the poet's acute diagnosis of the ills which afflict human experience.

Faust is an old professor who has fallen into academic despair and seeks by magic to salvage some meaning to life. When Mephisto appears, he turns out to be the philosophical pessimist:

I am the Spirit that Denies!  
And justly so: for all things, from the Void  
Called forth, deserve to be destroyed:  
'T were better, then, were naught created.

F. C. S. Schiller, the Oxford pragmatist, says that his pessimism is profound because it is complete intellectualism—source of all devilry for the pragmatist, and it is cheerful because it is an ancient and sophisticated pessimism.<sup>5</sup> He is not seriously interested in winning Faust for the infernal regions; he is out simply to demonstrate the inane of existence and to have a good time doing it. By indirection, if not by deliberate intention, he becomes the instrument of Faust's redemption by injecting into the jaded professor that *streben* (key word for Goethe's philosophy) which carries him out of the halls of contemplation into the world of action. After pursuing the common aims of sensuality and lust, wealth and power, and aesthetic values in classic art, Faust finally joins the modern quest for social redemption, seeking a society provided with plenty and living in happiness on land wrested from the sea by engineering genius. All levels are fraught with tragedy, and this last by a peculiarly modern type of tragedy, and yet it is as ancient as Naboth's Vineyard. A pious old couple with a cottage and chapel by the sea obstruct the dream of utopia and fall in the flames of "progress"! Blissful contemplation of the humanitarian dream forfeits the bond to the devil and Faust falls dead, but the devil is cheated; divine grace intervenes:

The noble Spirit now is free,  
And saved from evil scheming:  
Whoe'er aspires unweariedly  
Is not beyond redeeming.

There is a selfish egoism and individualism about Faust's *streben* which is a glaring weakness in Goethe's philosophy for prophets of the social gospel.<sup>6</sup> Some would seem to hold that no miracle would be necessary

<sup>5</sup> Essay "Concerning Mephistopheles" in *Humanism*. London: Macmillan, 1912.

<sup>6</sup> R. T. Flewelling, *Christ and the Dramas of Doubt*. The Abingdon Press, 1913. Chap. XII-XV.

for salvation if man were fully devoted to humanitarianism. But events of the twentieth century have shown the Naboth's Vineyard episode to be a very minor incident of what man is capable of in the name of humanity and democracy. For the promise of utopia whole populations have been displaced and minority groups liquidated by millions. Goethe at least got a glimpse of the complicated and ambiguous situation of man as he faces the problem of humane activity.

### THE DEVIL FOR MODERNISTS

Mephistopheles is a superb embodiment of the moral struggle as it existed in the liberal industrial culture, an age which now may have come to an end. The humanistic spirit was responsible that a brimstone hell passed out of theology, hell-fire out of the pulpits, and imprecatory psalms are no more read in the pews. Perhaps this is but to say that when religion becomes philosophical it has little use for the idea of Satan. A. C. Knudson, in his *Doctrine of Redemption*, states the matter for the rational tradition: "Satan occupies no logical place in the Christian system of belief. His existence does not explain the origin of sin nor does it make temptation any more intelligible. In so far as it implies a nonhuman source of human sin, it is a relic of dualism and cancels the concept of sin." But rational criticism does not yet seem able to exorcise the demons. They grow out of human soil, where the spade of reason is not adequate to reach the roots. Even in "enlightened" America, to say nothing of other lands, the devotees of Satan have been known to break into Christian churches to hold their modernized version of Walpurgis-Night. An American novelist like Theodore Dreiser, apostle of naturalism though he is, when he comes up against the naked depravity of man has recourse to the Christian devil. In *An American Tragedy*, he presents the tragic moral conflicts of our society in a poignant episode. At the moment when Clyde Griffith is first struck by the thought of murdering his sweetheart as a means of release from his predicament, Dreiser introduces a parenthesis: "(what devil's whisper?—what evil hint of an evil spirit?)."

The idea of Satan will continue to stand for the dark and demonic aspects of human experience. "The devil's cleverest wile is to convince us that he does not exist," said Baudelaire, and Denis de Rougemont thinks this is the "most profound observation on Satan written by a modern."<sup>1</sup> Two Englishmen have joined the Frenchman in recent works which argue

<sup>1</sup> *The Devil's Share*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1944.

brilliantly the reality of devils in the modern world, William Robinson<sup>8</sup> and C. S. Lewis. The devils come to life in *The Screwtape Letters* of Mr. Lewis, and in *The Problem of Pain* he argues their reality.<sup>9</sup> These have a second in the American, Edwin Lewis, who says in *The Creator and the Adversary*, "God cannot act creatively without making it possible for the demonic to act discreatively."<sup>10</sup> Dostoyevsky's devil is a shopworn member of the gentry who appears to Ivan Karamazov to plague him with all his own rejected nihilism. Thomas Mann's devil in *Doctor Faustus* has red hair and speaks only old German, appropriate to the country in which he has a special popularity.

So devils there still are. Carl Sandburg represents the contemporary poetic treatment of them in his "Wilderness."

There is a wolf in me . . . . fangs pointed for tearing gashes . . . . a red tongue for raw meat . . . . and the hot lapping of blood—I keep this wolf because the wilderness gave it to me and the wilderness will not let it go.<sup>11</sup>

His devils are the hairy and scaly-faced ghosts of our biological ancestry: "O, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie, inside my ribs . . ." Though names and faces change, the problem remains the same: the fox, the hog, the baboon, or the inferiority complex has to be exorcised and subdued no less than the fiery dragon or horned diablerie; and sometimes modern procedures, whether in psychiatrist's parlor or priest's confessional box, are in no essential different from ancient incantation and amulet.

<sup>8</sup> *The Devil and God*. The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945.

<sup>9</sup> Both published in New York by The Macmillan Company, 1943 and 1944.

<sup>10</sup> The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1948, p. 138.

<sup>11</sup> From *Cornhuskers*, by Carl Sandburg. Copyright, 1918, by Henry Holt and Company, Inc. Copyright, 1945, by Carl Sandburg. Used by permission.



# The Evangelistic Challenge Today

NORMAN VICTOR HOPE

ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING, and at the same time most encouraging, features of contemporary church life is the renewed emphasis on evangelism as one of the church's major concerns. This has found expression in several ways. For one thing, the old-line, standard-brand Protestant denominations of the United States and Canada now employ some forty full-time Secretaries of Evangelism—most of them of relatively recent appointment. Again, the volume of literature dealing specifically with this theme of evangelism—much of it excellent in tone and wise in suggestion—has multiplied rapidly within the past few years. For example, in 1945 the Church of England published its famous report, *Towards the Conversion of England*. The English Methodists issued a parallel document entitled *The Message and Mission of Evangelism*. The Church of Scotland drew up its own manifesto on this subject under the title, *Into All the World*.

Once more, these past few years have witnessed several strikingly successful evangelistic campaigns in the United States. The Rev. Bryan S. W. Green, reputedly the most persuasive evangelist in the Anglican Church today, conducted a mission in New York City not long since, the like of which the Protestant Episcopal Church—it is no exaggeration to say—has not witnessed in all its long history. More recently, the Rev. "Billy" Graham, a very different type of evangelist from Mr. Green, has been receiving widespread publicity for his campaigns, which apparently have not only created much excitement but have produced many decisions for Jesus Christ. Again, the ecumenical movement has put evangelism at the very center of its interest. The well-known report, *Man's Disorder and God's Design*, goes so far as to say that "if an ecumenical movement is not primarily a strategy of world-wide evangelism, then it is nothing but an interesting academic exercise."<sup>1</sup> So the World Council of Churches, at its first meeting in Amsterdam in 1948, set up a Department of Evan-

<sup>1</sup> *Man's Disorder and God's Design*, Harper & Brothers, 1949. Vol. II, p. 116.

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gelism, "to stimulate and assist the churches in meeting more adequately their responsibilities for the proclamation of the Gospel of Christ to all men everywhere in all their individual and social relationships."

This renewed emphasis on evangelism, it is interesting to note, is not confined to any one nation or to any one denomination. It has vitally affected practically all the old-line groups, in addition, of course, to the large and prominent place which it has always occupied among the so-called "sects" or "cults" of latter-day America. Nor is it confined to any one country; for its influence has extended to virtually every country in which Protestantism exists in any strength at all—Great Britain, Canada, Germany, even France. One of its most striking expressions is to be found in the Iona Community movement headed by Dr. George F. Macleod in Scotland. It seems to be a movement of God's Spirit on a wide scale.

What are the causes which have produced this resurgence of interest in Christian evangelism? In the last analysis, of course, this is a movement of the Spirit; and the Spirit bloweth where it listeth. But, humanly speaking, several factors seem to have helped to focus attention today on the church's evangelistic task. For one thing, there has been something of a reaction against an overemphasis on the so-called "Social Gospel." Dr. William W. Sweet, writing as recently as 1944, reported that "the emphasis in most of the best preaching of the past generation has been impersonal, stressing social ills rather than personal sin; and the doctrine of conversion, so much stressed by our fathers, is no longer even mentioned in the best pulpits."<sup>2</sup> Today, however, it is increasingly realized that while the Christian church must always be sensitive to social injustice, the soul of all progress is the progress of the soul. While it is no doubt true that "if religion ends with the individual, it ends," it is even more true that if it does not begin with the individual, it doesn't begin. Even in the most perfect social order, could such be achieved, there would still be what the late Lord Morley once called "that horrid burden and impediment on the soul which the Churches call sin, and which, by whatever name we may call it, it is a very real catastrophe in the moral nature of man." This fact has become glaringly, almost frighteningly, clear in the world of today. So churchmen of almost all denominations are realizing that though there may be nothing wrong in praying, "Create a new social order, O Lord, and renew a right structure in society," the psalmist's prayer is far more basic and necessary, "Create in *me* a clean heart, O Lord, and renew a right spirit within *me*."

<sup>2</sup> W. W. Sweet, *Revivalism in America*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944, p. xiii.

Secondly, there is something of a reaction against what Dr. Ernest T. Thompson calls "a growing reliance—too great reliance, subsequent events have proved—upon 'religious education' as a substitute not only for revivalism but also for personal evangelism with which it had been so long associated."<sup>3</sup> To say this, of course, is not in any way to decry or disparage Christian education: for it must always have its necessary place in the unfolding and development of the Christian life, in enabling Christians to grow in grace and in the knowledge of their Lord and Savior. But while that is true, there is no substitute for personal commitment and decision, for individual surrender to Christ, which it is the essence of evangelism to bring about.

Thirdly, the deep and pervasive influence of such modern pseudo-religions as Nazism and Communism has helped to recall Christians to their evangelistic task. For these false religions have understood the need for evangelism on their own behalf; they have exploited every device known to modern science in order to win—or at least coerce—friends and influence people; and they have organized their converts into becoming evangelists for their own perverted and even diabolical ends. Every communist convert, for example, is expected to become a personal evangelist for the gospel according to St. Marx, and to help this gospel to infiltrate every possible area of life. So successful has this communist movement become that it presents a serious menace to Christianity in many parts of the world, especially in the Far East. The success of this kind of pseudo-religious movement has put Christianity on its mettle: it has helped to awaken the church to a sense of urgency and responsibility in its high task of making men Christian.

A final factor which has contributed to the renewed emphasis on evangelism is the profound sense of insecurity which has gripped the world in recent years, especially since the dropping of the atomic bomb in 1945. There is widespread fear of a third World War in which—as someone has said—all men will be cremated equal. Our contemporaries, feeling that they are living as on the edge of a volcano which might erupt at any moment, are desperately seeking for some sense of security and certainty in life. Hence they eagerly devour such books as Liebman's *Peace of Mind*, Sheen's *Peace of Soul*, and Peale's *Guide to Confident Living*. Hence, also, they are wistfully turning to the Christian evangelist to see if he has the real and final answer to life's insecurity and fears.

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<sup>3</sup> E. T. Thompson, *Changing Emphases in American Preaching*. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1943, p. 104.

This, then, is the task squarely presented to the Christian church today; the task, namely, of so presenting Jesus Christ as the Lord of all good life that men will surrender to him and serve him in the fellowship of the Church, which is his Body. How shall the church most fruitfully and effectively respond to this evangelistic challenge of today?

It is the thesis of this article that only a total evangelism will suffice, that is, a total church presenting a total gospel to meet man's total need.

## I

This total Christian evangelism should be prosecuted on all fronts. There are various forms of evangelism—personal evangelism, cell evangelism, pastoral evangelism, what Dr. Andrew W. Blackwood happily calls “evangelism in the home church,” and mass evangelism; and they are all necessary. Personal evangelism—the testimony of one soul to another as to the experience of Christ's redemption—has a long and honorable history, beginning with our Lord himself in such incidents as the conversion of Zacchaeus and the woman at the Samaritan well, through Paul and Wesley and Moody and thousands of others right down to the present day. Much emphasis is being given to this kind of evangelism today—as, for example, the New Life movement which is doing so much to revitalize the Presbyterian Church—and rightly so. Cell evangelism, too, is growing in influence, because of what Dr. Elton Trueblood describes as “the discovery or rediscovery of the explosive force that lies in a really committed group who seek to witness *together* to the life and reality of the Living Christ.”<sup>4</sup> The Gideons in the United States and the Iona Community in Scotland are illustrations of this kind of evangelism. Again, more and more ministers are wakening up to the rich possibilities of pastoral evangelism, and are preaching sermons designed to bring their congregations to the point of wholehearted commitment to Jesus Christ.

It goes without saying that all these forms of evangelism are vitally necessary in the church today; they are unquestionably doing untold good to the Christian cause. But not so much is being said or planned about mass evangelism. Apparently the impression has grown up—at least in certain quarters of the Christian church—that mass evangelism is a thing of the past, that it was all right in the days of Wesley and Whitefield, of Moody and Sankey, and even of “Billy” Sunday, but that it is outmoded today. In the judgment of the present writer, however, this impression is mistaken. It may be admitted that during the first quarter of the present

<sup>4</sup> *Signs of Hope*. Harper & Brothers, 1950, p. 98.

century mass evangelism was not always conducted on the healthiest lines; but that does not mean that mass evangelism is necessarily a thing of the past. On the contrary, it would seem to have great possibilities for the present and the future. Anyone who lived in Nazi Germany, as the present writer did, knows what mass evangelism can do—even in a cause which is diabolically evil—when properly organized and conducted by such skillful propagandists as Hitler and Goebbels. And such recent events in the United States as the strikingly successful campaigns of evangelists like Messrs. Green and Graham would seem to provide convincing evidence that the day of mass evangelism, when properly conducted, is by no means over. Its potentialities should be examined and tried out by the Christian church in prosecuting its evangelistic task.

These types of evangelism are in no sense rivals or competitors. Rightly understood, they supplement one another in the over-all strategy of prosecuting the evangelistic task on every possible front.

## II

This task of Christian evangelism should be discharged by all possible methods—of a dignified and worthy character, of course. A survey of the history of Christian evangelism discloses one striking fact, namely, that though the motive and the goal have always been the same throughout the centuries, the methods employed have varied markedly in each age. Paul, for example, had one method: he usually made for the local Jewish synagogue, and preached his gospel there in the hope of winning to Jesus Christ at least the Gentile fringe of "God-fearers" who had been attracted to the Jewish faith because of its monotheism and its high moral standards. Luther, again, of course, preached powerful evangelistic sermons. But probably his chief method of evangelism was the pamphlet—short, pithy, pointed—dealing with some basic Christian theme. Of such pamphlets he wrote many; they circulated widely not only throughout Germany, but even further afield, and won numerous converts to the Reformation Gospel. John Wesley, the greatest evangelist of the eighteenth century, being deprived of the opportunity of preaching in churches, went out into the open air, and speedily developed a technique of out-of-doors preaching which proved remarkably effective. He likewise enriched his worship services by employing hymns in public praise, these being written mainly by his brother Charles. And he not only allowed but even encouraged suitably gifted laymen to preach the gospel. In these ways was spread that Meth-



odist revival which did so much to revitalize the life of eighteenth-century England.

Charles G. Finney, the well-known American revivalist of the 1820's and 1830's, adopted what were called "new measures." These Dr. William W. Sweet explains thus:

The new measures which so aroused the conservative revivalists were his practice of inviting people under conviction to come forward and occupy what came to be called "the anxious bench"; of praying for people by name in public meetings; of permitting women to pray in public and in the presence of men; and of using what were termed "undignified means" of advertising his meetings."<sup>5</sup>

Dwight L. Moody, later in the nineteenth century, spoke straight home to men's minds, wills, and consciences in his evangelistic services, where he was greatly assisted by Ira D. Sankey's hymns and organ; and he evolved the technique of the "after-meeting," where enquirers could be dealt with personally and privately and pointed to the Lord Jesus Christ. Thus many methods have been employed throughout the church's history to bring men and women to decision for, and commitment to, Jesus Christ.

Today the same principle should be applied, and all worthy methods pressed into service to bring home the gospel message. Thanks to modern science, amazingly effective propaganda techniques have been devised: in particular, the press, the movies, the radio, and last but by no means least, television. The world knows how to exploit these tremendous techniques of popular persuasion for its own commercial ends. The communist masters of the Kremlin—like their former Nazi counterparts—have exploited them to the full. Is there any reason at all why the Christian church should not employ them in the great task of evangelism to which it is committed? To be sure, Christian preachers and educators have already made a beginning in using these new propaganda weapons; but much more will have to be done in all these fields before it can possibly be claimed that these methods of bringing the Christian message home to the unevangelized have been used at all adequately.

### III

This work of Christian evangelism should be undertaken by all professing Christians; for it is the responsibility of the whole church membership. Sometimes, at least, this has not been understood. It has been supposed that the work of Christian evangelism is something reserved for a

<sup>5</sup> *Revivalism in America*, pp. 135-6.

special group of professional revivalists, who go around from place to place conducting evangelistic campaigns of greater or shorter duration. Or, where that idea has been abandoned, it has been supposed that evangelism is the particular responsibility of the minister, the full-time paid servant of the church.

Undoubtedly, in the judgment of the present writer, much fruitful work has been done in the past by professional peripatetic evangelists such as Moody and Sunday, and much may be done by such men in the future. And, of course, evangelism is one of the basic duties of Christian ministers, who have made, and continue to make, an invaluable contribution in this way. But this task of Christian evangelism is the clear responsibility of all church members, lay as well as clerical; and that for several reasons. For one thing, the New Testament makes no distinction between clergy and laity: all who profess and call themselves Christians are kings and priests to God, and all have the same privileges and responsibilities in God's Kingdom. Again, there are many more laymen than ministers in the church; for every one minister there are hundreds of laymen. Moreover, in the work of Christian evangelism laymen have a psychological advantage; for, from the point of view of the prospective convert, the minister represents the paid salesman for Christianity, whereas the layman is the satisfied customer, who cannot help recommending something which he has found so richly satisfying. Once more, laymen have opportunities of evangelistic witness denied to most ministers, for they (the laity) get into places and touch groups ordinarily unreached by professional clergymen. Total evangelism, to be at all worthy of the name, must cover Chambers of Commerce, labor unions, legislatures, executive branches of government, and other similar areas of public life; but clearly, the evangelism of such places will have to be carried out mainly, if not exclusively, by laymen. It is one of the major virtues of the New Life movement that it has firmly grasped this important principle: that Christian evangelism, if it is to be anything like fully effective, must enlist the laity as well as the ministry, that it is, in fact, the task and responsibility of the whole witnessing church.

#### IV

Total Christian evangelism should appeal to every aspect of man's personality. That is to say, its message should enlist and capture man's thought, feeling, and will—all three aspects of his consciousness.

For long in America that popular form of evangelism known as re-

vivalism appealed overmuch to the emotions of the prospective converts—in some cases, indeed, producing scenes of something like hysteria. Today, however, there has been a sharp reaction against this wallowing in emotion, at any rate among ministers of the old-line denominations. As Dr. William W. Sweet puts it:<sup>6</sup>

The suspicion under which emotion has fallen as a result of the new psychology has served to discredit the old emotional revivalism. The type of evangelistic minister, who believed that there was a place in every sermon where the preacher should drill for water, no longer is found in the principal pulpits of the historic evangelical Churches.

This reaction against hyperemotionalism has its praiseworthy side. For it means that Christian preaching, including evangelistic preaching, should appeal to men's minds, as most assuredly it should. Therefore evangelistic sermons should not consist—as Dr. Albert E. Day says that too often they have consisted—of “some anecdotal exhortations interspersed with quotations from Scripture and a fervent use of pious shibboleths.” Rather, the evangelistic message must be based on sound Christian theology, that is to say, on a valid and authentic articulation of the meaning of Jesus Christ's Saviorhood for life today, and his triumphant adequacy to meet and satisfy all of man's deepest needs, or pardon, peace, and power.

At the same time, however, effective Christian evangelism will not overlook the importance of enlisting emotion in its service. Dr. Sweet asserts that “emotion has been so completely squeezed out of present-day Protestant worship, that the people are becoming emotionally starved.”<sup>7</sup> Whether this be altogether the case or not, the wisest and most effective Christian evangelism will never allow itself to forget those words of Jonathan Edwards which Dr. Sweet quotes: “He that has doctrinal knowledge and speculation only, without affection, never is engaged in the business of religion. . . . True religion is a powerful thing . . . a ferment, a vigorous engagedness of the heart.”<sup>8</sup> As every competent observer of human nature knows, emotion plays a highly important part in life, in moving the will and thus influencing decision. Many great resolutions are made emotionally; and a total Christian evangelism will recognize this fact and act upon it; so that its appeal will be not to man's reason alone, but to his feelings and will as well. Total Christian evangelism will enlist man's total personality—as did the message of Jesus Christ in the days of his flesh.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

## V

If total Christian evangelism is to be effective to its maximum degree, it must cover all of his life, it must speak to his total condition, it must bring a message of redemption which will include and sanctify every area of his activity.

Too often, at least in the past, the Christian message has been thought of, and even preached, as though it were primarily and even exclusively a private and individual affair—in the spirit of the hymn, one verse of which runs thus:

Nothing is worth a thought beneath  
But how I may escape the death  
That never never dies;  
How make my own election sure,  
And when I fail on earth secure  
A mansion in the skies.

But it must be realized that the gospel of Jesus Christ is a gospel of total salvation: it speaks redemptively and transformingly to the whole of man's life activity. It is not merely a message of redemption from a hell beyond the grave: it concerns itself with man's salvation in every hell of this present world. In other words, it must be preached as the only way of redemption not merely in a man's private devotional life—though, of course, it will begin there—but also for his every activity as a human being, in his family life, his business, his leisure, and his politics. Only thus is the gospel of Jesus Christ seen in its richness and fullness, as the message of him who is the Lord of all good life, and who came to earth that men might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.

# Ira D. Sankey and "Gospel Hymnody"

ROBERT STEVENSON

## I

BY WHAT CRITERIA shall we measure the greatness of a musical composer? By the number of copies his music has sold? By the amount of recognition he received from important personages during his own lifetime? By the stir his comings and goings made in newspapers? And by what standards, more especially, shall we measure the greatness of a composer in the sacred field? Shall his worth be measured in such terms as these: numbers of persons who have been added to church membership rolls, or have responded to altar calls, or have visited inquiry rooms under the spell of his music?

If we accept any of these criteria as determinative of true greatness, then Ira D. Sankey, unrecognized as he is by historians of serious music, deserves an important niche in the pantheon of composers; and if we accept lengthy concert lists as a measure of efficacy in sacred music, then Sankey, composer of "The Ninety and Nine" and "I Am Praying for You," vastly exceeds in importance such another well-known figure in sacred music history as J. S. Bach, composer of the *St. Matthew Passion* and the *Mass in B Minor*. *Salvation Songs and Solos* has undoubtedly "saved" millions. Whether any composition by Bach, on the other hand, has ever brought even a single person to the altar for a confession of sin or into the inquiry room for pastoral prayer is (to put it mildly) doubtful.

Only one of Bach's vast collection of over two hundred cantatas was published during his lifetime. But everything that Ira D. Sankey wrote was immediately published and avidly bought; just one collection of his sold in England alone eighty million copies within fifty years after its initial publication.<sup>1</sup> During a brief four months in London on his 1875 tour, Sankey sang such songs of his as "I Am Praying for You," "Yet There Is Room," "It Passeth Knowledge," "The Ninety and Nine," and others of the same type, to an astronomical audience of over two million

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<sup>1</sup> *The Ira D. Sankey Centenary*, New Castle, Pennsylvania, 1941, p. 35.

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five hundred thousand people.<sup>2</sup> It is an open question whether two million five hundred thousand persons as an aggregate total have listened to actual performances (excluding radio and records) of such masterworks of Bach as his Passions or his Masses in all the long years since first he conceived these compositions during the 1720's and 1730's.

During that one memorable year, 1875, when all Britain seemingly flocked to hear Sankey's songs as he rendered them in the Moody services, even Queen Victoria thought of hearing Sankey, although she decided against attending the meetings on account of the enormous press of the crowds. She wrote in a letter, "It would never do for *me* to go to a public place to hear him, . . . nor, as you know, do I go to *any large public places now.*"<sup>3</sup> William Gladstone, prime minister, did, however, hear Sankey's renditions of his songs, and a man like Lord Shaftesbury could assert that had Moody and Sankey "done nothing more than teach the people to sing such hymns as 'Hold the Fort, for I am Coming,' they would have conferred an inestimable blessing on Great Britain."<sup>4</sup>

The largest crowds ever assembled in New York history heard Sankey's songs at the New York Hippodrome during the 1876 Christian Convention. William Lyon Phelps, testifying to the power of Sankey's music not in New York but in Hartford during a later tour, spoke of it as "enormously affecting." Phelps remembered that Sankey "played his own accompaniment . . . He had a way of pausing between lines of the song, and in that pause the vast audience remained absolutely silent."<sup>5</sup> A sophisticated music critic wrote of the overwhelming power that emanated from Sankey's renditions: "Even the critical musician will allow its prodigious grandeur—a grandeur far different from that of a Handel festival, but more impressive, as it is natural, spontaneous, and enthusiastic."<sup>6</sup> That it was not Sankey's powers as a singer, but rather his powers as a composer that garnered him such extravagant devotion, is perhaps obvious when we read another trained musical observer's remarks:

A very erroneous opinion seems to exist among some people that this gentleman is an accomplished singer. Nothing can be further from the truth. Mr. Sankey has no pretensions of the kind and we question if he could vocalize properly the simplest exercise in the instruction book. He has possibly never had a singing lesson in his life. His voice is a powerful baritone of small compass.

<sup>2</sup> W. R. Moody, *The Life of Dwight L. Moody*. New York, 1900, p. 251.

<sup>3</sup> W. R. Moody, *D. L. Moody*. New York, 1930, p. 213.

<sup>4</sup> *The Ira D. Sankey Centenary*, pp. 33-39.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>6</sup> Gamaliel Bradford, *D. L. Moody, A Worker in Souls*. New York, 1927, p. 183.

And yet it was this singer with "no pretensions of any kind" who because he sang "with the conviction that Souls are receiving Jesus between one note and the next"<sup>7</sup> was able to tour England, Scotland, Ireland, the United States, everywhere triumphing; in the heyday of his touring he went as far afield as Egypt, Palestine, and appeared even in manifestly unfriendly environments, reaping adulation and applause such as only the most successful opera stars have gained.

## II

Who was this Sankey? His life story began unmusically. His father, like the father of Stephen Foster, enjoyed local prominence in Western Pennsylvania politics. During a period of time when William Foster was serving as mayor of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, David Sankey, father of Ira Sankey, was serving a term in the Pennsylvania legislature, representing Lawrence County. The only approach to music study he seems to have made occurred in 1860 when he took a short trip to Farmington, Ohio, where he met William Bradbury, composer of the music for "He Leadeth Me," "Just As I Am," and other favorites; Bradbury was a trained organist and choirmaster with years of European study and travel in his background. Just how much Sankey could have gathered from him in a brief singing convention is, however, not ascertainable. During the Civil War, Sankey, unlike Moody, whose coadjutor he was later to become, actually served in the Union Army, completing his service as a sergeant. He took a minor position in government service, and married the daughter of a state senator. He was elected Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association in New Castle in 1867, and went to Indianapolis as a delegate to a Y.M.C.A. convention in 1870. There he met D. L. Moody.

Moody, already one of the great names in American evangelism, immediately perceived Sankey's potential usefulness upon hearing Sankey rouse a slumbering audience into enthusiastic singing. "I have been looking for you for eight years," Moody told Sankey. Moody was an unmusical man himself; his early days in Sunday-school work had, however, convinced him of the immense usefulness of music in religious meetings. He used singing in his Chicago Sunday school in order to attract the gamins in off the streets, and to keep them happy after they got inside his barn. Whenever discipline lagged, music was interjected; once, for instance, he decided to thrash a recalcitrant pupil, but before grabbing the young man and hustling him off into the cloakroom he directed the Sunday school

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

to start singing as loudly as possible a familiar hymn. On another occasion a woman overpowered with excitement grew hysterical, whereupon Moody immediately called for the singing of "Rock of Ages" while the ushers carried the lady out. Moody could not himself distinguish one tune from another, as his son later testified,<sup>8</sup> and his approach to music was entirely pragmatic. In music, as such, he manifested no interest, but in music as a tool he was immensely interested. Any tool that he could use in evangelism was avidly scrutinized and then used in his own individual way.

Moody called Sankey with the urgency of the New Testament imperatives: "Follow me!" Sankey followed Moody to England in 1873, at a guaranteed salary of one hundred dollars a month. Beginning very modestly in York, with a small meeting in which only eight were present, the pair mushroomed into the most famous religious figures of the epoch. In Scotland, Sankey achieved a major victory. Faced by the Calvinist prejudices against solo singing and against organ accompaniments, he overcame both objections. He tactfully used as text for the first of his original songs composed for the Scottish meetings verses by Dr. Horatius Bonar, pastor of the Chalmers Memorial Free Church, Edinburgh. "Yet There Is Room," a collaborative venture with words by Dr. Bonar and music by Sankey, proved an immediate and enormous success. Sankey, before sitting down to play his own accompaniments at his small reed Estey organ, always prayed with the congregation that God would bless his singing, and use the music to bring salvation to many hungry, lost souls. This intimate approach prefaced by prayer helped to dispel the antagonism of the unco guid who hated organs as they hated sin. Only on one occasion is it recorded that a startled worshiper unprepared for the sight of an organ in church rose rigidly, and rushed from the hall, crying, "Let me oot, let me oot. What would John Knox say of the both of ye?" The opinion of the many was expressed by a prominent professor from Free Church College, Edinburgh, who said:

It is amusing to observe how entirely the latent distrust of Mr. Sankey's "kist o'whistles" [organ] has disappeared. There are different ways of using the organ. There are organs in some churches for mere display, as some one has said "with a devil in every pipe," but a small harmonium designed to keep a tune right is a different matter, and is seen to be no hindrance to the devout and spiritual worship of God.<sup>9</sup>

What Calvin's reaction would have been to this refined example of

<sup>8</sup> W. R. Moody, *D. L. Moody*. 1930, p. 198.

<sup>9</sup> W. R. Moody, *The Life of Dwight L. Moody*. 1900, p. 186.

reasoning is haplessly unobtainable. Sankey achieved a victory over Scottish conscience that not Bach nor Handel nor any other superlative organist had ever been able to achieve. An American Methodist, invading the stronghold of Knox, achieved the hitherto impossible. Publicizing the most spectacular series of meetings in Scottish history, Moody immediately "suggested that a fund of two thousand pounds be raised to send reports of the meetings . . . to *all* ministers in the United Kingdom."<sup>10</sup>

Sankey's methods were spectacularly successful; even such penetrating observers as Matthew Arnold, certainly no friend of American emotionalism, recognized the validity of the Sankey approach. Matthew Arnold in *God and the Bible* took to task the uninformed scientist who presumes to trifle with the great truths of religion, criticizing specifically one unenlightened scientist who grossly misunderstood the flux and flow of Christianity through the centuries. Compared with a scientist who knows nothing of the processes of history, Matthew Arnold declared that "Moody and Sankey are masters of the philosophy of history." Arnold felt the influence of uninformed "professors" who know nothing of the processes of time to be pernicious; such persons "instead of listening to the solemn and rhythmical beat" of the waves that come and go in man's spiritual history, choose instead "to fill the air with one's own whoopings to start the echo. But the mass of plain people hear such talk with impatient indignation, and flock all the more eagerly to hear Messrs. Moody and Sankey."<sup>11</sup> Arnold continued:

They [the mass of plain people] feel that the brilliant freethinker and revolutionist talks about their religion and yet is all abroad in it, does not know either that or the great facts of human life; and they go to the people who know them better. And the plain people are not wrong. Compared with Professor Clifford, Messrs. Moody and Sankey are masters of the philosophy of history.

Although Sankey was an innovator in Scotland when he finally persuaded congregations there to sanction an organ, and though he was the first, as George Stebbins tells us, to coin the name, "Gospel Hymns," for folklike tunes with enormous popular appeal, his theology was entirely conservative. In 1899, the year of Moody's death, long after Moody had dismissed Sankey from his service because of Sankey's failing health (although Sankey, of course, outlived Moody)—in 1899, we say, Sankey wrote this short summary of his faith: "Hold fast to the good old ways

<sup>10</sup> W. R. Moody, *D. L. Moody*. 1930, p. 159.

<sup>11</sup> Matthew Arnold, *God and the Bible*. London, 1904, p. xvi.

of our fathers:—believing the good old Bible from back to back. . . . I have found no new way to heaven.”<sup>12</sup>

### III

Sankey's influence today remains vital; a recent British hymnal, *Hymns of Prayer and Praise*, published by the Oxford University Press, includes seventeen Sankey hymns. The 1938 hymnal of The Church of England in Canada includes three.<sup>13</sup> Although Sankey was a Methodist, the Methodist hymnals have not given him any more attention than have the hymnals of other denominations and countries. Sankey was important because he was typical. Other gospel hymn writers were as prolific, and perhaps more inspired. George Coles Stebbins and Philip P. Bliss, to name only two other widely known composers of gospel melodies, contributed some of the best-liked tunes of the gospel movement. Bliss, Sankey's senior by two years, died in a train wreck at Ashtabula in 1876. Bliss's "Pull for the Shore, Sailor" was a great favorite with Crown Prince Humbert of Italy, who learned it as a child from his Waldensian nurses. The rector of St. Paul's Within-the-Walls, American Episcopal Church in Rome, used often to have "Pull for the Shore, Sailor" played on the carillon of his church in order to please the royal appetite for this number.<sup>14</sup>

Gospel melodies of the Sankey-Bliss-Stebbins-Doane type have been the staple of evangelical hymnals published for use in mission areas. Even in his own lifetime people in as distant countries as Egypt knew the Sankey-type melodies, and called for them when he toured the Near East. Hymnals published during the past half-century in China, Japan, Mexico, and South America, designed for evangelical situations, unfortunately or fortunately, depending on one's point of view, have specialized in "gospel hymns." Sankey's best-selling autobiography, *My Life and the Story of Gospel Hymns*, contains hundreds of anecdotes testifying to the "power" of gospel hymnody.

Musicians have felt that "gospel hymnody" is not an unmitigated blessing. Moody and his "legions of light" have generally treated music as a utilitarian art—not a fine art. As long as a piece of music demonstrates power to furrow fallow ground and prepare a crop of converts, music is welcomed. But the claims of music as an art with standards of

<sup>12</sup> Ira D. Sankey Centenary, p. 68.

<sup>13</sup> W. R. Runyan, "A Century of Sankey," *Moody Monthly*, 1940, p. 655.

<sup>14</sup> Walter Lowrie, "St. Paul's Within-the-Walls," *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church*, March, 1950, p. 27.



excellence which are independent of the numbers of converts supplied—such claims are not always gladly recognized by those who think of music strictly in utilitarian terms.

At a mammoth celebration in his home town honoring the returned conquering hero, Sankey presented several large gifts to the citizens of New Castle. The notice of the Sankey celebration read, in part: "The congregation then sang 'There Is a Fountain Filled With Blood.' The New Castle Octette next delighted the audience by giving 'Rock of Ages,' and they were followed by Rev. C. H. Dunlap, of the First Presbyterian Church, who offered a short prayer."<sup>15</sup> D. L. Moody demanded short prayers, and he demanded music that would delight the audience. Gospel hymnody does delight audiences. In an epoch when the churches must enlist the support of thousands of people who know nothing about music as an art, but only as a species of entertainment, gospel hymnody is a necessity. When a long-winded preacher prayed too lengthily, Moody, "who never loved long prayers and never made them, got impatient: 'While Brother Jones is finishing his prayer, let us all join in singing,'" Moody interrupted. Moody, who would interrupt even a long prayer if he felt the preacher was losing his audience, treated music, of course, with even more cavalier abandon. "He would have nothing whatever to do with a piece of music which only appealed to the sense of beauty." Moody's philosophy of music is a key to the understanding of the whole course of gospel hymnody. He judged music entirely in terms of its mass effect.

He could form no judgment . . . by hearing it played or sung in private. He must see it tried in a crowd, and could discover in an instant its adaptation to awaken the feelings which he needed to have in action. If it had the right ring he used it for all it was worth. "Let the people sing," he would shout—"let *all* the people sing. Sing that verse again. There's an old man over there who is not singing at all, let *him* sing." No matter how long it took, he would keep the people at work until they were fused and melted.<sup>16</sup>

This insensitivity to beauty in any of its forms—except as it appears in ethical conduct, the beauty of holiness—has caused many professional musicians to eschew gospel hymns. According to Kant's categorical imperative, every person deserves to be used not as a means toward some other objective, but as an end in himself. Professional musicians, quite naturally, have winced when they have been treated as means rather than as ends.

<sup>15</sup> *Ira D. Sankey Centenary*, p. 80.

<sup>16</sup> Bradford, p. 168.

Those musically minded persons who have been ready to sacrifice all canons of artistic excellence in order to reach the largest number of persons have been happiest in their association with gospel hymnody.

Gospel hymnody has the distinction of being America's most typical contribution to Christian song. Gospel hymnody has been a plough digging up the hardened surfaces of paved minds. Its very obviousness has been its strength. Where delicacy or dignity can make no impress, gospel hymnody stands up triumphing. In an age when religion must win mass approval in order to survive, in an age when religion must at least win a majority vote from the electorate, gospel hymnody is inevitable. Sankey's songs are true folk music of the people. Dan Emmett and Stephen Foster only did in secular music what Ira D. Sankey and P. P. Bliss did as validly and effectively in sacred music.

## Friedrich, Freiherr von Hügel

J. W. C. DOUGALL

THE PERIOD OF THE MODERNIST MOVEMENT within the Roman Catholic Church covers the closing years of the nineteenth century and may be said to end with the antimodernist declaration imposed by Pope Pius X on all Catholic teachers and clergy in 1910. It was in this period that Baron Friedrich von Hügel played an active part as critic and reformer. Von Hügel's connection with Father Tyrrell, the Abbé Loisy, Duchesne, Blondel, and other Catholic scholars in France, Germany, and Italy had given him a prominent place in the modernist movement. He had become known among scholars through a paper which he read at the International Catholic Congress at Freiburg in 1897, giving the results of historical criticism as applied to the Old Testament. It was a fundamental principle of his mind and outlook that the scientific method should be as fearlessly applied to the study of Scripture and historical institutions as to other subjects, and this he tried to do. But Loisy's books were condemned and he was excommunicated, the modernist reviews *Rinnovamento* in Italy and *Demain* in France (which held the movement together) were suspended, and the Baron himself was among those who were rebuked by the Roman authorities for pride, arrogance, and vanity. Then the papal decree *Lamentabili* of 1907 struck at the whole movement. It was followed by the Encyclical *Pascendi* of September 16, 1907, which set out the errors of the modernists, ordered their exclusion from chairs in seminaries and Catholic universities, prohibited the reading of their books, and set up a Council of Vigilance in each diocese to ensure the execution of these measures.

Von Hügel was in much pain and distress at this time. He was most closely attached to Father Tyrrell, whom indeed he had introduced to the study of historical criticism, and Tyrrell had been first of all dismissed from the Society of Jesus, then suspended from the administration of the sacraments, and finally excommunicated. Tyrrell, an Irish Protestant, convert to Rome, was a fighter, a determined individualist, who

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revolted against the discipline of censorship imposed by his Society. In a privately printed anonymous Letter addressed to a Catholic professor of anthropology, he had attacked the authority of the Roman Church. When the Encyclical *Pascendi* was published, Tyrrell replied in the *Giornale d'Italia* and then in two signed letters to the Times. By these actions, from which his closest friend von Hügel was unable to dissuade him, Tyrrell came into headlong collision with Roman authority, and his life ended in tragic and heartbreaking failure.

The attitude and method of von Hügel was quite different. He not only differed from many members of the group as they grew more negative, skeptical, hostile to the Church, and positivist rather than Christian in outlook. He also differed markedly in temperament and approach. He believed that the opportunity for reform existed as long as he could work within the Church but that, the moment he or any of the reformers incurred the sentence of condemnation, his work and influence were finished. So he kept pleading with his friends Tyrrell, Miss Maude Petre, and others, to fight with the flat of the sword, to keep their tempers, to answer criticism with respectful firmness, and to do everything possible to remain within the Roman Church. Yet it seemed at times as if he, like others, might be deprived of its sacraments, and as if in the end he escaped only because he was a layman whose influence lent prestige to the Roman Church in many places, and because his writings in any case were not of a kind to become popular or dangerous.

Von Hügel's attitude to the Church authority is shown in one of his essays entitled "Official Authority and Living Religion." He accepts the Roman authority as a normally necessary part of the fuller, more fruitful religious life. Organization is a necessary means but not an end. The Church as an organized institution cannot be traced back to Christ except in the most rudimentary form. The kind of infallibility claimed by Rome calls for reconsideration. These are radical assertions and it may be argued that von Hügel's conduct was less bold than his words. But the Church which he loved and needed, the Church which he accepted and defended, in spite of its errors, superstitions and excesses, was far greater, more mystical, more personal, than the Roman authority. It was the Church of the sacraments and of the saints. His own practice of religion centered in the Church. Though he set aside a fixed period daily for spiritual reading in the Psalms, Thomas à Kempis, and Augustine's *Confessions*, yet he attended Confession once a week or once a fortnight and repeated one decade of the rosary every day, so that his interior life should not lose touch with

the devotion of the people. Though he had probably more friends among the teachers and scholars of other churches than in his own, and though he confessed to having very few English Catholic friends with whom he could share his deepest thoughts, yet he wrote, "I am a child of the Confessional. I am a son of the great Roman Church."<sup>1</sup> Sometimes he spoke of institutional Christianity as his hair shirt and of the Roman Church as his deepest pain, but still it was to him the home of the soul and the deepest teacher and fullest representative of the costly supernatural heroic life to which he aspired.

The life of the teacher of religion, as he understood it, partakes of this character. At the conclusion of the first volume of *The Mystical Element of Religion*, he returns to the question with which he began—the question of how one soul can influence another soul or, as he now calls it, the secret of Spiritual Persuasiveness. And his answer is that the Universal and Abiding does not influence the life or move the will unless somehow it takes shape in a human life and accepts the limitations of the evanescent. To try and help on the life of another soul means therefore "a specially large double death to self on the part of the life-bringing soul,"<sup>2</sup> first in its willingness to communicate only the *essence* of its own experience and then in the acceptance of the partial and incomplete response of the other as sufficient at least for the time being, and not to be forced beyond its own apprehension of reality.

Von Hügel was never at school or university. He had various tutors at different times, Lutheran, Quaker, Jewish, Catholic, but it is to two men in particular that he attributes the most influence on his own character. The first was a Dutch Dominican friar whom he met in Vienna when he was eighteen: "a whole man," he says, "with all the instincts of a man, yet all mastered and penetrated through and through by a love of Christ and of souls."<sup>3</sup> And the other, even more potent, influence was that of Abbé Huvelin, a French secular priest to whom he went as a man of thirty-four. From the sayings of Huvelin collected by von Hügel and given in the memoir by Bernard Holland, it is clear that he not only took this man as his director but that he employed Huvelin's ideas and methods in the direction of his own pupils. He wrote once to his niece, "The spiritual world is a great world of facts, and you must learn about it as you would learn forestry from the forester. You are a goose if you cavil

<sup>1</sup> *Letters from Baron von Hügel to a Niece*. Edited by Gwendolen Greene. J. M. Dent & Sons, 1928, Introduction, p. xlii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Selected Letters*. J. M. Dent & Sons, 1928. Memoir, p. 5.



at that. I learnt all I know from Huvelin. What I teach you is him, not me." <sup>4</sup> Later he summed up Huvelin's character as "everywhere that tenderness in austerity and that austerity in tenderness which is the very genius of Christianity." <sup>5</sup> So along with Thomas à Kempis and Augustine's *Confessions* he often sent his pupils a hand-written copy of twenty or more sayings of Huvelin—though he would say when sending them how much less living and probing the words would be to them than to himself, who had gone to Huvelin at a time of sore need and had met, recognized, and submitted to that teacher's spiritual greatness and piercing vision.

The Baron's methods as a teacher are seen best in the case of his niece, Gwendolen Greene, a daughter of Sir Hubert Parry. She had known him when she was a child, but she was afraid of his deafness and of his ear trumpet. She was a woman of thirty-eight when she began to study under her uncle's guidance. His letters to her cover a period of six years and show the extraordinary trouble he took with her reading and learning. It was his habit to send her regular parcels of books, carefully selected to suit her stage and experience. These were accompanied by a letter explaining the particular value of the individual books and pointing out what she was to note with special care. Often he took the trouble to procure for her and for himself identical copies so that he could follow exactly what she was reading or he could read out passages to her when she came for a lesson, the references in either case being easily found by teacher or pupil.

The course of reading prescribed was largely in the classics and history: Caesar, Cicero, Virgil, Tacitus, Horace, Livy, Pliny, later Plato and Aristotle, all of these in translations. At intervals and later on he prescribed some of the Christian authors—Augustine, Tertullian, Jerome, and others—but principally it was a course in the classics and history. He wanted his pupil to be steeped in history, pagan and Christian, for this was all part of his philosophy of religion. In one of his letters, recommending Herodotus as an author, he writes to his niece, "I am sure that when, twenty years hence, you look back upon your life, you will specially thank God for this double current, the current directly religious—this very pure in quality and genially costly—the current not directly religious, this also very large and deep—a great bucket of pure water into which to drop drops of the purest religious wine." <sup>6</sup> At another time he writes, "Gradually I

<sup>4</sup> *Letters to a Niece*, Introduction, p. xv.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

shall give you more directly religious books to ponder; yet to the end these should be made to penetrate and purify a whole mass of not directly religious material and life. God is the God of Nature as of Grace. He provides the meal and the yeast. Let us act in accordance with this, His own action."<sup>7</sup> He warned his niece repeatedly against allowing the fascinations of Grace to deaden or to ignore the beauties and duties of nature. She must take it as a danger signal if she found Homer and Pindar insipid after Tertullian and the *Confessions*. Nature and Grace were parts of one great whole. "No grace without the substrate, the occasion, the material of nature,"<sup>8</sup> and, on the other hand, in the individual life, no nature without Grace. Again he wrote, quoting Aquinas, "Grace does not abolish Nature but fulfills and perfects Nature."<sup>9</sup>

This position which he worked out in various ways in his two-volume study, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, published in 1908, he had already reached ten years earlier in his correspondence with Father Tyrrell. In a letter setting out his agreements and disagreements with the teaching of the mystics he had written of experimental science, critical scholarship, and all study of phenomena as "a purifying medium." "Occupation with the concrete thing, the historical event, ought to have a normal and necessary place," he said, "in the very theory of spirituality."<sup>10</sup> The careful, disinterested study of facts and things was of permanent and irreplaceable value. Man who was deepened by religion had his mind disciplined and widened by the nonreligious thing. The nonreligious interests which he so urgently stressed in his direction of others were perfectly suited to provide "the rest, the expression, and the purification"<sup>11</sup> needed by the moral and spiritual side of our human nature.

Another feature of his teaching was his restraint and respect for the independence of those he tried to help. He had made a natural but serious mistake in regard to his own daughter Gertrude. He had hurt her spiritual eyesight by straining it to see what was not yet within her field of vision. He was not going to make the same mistake again. Consequently one of his constant themes is that there must be no forcing. We are to learn from watching the cows as they browse peacefully in the fields. Mentally and spiritually we are to take what suits us, passing by the rest, neither trying

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>9</sup> *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*. J. M. Dent & Sons, 1924, p. 213.

<sup>10</sup> *Selected Letters*, p. 73.

<sup>11</sup> *The Mystical Element of Religion*. J. M. Dent & Sons, 2nd Edition, 1927, Vol. I, p. 77.

to swallow what is not meant for our particular digestion, nor sniffing and snorting violently at what we do not understand here and now. It may be (and he hopes it will be) possible for us to assimilate later what others have found to profit them. We need not pompously affirm that we cannot see this or that. But we must not force ourselves to accept the principles and convictions of holy and learned men if that endangers our sincerity. So he advised in regard to spiritual reading which, in small doses, never more than fifteen minutes a day, had been his sustenance ever since he became a Christian: "A gentle passing by of whatever does not suit one's soul without a trace of would-be objective judging, for what repels or confuses us now might be the very food of angels."<sup>12</sup>

The Baron recognized the danger that his own strong faith and conviction might easily push some of his disciples into the Roman Church. Evelyn Underhill describes in her letters how, when she put herself under his direction five years before his death, he told her, a practicing Anglo-Catholic, that she must never think of moving on account of her religious preferences, comforts or advantages, but only if she was so decidedly called that she would feel it wrong to resist—and the Baron told her that he did not see any compelling reason why she should change. He told his niece also, "I never want to convert any soul that is practicing in good faith what religion it possesses. I only want to deepen and strengthen what it has already got."<sup>13</sup> He spoke of people who had changed under his influence and had become poor or even unpracticing Catholics, and how much he blamed himself for having unsettled them. He wanted to make the old Church as inhabitable as possible intellectually but not to proselytize. One Roman Catholic fallen away gave him more pain than a hundred accessions gave him joy. When his niece spoke of joining the Roman Church he begged her to put it off, to wait patiently for more light and to avoid all rash judgment and action.

We revert then to the question of how one soul can influence another soul, and ask how his philosophy of religion corresponds with his experience and methods as a teacher. To begin with he takes the whole personality as both the means of understanding and the medium of communication. To know God or any of God's creatures a man must become "outward-moving, humbly welcoming, generously interpretative, willing to accept dimness and obscurity"<sup>14</sup> in proportion to the greatness of the Object or

<sup>12</sup> *Selected Letters*, p. 229.

<sup>13</sup> *Letters to a Niece*, Introduction, p. xxxix.

<sup>14</sup> *Essays and Addresses*, p. 99.

Subject to be known. Darwin, to whom he points as illustration, only learned the character and habits of orchids, earthworms, and humming-birds because he was always loving, learning, and watching. He learned by humble observation and docility through a process of slow self-purification. So, argues von Hügel, God, the soul, all the supreme realities and truths, which are incomprehensible and at the same time indefinitely apprehensible, are to be known "slowly, laboriously, intermittently, not apart from our dispositions but as we are ready to pay the price, as we become less self-occupied, less self-centered, less obstinate, more gladly lost in the crowd, more rich in giving all we have and all we are."<sup>15</sup> God, then, is to be known by the whole personality growing at the daily, hourly cost of self, purified by the thing, and deepened by love of God and neighbor.

That insight into the means by which a man apprehends the deepest truth is the obverse of the teacher's experience of trying to impart something that is still too hard for the pupil to grasp. Here, the teacher, himself a humble disciple, realizes both that he is in touch with a reality greater than himself, and that his present experience gives him only a partial, imperfect, and confused knowledge of that greater reality. To illustrate this, von Hügel takes the analogy of a dog's knowledge of his master and a man's knowledge of God. "The source and object of religion," he writes, "cannot by any possibility be as clear to me as I am to my dog. The obscurity of my life to my dog must thus be greatly exceeded by the obscurity of the life of God to me, His reality and life, so different and so superior, so unspeakably more rich and alive than is or ever can be my own life and reality."<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the knowledge that I do have is real as far as it goes, and more complete than any analysis of it can be. So reality comes first, then knowledge of it, and only then the science of this knowledge.

Another important feature of his philosophy of religion is that as with every other degree and kind of reality we always apprehend God only in and with and on occasion of, yet also in contrast to other realities. Von Hügel, as one would expect, was strongly critical of Lutheranism and of all systems of religious thought which were hostile to the body and sought to eliminate the element of physical experience in religious apprehension. He worked this out in a lecture he gave in Edinburgh in 1914 which, according to his letters, appears to have been delivered in "dear old Dr. Alexander Whyte's library" when von Hügel was on his way to St. Andrews to receive the honorary degree of LL.D.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102f.

It was a principle with him and integral to all other convictions of the manner of God's revelation that the sensible world conveys the reality of the world of spirit, and that when we exclude the sense or incarnational element we leave Christianity abstract, intellectual, and morbid. This was congruous with his general position as to the transcendental element in experience, that the God whom he described as the Contrasting Other was to be known in and together with the world. The spaceless was to be encountered in space, the eternal in time, the one God to be apprehended in his real prevenience and condescension by many and varied approaches. Omnipresence, he claimed, could not have become a category of thought except as men had a sense of spatial difference. Man could not imagine eternity or think of God as everliving unless by experience of time and succession. So he could never apprehend spirit out of relation to body. Thus von Hügel was opposed to the idea of pure spirituality. He welcomed the external world of sense and symbol, not merely as a means of expressing religious sentiments but as God's way of awakening and feeding the soul. "I kiss my child not only because I love it," he said, "I kiss it in order to love it. A religious picture not only expresses my awakened faith. It is a help to my faith's awakening."<sup>17</sup>

In perfect accordance with this understanding of revelation is von Hügel's view of Nature and Supernature. He thinks that the revival of religion depends on a recovery of this vital distinction which was part of the outlook of the Golden Middle Ages, to which he appeals as far richer and more wholesome than the outlook of either the Roman or the Protestant Churches since the Reformation. "Not the contrast between sin and virtue but the difference between Nature and Supernature can furnish a solid starting point for the recovery, the resuscitation of religion, as by far the richest, the most romantic, the most entrancing and emancipating fact and life, extant or possible anywhere for man."<sup>18</sup>

There is also the well-known passage where he speaks of God's outward action as moving on two levels, the natural and the supernatural. "We thus recognise," he writes, "in man's actual life a polarity, a tension, a friction, a one thing at work in distinctly another thing, like yeast in meal, like salt in meat, like coral-insects and whole coral-reefs in the huge ocean, so different from themselves."<sup>19</sup> Later, in the same essay, he speaks of the natural as the dim background of our lives, the honesties and

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 280.

<sup>19</sup> *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, Second Series. J. M. Dent & Sons, 1928, p. 219.



decencies of average domestic and political life, while the supernatural is the Beatitude of Heaven, the Direct Vision of God. Again he expresses the same thing as the contrast of mountain and plain, Edelweiss and Alpenrose alternating with the cornfields and potatoes. This contrast, he describes elsewhere, as "tension to the verge of strain and détente to the verge of relaxation. In both these movements of the soul, God can and should be envisaged; in the détente, the God of Nature, the source of all that is wholesome and homely; and in the tension, the God of supernature, the source of all that is ardent and heroic."<sup>20</sup>

By this bridge or on this bridge we have reached what is perhaps the most characteristic feature of von Hügel's religious thought, the idea of tension, polarity, friction. Apparently he felt that this was his most important contribution to the study of mysticism and of religion at its highest and best. "The soul," he wrote in 1898, "can live to be fully normal in normal circumstances only by a double process: occupation with the concrete and then abstraction from it, and this alternately on and on."<sup>21</sup> "Two movements," he said twenty years later, "yield the richest fruit and fascination of Catholicism, of attachment and of detachment, of particularity and of abstraction, of sense and of spirit, of time and of eternity, of place and of ubiquity."<sup>22</sup> At other times he expressed this polarity in terms of religious and nonreligious interests. "For myself," he confessed, "I must have both movements, the palace of my soul must have somehow two lifts, a lift which is always going up from below and a lift which is always going down from above. I must both be seeking and be having. I must both move and repose."<sup>23</sup> Elsewhere he expressed the double movement in terms of a religious and a humane ethic. He criticized Thomas à Kempis because, in the *Imitation*, the world-fleeing movement had displaced the world-penetrating, world-seeking movement. Von Hügel never pretended that this double beat in religion or in life was easy to achieve. If, as he wrote, quoting St. Bernard, grace works in man's free will and the free will finds itself through grace, yet a man must "pray as if all depended on his prayer and work as if all depended on his action."<sup>24</sup>

These "two eyes of religion, the twin pulse-beats of its very heart,"<sup>25</sup> are most characteristic of von Hügel's life and teaching. His two volumes on mysticism point to this same conclusion. The priority, givenness, pre-

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Selected Letters*, p. 72.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 254.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 354.

<sup>24</sup> *The Mystical Element of Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 70, 80.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 395.

venience of God—that is the one pole. The necessity of the Cross—of choosing between the “noble pangs of spiritual childbirth, of painful-joyous expansion and growth, and the shameful ache of spiritual death, of dreary contradiction and decay”<sup>26</sup>—that is the other. Religion, he compares, following Troeltsch, “not to a circle with one center but to an ellipse with two foci.”<sup>27</sup> There is severe antagonism and a close interior union between the world and God.

We may illustrate this by two anecdotes told of von Hügel himself. When describing the richness of the Catholic contribution to religion, he spoke of the beauty not only of marriage but of celibacy as a religious vocation. Then he added, “Christianity for me is essentially, centrally, a heroism.”<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, when speaking of Parkman’s long writing on Canadian history, he told how in spite of bad health, he worked on and on till he finished his task. “And yet,” added von Hügel, “there was no religion in the hard work and sacrifice.” “What is religion, then?” asked his friend, Mrs. Chapman. “Religion,” he answered, “is adoration.”<sup>29</sup> To the end there is this tension and friction. Always there are the two poles in thought and prayer and action. Yet there can be no doubt which is primary. “The Gospel,” he quotes again from his favorite Troeltsch, “ever remains with all possible clearness and keenness, a promise of redemption, leading us away from the world, from nature and from sin, from earthly sorrow and earthly error, on and on to God. Great as are its incentives to Reconciliation, it is never entirely resolvable into them. And the importance of that classical beginning ever consists in continuously calling back the human heart, away from all Culture and Immanence to that which lies above both.”<sup>30</sup>

In his own way that is what von Hügel still does for us.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 359.

<sup>28</sup> *Selected Letters*, p. 328.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>30</sup> *The Mystical Element of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 360.

# The Relevance of the Fall

WILLIAM HORDERN

IT IS NOT TOO LONG AGO that all thinking men were agreed that the concept of the fall had been left behind with other ancient superstitions of man. Any idea of a golden age in the past was denied in the light of an ever-ongoing progress that was carrying mankind from a state of barbarism toward a state of future bliss and perfection. However, it would appear that the idea of the fall was too quickly laughed out of court. Today we find that the two most widely followed philosophies of history, the Christian and the Marxian, are again making use of an idea of the fall. This raises the question as to why this idea, so recently abandoned without regret, should once more claim the minds of thinking men.

## I

The idea of a past golden age and the fall therefrom has haunted the mind of man since the days of his earliest thinking. Most of the great Greek thinkers held some form of the theory. It is true that the Greeks generally saw history running in cycles and repeating itself, but they usually believed that their age was in that part of the cycle in which disintegration was ruling. Stoicism, in particular, founded its doctrines on the belief in a past golden age. It is rather significant that the only school of Greek philosophy which did not hold to such a concept was the Epicurean which was built upon the materialistic atomism of Democritus. That is, the most coldly rationalistic group failed, as later rationalistic groups have failed, to see any meaning in the story of man's fall.

Greece was not alone in holding this concept. The two sages of ancient China, Lao Tze and Confucius, both held to a belief that the golden age was past. The idea also occurs in Hindu thought, so it may well be said that the idea was a universal concept in the ancient world.

Although the idea of a fall had a long and distinguished history both outside of and within Christianity, it seemed that the nineteenth century had dealt the belief a death blow. Natural science proved that the Garden of Eden could be no more than a myth, and biblical criticism agreed. The

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idea of evolution gave man the belief that his species had climbed up from dark antiquity in the primeval slime, had evolved its way through a long history, and was moving on toward an earthly Valhalla of perfection. Actually there was not, in evolutionism as such, any doctrine of progress, but only a doctrine of change. Evolution was misread in terms of progress, which gave man the hope of certain progress in the future. Further, it was accompanied by scientific discoveries which banished ancient enemies and fears of man, and this practical progress did more than the theory of evolution itself to give man an idea of inevitable advance. Hence a Spencer confidently forecast that evil would and must disappear.

Ironically enough, the idea of progress had no sooner gripped the mind of man than the facts of history began to jar it from its moorings. Even the nineteenth century had thinkers who saw that the great technical advance was accompanied by the increase of slum areas and that poverty was as widespread as ever. The idea of progress was always more logical to the middle-class intellectual of the western world than to the working class in his own country or to anyone in Asia or Africa. But it took the twentieth century, with its series of historical catastrophes, to put a final end to the hope. If inevitable progress is not a dead philosophy today, certainly each day's headlines leave it weaker.

## II

Although Christian thinking had abandoned the idea of the fall, the twentieth century is witnessing a return to the doctrine. Once man grew used to accepting the biblical story of the fall as a myth, it took on new importance as an interpretation of man's condition. Today many theologians are finding new facets of truth in the old conception. To such persons the fall represents the cleavage in man between the essential goodness of his nature and his existential unrighteousness.

Interestingly enough, the Marxians also have an idea of the fallen condition of man. For them the Garden of Eden was the primitive *gens* organization where a simple communism reigned and life was free of exploitation. Into this blissful scene came the serpent in the form of private property. As a consequence, man fell; the original communism gave way to a system of man exploiting his fellow men. From this all other evils flowed; for example, even the sex relationship fell from its original basis in natural love to a union based on property relationships. This resulted, in turn, in adultery, prostitution, and the subjugation of women.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Engels, F., *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*.

The Marxian doctrine is, however, a post-Christian one. Whereas the ancients, in their view of the fall, pictured the golden age as gone forever and history therefore without hope of salvation, Marxism follows Christianity in looking for a redemption from the fall. In both Marxian and Christian forms, the original righteousness of man stands as a background of light to bring out the darkness of man's present state. It haunts man's memory as a picture of what he might still be. It stands as a challenge to what he may yet become.

From the Christian point of view, however, there are certain grave weaknesses in the Marxian idea of the fall. Since, according to the Marxians, sin came into the world with the rise of private property, that is, with a special social system, it follows naturally that sin can be wiped out and the fall reversed by a change in social conditions. This is the trap into which Marxism fell when it painted its utopian picture of the future classless society. It is just this utopian element, based on the view of the fall, which has led all Communists to hold up modern Russia as a standard of perfection. No criticism is allowed because Russia stands beyond the revolution, that is, it has finally been saved from the fall. To criticize Russia would be to abandon their whole doctrine and admit that evil was more than the result of the social forms. Of course, this is not to say that the Communists have any monopoly on self-righteousness, but it is to understand the particularly stubborn nature of it in the Marxian concept.

Christians may often be as self-righteous as the Communists, but at least there is that in their creed which acts as a check upon undue pride. Sin is seen as something so stubborn, the fall of man so serious, that Christ alone has achieved the lost righteousness. In Christian thought, the fall symbolizes that man chooses to live for himself and his own selfish ends rather than to live for God. On this basis it is clear that while private property, used for exploitation, is an expression of man's fallen nature, it cannot be the cause. If man were not predisposed toward his own self-interest, instead of toward God, he would not make private property the means of exploitation. Therefore transferring private property from the capitalists to the commissars is not an alchemy that changes the base metal of human nature into gold. In short, the Christian is protected from self-righteousness by the fact that he takes the fall more seriously than the Marxian.

### III

Nevertheless, there is one aspect of the Christian doctrine which is overlooked by some modern theologians. These men have the tendency



to use the fall only for understanding the psychology of the individual. In abandoning the historicity of Genesis, some have too quickly assumed that there is no historical locus of the fall. Even those who have most strongly rejected the idea of progress have nevertheless retained the idea that there is no stage of history which represents a more ideal condition of man than our own. This is not to say that they consider the present as ideal; rather they see all stages as equally miserable. But is this so?

One does not need to accept the ideal picture of the primitive communism which is drawn by Marx; but a realistic study will, I believe, reveal that neither is the life of primitive man simply "nasty, brutish and short." Primitive life, with all of its ferocity, does have a harmony of relations which has been lost. Primitive man quite often does show a freedom, a dignity, and a sense of brotherhood that puts modern man to shame. After all, it was the civilized men who taught the American Indians to take scalps. A modern anthropologist, William Howells, has said, "Your chances of being psychotic would be less in many primitive tribes than right where you are, surrounded though you may be by sanitation, law, psychiatry, uplifting literature."<sup>2</sup> The march of civilization is loss or fall as well as gain or progress.

Starting with this clue we see that a basic truth in the idea of the fall is that as man has gained, through knowledge and science, a control over the forces of nature, he has been losing his control over history. The same advances that have made life more comfortable and convenient have also made it more dangerous. Man's sinful weakness, the lust for power, self-sufficiency, exploitation have remained a continual danger in every stage of history. As science places more and more power in the hands of man, these sinful tendencies gain a new potency. As a result, civilization begins to assume the aspect of deterioration. The knowledge that produced the atomic bomb has not been able to produce a method of controlling its use. But it is not just a matter of the atomic bomb, though the bomb does put it into sharper focus. Every advance that man has made along the road once called progress has been purchased at a price.

Increased knowledge brings increased problems because man's reason is fully capable of controlling matter, but is not capable of controlling man. Rationalization, in place of reason, is as prominent among the educated as among the uneducated. This is not to say that man ought to act unreasonably, but it is to recognize that man needs more than reason in order that he act reasonably. When it is glibly said that the science which has given us

<sup>2</sup> Howells, William, *The Heathens*. Doubleday and Co., 1948, p. 2.

our techniques must now show us how to use them, we have two legitimate questions to ask. First, even if science can find a solution for our political and moral problems, how can we persuade men to follow it? Secondly, if the problem is that man's knowledge of natural science has outstripped his political and moral science, we can only ask why this is so when natural science, as we know it, is only two or three centuries old, while political and moral questions have been studied by the best minds of men for thirty centuries and more? Is not the answer that the political and moral realm is not a field in which reason alone can work, while natural science is? As a result, the growth of knowledge, instead of saving man, as the heralds of progress believed it would, has brought a whole host of problems that our forefathers never knew or imagined. Today we are in a position where further eating from the tree of knowledge can only raise more flaming swords at the east of more Edens that we have left behind (Gen. 3:24), unless we can acquire that wisdom which is more than knowledge.

Another aspect of the fall is seen in the fact that evils usually begin in small and seemingly harmless fashion, but they have a tendency to grow and entrench themselves until they become institutions which Paul Tillich has aptly called "demonic." They become so powerful and widespread that many forms of goodness depend upon them. The result is a fallen historical situation in which great areas of good and evil stand or fall together. Under such circumstances the purely moralistic approach that hopes single-handed to destroy evil is utterly utopian. An excellent example of this is imperialism. One of the most disillusioning facts of recent history has been that European reform parties which have, while in opposition, condemned the imperialism of their nations, have, when in power, shown a great reluctance to cut themselves free from old imperialism. This is because imperialism had become so deep-seated that the very standard of living of the ruling nation was dependent upon it. To destroy imperialism would also be to destroy many of the democratic advances made in the imperialistic countries. When such a position is reached, righteousness can be purchased only at the price of a cross.

A further truth of the fall is that as history moves on, the effects of sin accumulate. "The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge" is a hard saying. Unfortunately it is a truth of history. Any deep analysis of the causes of the present cold war takes us back not only to the acts of Hitler, to Munich, and the depression, but beyond, to the Treaty of Versailles and the Russian Revolution. And the causes of these lie still further back in such things as the Treaty of

Vienna and Tsarist tyranny. The result is that we find ourselves in a tragic situation. Our choices are limited and a way must be chosen, not because it is the ideal Christian way, but because it is the lesser of two evils. This means that a Christian, though having the highest of motives, is forced to take a stand that will be filled with grave risk and considerable imperfection. If he sincerely backs America's present foreign policy, he is following a path that may well lead to the destruction of all civilization in atomic warfare. On the other hand, his equally sincere pacifist brother is advocating a course that may well hand the world over to Communist tyranny. So the sins of man accumulate, and we can never act in a purely ideal fashion because we have no way of choosing the situation in which we must act. The fallen situation dictates to us only a limited number of possibilities for action. Therefore good will or sincerity is not enough to assure success or victory. That is why Jesus was crucified. Only as we understand this fallen nature of history can we hope to meet the demands which it puts before us.

#### IV

It can be said, and there is considerable truth in it, that the present return to the concept of the fall is simply the disillusionment natural to a situation of world crisis and despair. Nevertheless, it is also true that in times of crisis we often see life most clearly. Times of ease and comfort seldom show the real nature of a man, neither can they show the real nature of history. But one thing should be stated clearly. While there are points of contact between a simple cry of despair and disillusionment, heard frequently today, and the idea of the fall of man, the Christian idea of the fall is basically opposed to despair. The message of the fall is that the present chaos and disaster of history is not a natural state of being. Man was not ever thus, he need not always be as he is. Man can be changed, redeemed. If man's increase in knowledge creates new problems in history, it also creates the tools with which they can be overcome if new moral energies are found, as they are found in Christian life. If evil entrenches itself in demonic institutions, the Christian believes that goodness is also institutionalized in the divine institution of the church, although we must not forget that the church itself may become demonic. And if the evil acts of men accumulate into an historical fate, it is no less true that the acts of Jesus and his followers also accumulate into an historical redemption—the Kingdom of God.

This is why the fall provides the frame for the most realistic and yet the most hopeful theory of history. It can face the reality of a world

that is not getting better but worse. It does not need to hide its head in the sand before any dark fact, as the theories of progress always ignored the Dark Ages or the economic ills of their own time; but still it does not give way to despair. In the world as we see it today the Christian insights about the fall have assumed an urgent relevance. The fact that the Marxists are also groping after a similar idea strengthens our faith in its relevance. Nevertheless, the Marxians have refused to accept the full implications of the doctrine and so it has become in their hands an instrument of self-righteousness, which in turn accelerates the fall of history. In Christian hands it can become a newly enlightened approach to the problems of man.

# Sholem Asch—Man of Letters and Prophet

RALPH W. GEORGE

ON ONE OF THE THOROUGHFARES of Stamford, Connecticut, appropriately enough called Sky Meadow Drive, lives a slight, modest writer now nearing the age of threescore years and ten. When he speaks, one notes that his English is broken. Yet this quiet figure, who must write in Yiddish, but who thinks in terms common to all men, is one of the outstanding novelists of the Western world. Certainly, for the moment, he is the leading man of letters among American Jewry.

Sholem Asch was born in Poland, November 1, 1880. He was trained for the rabbinate. But like his contemporary, Lloyd Douglas, he turned from the ministry of the spoken to the written word. He was only twenty-one when he first became an author. Coming to America in 1910, as if he already saw the ominous clouds on the European horizon, he shortly took his place among our foremost Jewish writers—Israel Zangwill, the O. Henry of New York's ghetto, and Edna Ferber with her unforgettable stories and her inspired autobiography, *Peculiar Treasure*.

The novels, stories, dramas, serious works, and magazine articles which lend special luster to this son of Israel are largely the fruitage of the past twenty years. They include brief tales such as are gathered up in the volume, *Children of Abraham*; novels like *Song of the Valley*, *Mother*, *Three Cities*, *The Nazarene*, and *The Apostle*; essays of the type "I Adopt an Ancestor" in the *American Mercury*; and notable affirmations of faith such as *What I Believe* and *One Destiny*.

## I

The power of Sholem Asch has numerous roots. One of these is a certain subtle humor. One might judge from his writings of the past decade, tinged as they often are by the consciousness of his people's tragedies, that he lacks any such feeling. Yet among the tales in the collection, *Children of Abraham*, is one called "From the Beyond." Here an elfish glee delights and fascinates the reader. The story concerns one Boruch

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Mordecai, who was thought to have died. But when the undertaker arrived, Boruch suddenly roused from his coma, sneezed, and to the consternation of everyone demanded that his wife produce a bowl of grits and milk. Somewhat later, when it had been explained to Boruch that he was supposed to have passed on, he decided to agree. Yes, he gradually acknowledged, he had traveled to the Great Beyond and there had seen the Dark Angel. Indeed, as the days came and went, and his egoism was constantly fed by the curiosity of his neighbors, he recalled that he had talked with the Dark Angel. As a matter of fact, he had not only talked with him, but had actually defied him. His speech brought submission from that King of Shades so that all his ancestors who stood about the heavenly court were both surprised and pleased. To his credulous acquaintances he would exclaim, "You should have seen them open their eyes." And then he would add, "Take my word for it, a man who knows how to use his tongue doesn't have to be afraid of anybody. The main thing in life is to be able to stand up for your rights, and to speak up."<sup>1</sup>

"Years later," concludes our author, "when Boruch Mordecai really died, he lay three days and nights on his bed. They were afraid to go near him. Who could tell? Perhaps Boruch Mordecai was having it out a second time with the divine council, and perhaps it would end up the same as before. After all, he was a man who knew how to stand up for his rights."<sup>2</sup>

Another source of Sholem Asch's power lies in his use of materials familiar to him but unfamiliar to his American readers. His early novels have their roots largely in the life of Eastern Europe—Poland particularly, and Russia—as in the case of *Three Cities*. *Salvation*, a novel of Poland in the late nineteenth century, is a good example of the way in which our artist weaves together the colors and sounds which he had known in childhood. It is a story of life in a small, isolated town, unfolding a modified feudalism and a core of folklore and superstition which have now passed away forever.

The hero of this tale is a strange character named Jechiel. He wanted to become a rabbi versed in the holy books of his fathers. Intellectual achievements, however, were beyond him. Yet in the eyes of his fellows he became a rabbi, so kind was he to the poor and distressed, so subtly helpful to those who sought him out with their problems and anxieties.

<sup>1</sup> Sholem Asch, *Children of Abraham*. Copyright, 1942, by Sholem Asch. P. 97. Courtesy, G. P. Putnam's Sons.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99.

Through the story there runs a vein of Jewish mysticism. In fact, one might readily believe that within the frail frame of this Psalm Jew, as he was jeeringly called, our author has tried to compress the personality of St. Francis of Christian history. Surveying the fields of his penurious countryside, so weary after the summer heat and the labored harvest, their furrows seemed to him like the lines in an aged face. Thus moved, he would exclaim, "Good morning, dear earth! How good you are, how lovely is the zeal with which you serve the Lord's will. If only Jeziel were half so good a servant of God as you are!"<sup>3</sup>

*Salvation* was published in 1934. In addition to its other qualities, one catches here the undertone of a purpose more compelling than that of an author who is simply writing to earn a living. For this tale is a study in religious tensions. Woven among its various strands is that of the love of Reisel, daughter of the Jewish horse merchant, Selig, for Stephan, a Catholic youth. In the intricate plot which is a description of their attempts to be married, we hear a prophet beseeching men to seek something higher than common hatreds and outworn superstitions.

What this better goal of life can be is set forth more clearly in Asch's more recent novel, *East River*. Here the scene is American rather than European—48th Street, from First Avenue to East River, New York City. The narrative is largely a cross-section picture of people who lived in or near one block. Within or close to its walls we meet the Davidowskys, the McCarthys, the Greenstocks, the Maloneys, the Hirsches. One of the main threads of this flowing story has to do with the marriage of Irving Davidowsky and Mary McCarthy. With marvelous fidelity to outer fact and inner feelings, the author causes us to see the strains involved in the mingling of such divergent faiths as Judaism and Roman Catholicism. The economic and social tensions are not forgotten, but they are secondary to the religious.

Sholem Asch's solution of the problem he depicts so profoundly is set forth in the character and disposition of Moshe Wolf Davidowsky, father of his family. He was deficient as a businessman, but proficient as a saint. The marriage of his son to an Irish girl, a member of that group which taunted his fellow Jews as "Christ-killers," was a staggering blow. But when that marriage faltered and his own wife left him, so that Mary, homeless, came to him as housekeeper, a strange spiritual evolution began. He could not have kosher food, especially on Christian holy days, save as

<sup>3</sup> Sholem Asch, *Salvation*. Copyright, 1934, by G. P. Putnam's Sons. P. 315. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons.

Catholic hands prepared it. And how could Mary, whose highest loyalties before marriage had been given to Rome, demean herself to cater to an old man's pagan whims? Yet both yielded, shortly, to a gracious tolerance and co-operation, a mutual submission which paved the way even for Mary and her husband to effect a reconciliation.

No wonder that Sholem Asch, having told a story in which the most formidable of human barriers are scaled, should afford his hero a fitting reward. The old block on 48th Street was to be torn down and Moshe Wolf was to go to live with his reunited son and daughter-in-law on fashionable Riverside Drive. But before leaving, the old man begged the privilege of staying once more on a Friday night with his ancient friend, Shmuel Chaim. Thus, for the last time, might he sit with other orthodox Jews on a Sabbath eve while a beloved rabbi explained the mysteries of their faith. So he carried to his cot and his dreams the scene of the evening's lesson. There "he remembered the words of the Sabbath song—'Prepare the Sabbath feast for the worshipers.' See! The Zaddikim were expiring with longing for the effulgence of God, for the love of God. . . . And in his sleep Moshe Wolf joined them, to expire with them, in longing . . . and in love. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

No doubt we should pause in our search for the philosophy or motivation of this Jewish author to note the exalted quality of his style. He does not stoop to the vulgarity and profanity of a Steinbeck or a Hemingway. Sholem Asch belongs to the classic tradition in literature, to the school of Dickens and Thackeray and Scott. Indeed, so far as an incomplete but wide reading of his works can discover, only one of his novels plays up the sex instinct to any degree. Yet even in this tale, *The Mother*, he does not begin to touch the depths sounded by our so-called realists. The fact is, Sholem Asch is a true son of Israel, not to be identified too closely with any one of its groupings—Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform—but a devout Jew for whom the Third Commandment is as sacred a word as was ever written.

## II

Is it not a bit curious that in our time, so often called a faithless age, fiction should turn so frequently to the New Testament and to Christian thought for its materials and its magnetic phrases? Zofia Kossak unfolds a chronicle of the early thirteenth century with St. Francis at its center, calling it *Blessed Are the Meek*. Lloyd Douglas offers us *The Robe* and *The*

<sup>4</sup> Sholem Asch, *East River*. Copyright, 1946, by Sholem Asch. P. 438. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons.

*Big Fisherman.* But of all the geniuses who have employed the beginnings of our faith as a basis for a story, Sholem Asch is outstanding. Indeed, for a fresh understanding of the Gospels and Epistles which is scholarly, but not laboriously so, he is an altogether indispensable resource for the Christian minister.

In the trilogy comprised of *The Nazarene*, *The Apostle*, and *Mary*, the purpose which has become increasingly dominant in our author's thinking stands out clearly. It is that of reconciling, if possible, the Jewish and the Christian cultures. *The Nazarene* is the story of Jesus in novel form. It is presented by means of an unusual device, that of first-person narratives by three very unlike characters: a Roman officer, Judas the disciple, and a young man of Jerusalem who appears as a student of Nicodemus. The first chronicle, by the officer Cornelius, provides us with a sweeping panorama of the Jerusalem of 2,000 years ago. In this account we visit Herod at his summer palace, witness the dance of Salome, and watch her as she is presented with the head of John the Baptist. Even in these necessarily sordid lines the author makes us feel the spiritual power of the Nazarene. Part Two is a magnificent piece of cadenced prose which suggests that the betrayal of Jesus was simply an act of misguided loyalty. And Part Three is a highly dramatic record in which the author places the blame for the crucifixion not on the Jews as a people, not on the Pharisees who are sympathetically portrayed, but on the selfish Sadducees and the Roman officials.

Here surely is a volume which none of us can afford to overlook. For *The Nazarene* is a vivid, artistic, and satisfying work, as brilliant as it is accurate. It has been said by some critics that no one but Sholem Asch possesses both the technical knowledge and the literary skill to write such a book. This statement might well be true also of *The Apostle*, with its 800 pages set forth in the grand tradition of the heroic novel. In his research, our author has scanned the Book of Acts, the Epistles, and contemporary secular literature for every shred of available evidence. Here we meet in colorful array the familiar figures of the later New Testament. We gain a rare understanding of what life in the cities was like in that era: its depravity, its loathsome amusements, its squalor and poverty, its political degradation, its economic unsoundness. We feel tremors of that decay of empire which was shortly to become final. We are introduced to some of the major pagans of those days—to the Emperors Caligula and Nero, and to Seneca, the philosopher. Religion, politics, and social customs are subjected to the most minute and detailed treatment.

Paul himself is presented to us as a divided personality—a schizophrenic. For the technique of the novelist, this theory of a split personality provides the basis for a plot: how could the hero's unity be secured? To the credit of Sholem Asch it must be said that although he does not allow his hero to find mental healing until just before his death, yet he does show his transformation as being due to the influence of Christ. A tense, dominating man grows patient and tolerant, finds a moving faith, and joins the mystics in his consciousness of oneness with God through Christ. And this is a great admission on the part of any Jew.

In his beautifully written story, *Mary*, our author concludes the trilogy begun in *The Nazarene* and *The Apostle*. It is, in fact, both prelude and postlude to his history of the beginnings of Christianity. As in the other works of this group, the environment of the main character is depicted with meticulous care. Only in this instance we find not a city with all its malformations but a village, Palestinian in every detail. We see a peasant home with its family affections and tensions, its furnishings, and the food and clothing employed on every occasion. Outside the house we have a close-up view of almost every plant in the garden and its uses, and of every animal in the fields beyond. Nazareth becomes a living reality as Sholem Asch describes the village characters together with their social and religious customs. Here again one feels the precarious economic and political basis upon which life rested, a system of taxes and exactions which took all of life save the spark of life itself. So realistically is this picture given us, imagination collaborating with historical insight, that it will be no longer possible to speak of Jesus' youth and early manhood altogether as "The Hidden Years."

With reverence and genius Sholem Asch recounts the life of Mary as suggested by the incidents relating to her in the Gospels: the Annunciation, her betrothal to Joseph, the Christmas scene, the journey to Jerusalem when the lad became twelve, the years in the carpenter shop, the wedding in Cana, and the episodes of his public ministry culminating in his death and resurrection. In following closely the New Testament, he has provided us with a Protestant rather than a Roman Mary, Jesus being but the first of several children. Having noted this fact, we must hasten to add that this Mary is indeed a new figure for most Protestants, a veritable link between earth and heaven.

Two contributions in particular are made by this novel to our understanding of the greatest of all mothers. First, it answers some of the questions which New Testament scholars have often raised. When did Jesus' unique self-consciousness first show itself? In infancy, replies our



author, with plausibility. To whom did Jesus relate the temptation experiences so that later they were available for literary uses? To his mother, declares Sholem Asch. How could a human and a divine nature be embodied in one personality? This man of letters answers with a picture of a normal physical body united to a consciousness devoid of every evil passion. Secondly, this story opens the door to the self-consciousness of Mary herself in which agonizing fear is followed by calm resolve, only to be succeeded again by fresh apprehensions. Quite aside from all its theological implications, this narrative is one of literature's most exquisite and daring delineations of the human spirit.

This trilogy—*The Nazarene*, *The Apostle*, and *Mary*—more than any other group of his works, allows us to peer into Sholem Asch's mind. As he confesses in his brochure, *One Destiny*, the horrors of the past fifteen or twenty years have convinced him that only one force can save our world—that of a union of the Jewish and Christian religions and cultures. For the consummation of this end he must himself become a prophet, vehement and passionate. Writing in the *Atlantic Monthly* for December, 1940, he pleads that "a bridge" be erected between the two faiths. So he dedicates himself to the vocation of a bridge-builder, not with steel, but with words and ideas and ideals. An astute and gracious builder of understandings he surely is, gifted beyond any outspoken ambassador of good will from our faith to his.

### III

How tremendous a leap he has attempted is evident from such a book as Dr. Kohler's *Jewish Theology*. For here a representative of Reformed Judaism sets forth the position of Jewish liberals. To them Judaism is both a religion and a racial inheritance. An Israelite may reject or accept the former. The latter he cannot escape, for he is born into it. This fact forms the first road block on the path to unity. Then, too, varying views of monotheism constitute an obstacle to a complete union of Jews and Christians. The belief in one God is the dearest possession of Israel. She grew toward it gradually. It is a major mark of distinction between her and paganism. So the church's doctrine of Christ's divinity appears to her as a form of heathenism, while the concept of the Holy Spirit seems but the counterpart of some feminine goddess. There are other difficulties also, such as the position of Paul, who regarded religion not so much as a way of life, Judaism's definition, but as faith in the death and resurrection of the Son of God, a totally unacceptable dogma to any descendant of Abraham.

Despite his genius and sympathy, Sholem Asch himself is not always

accurate in his interpretation of the Christian viewpoint as commonly held by Protestantism. In his stress on the messianic ideal as common to both religions it is evident that he regards every faithful Christian as an ardent Adventist in the literal sense of that term. Nor can we agree that Paul's transformation of character was merely an achievement in psychiatry. It was not unity of personality which the Apostle craved so much as an inner peace. This we believe he attained through trust in, and obedience to, his new-found Lord.

Nevertheless, having said this, let us hail Sholem Asch as a pioneer respected and beloved. For, with the main tenets of his faith—love of God and service to man, his praise of prophet and psalmist, and his recognition of the inner realities of a living religion—we can all heartily and joyfully agree.

# Preaching Values in the Revised Standard Version

FREDERICK C. GRANT

IT IS PROBABLY SAFE to say that there are more new translations of the New Testament, and even of the whole Bible, at the present time than there have been in any generation since the sixteenth century. Indeed, it has been estimated that, on the average, one new version has appeared every year since 1900. No one needs to argue the necessity or the advantage of this: the New Testament itself contains the answer—in the story of Philip and the Ethiopian. "Philip ran to him, and heard him reading . . . and asked, 'Do you understand what you are reading?' And he said, 'How can I, unless some one guide me?'" (Acts 8:30-31)<sup>1</sup>

The very *raison d'être* of the Bible, of a written record of revelation, of a sacred Scripture read at public worship and in private devotions, is to enable Christian people, and others, to understand the message of God to men. If men cannot understand the book, i.e., the language in which the message is expressed, how can they understand the divine message itself? The original language of the New Testament was the plain language of every day, raised to a somewhat higher level for religious purposes and containing a religious terminology, but not a purely literary, and never a bookish, language.

The translations of the New Testament began at an early date—the Old Latin and Old Syriac versions as early as *ca.* 150, it appears; and these were translations into the vernacular, not into a lofty literary diction and style. The Vulgate, the Bible of Western Europe for a thousand years and more, was, as its very name suggests, a translation into common speech. It was much opposed at first, but it won its way and became the Bible of the Latin church even as the Septuagint plus the Greek New Testament became the Bible of the Holy Orthodox Eastern Church: both Bibles have so remained, i.e., the official or "authorized" Bibles of East and West, to this day. The Reformation versions were in ordinary lan-

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<sup>1</sup> This citation, and later citations where indicated, are from the Revised Standard Version.

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guage, German, French, English, and other, so that the Scriptures might in truth be "understood of the people." There are at present over a thousand versions of the Bible or of parts thereof; new ones are being made every year by the American Bible Society, and by other societies, all in the interest of better understanding of the Word of God which holy Scripture contains and mediates. The old versions have been revised from time to time throughout Christian history—with the same end in view.

Moreover, new—that is, old—manuscripts have turned up from time to time, so that we have a better Greek text to work with than was possible fifty or seventy-five years ago; and, even more important, we know much more about *Koinê* (i.e., "common" or "everyday") Greek of the first century than was known in 1870 or in 1900—thanks chiefly to the thousands of Egyptian papyri that have been discovered, especially since 1900.

The result is that the New Testament now speaks to us with a freshness unequalled heretofore; it speaks the common language of Everyman—if only we can let it come through into English as simple and clear as the Greek in which it is written. It has fresh meanings for us today. Take for example the social implications of Christian faith, something undreamed of in the Jacobean era when the Authorized Version was produced; that social message is conveyed not only by the content of the New Testament message but even by its tone. It speaks to men directly, not through a class of official interpreters who alone know how to expound it—and who water it down to "suit the needs" of ordinary people! Furthermore, it speaks to the individual as well as to the church, but it speaks to the individual as a member of the church. True, there are plenty of passages that address the individual in his solitariness; but even in his solitariness he is still "a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven"—or at least he is one who has been called to be all this. It is this fresh understanding of the New Testament which provides the new "preaching values" in it.

## I

In the first place, the translation itself is fresher and more understandable. Some obscurities of specific words used in the older versions have been removed. For example, the laborers in the vineyard no longer receive a "penny" a day, but a "denarius" (Matt. 20:9). "Penny" may have been satisfactory in the sixteenth century, but it is preposterous now, and robs the parable of its entire effect. The point of the parable is that the owner pays a full wage to those who work all day, and in addition *gives* to those who have worked for a shorter time; he chooses to give to the last

what he paid to the first. It is a parable of divine grace and of the goodness of God, which no one can earn, even by a full twelve hours' toil. And a denarius, worth nearly twenty cents (in metal value) but with a purchasing value of probably four or five times that much in the first century, was like the standard "dollar a day" of the 1890's. It was the first-century equivalent of the good old Greek drachma, which had been standard in the eastern Mediterranean world for five centuries. True, the child does not know what a denarius is—any more than he knows what a *denár* is, in the *Arabian Nights*; but for that very reason it does not strike him as a ridiculous underpayment of the laborers.

Or take Phm. 9: how much more understandable, more pointed, more appealing is Paul's language if he addresses his friend Philemon, not as "Paul the aged" (which he was not, in all probability, since he had scarcely seen fifty years) but as "Paul, an ambassador (πρεσβύτερος) and now a prisoner for Christ Jesus" (R.S.V.)—an ambassador in bonds, no doubt, but an ambassador, nevertheless, of the Lord Christ! The "preaching value" of that one word hardly needs emphasis; the whole character of St. Paul gets summed up in it.

Or take the Prologue to Luke-Acts (Luke 1:1-4), which forms the combined Introduction and "Epistle Dedicatory" (to Theophilus) of the great two-volume apologetic work in defense of Christianity and the Christian church. Theophilus is no catechumen awaiting instruction in the early history of the church: he is more likely a Roman official, and what Luke is writing for Graeco-Roman readers (as Josephus wrote his *Jewish War* and *Jewish Archaeology* for a similar circle) is dedicated to an influential representative of them, so that he may know "the truth concerning the things of which [he has] been *informed*" (Luke 1:4, R.S.V.). After this accurate and up-to-date translation of the Prologue, every text and passage, every scene, discourse and incident, in the two volumes takes on fresh, new meaning.<sup>2</sup>

Or take Matt. 5:46. The "tax collectors" of the Gospels are not "publicans," either in the ancient sense (the Latin *publicani*, the great "tax farmers" of whole provinces) or in the modern (English inn-keepers or tavern-owners are "publicans"); nor are they "tax-gatherers," who go about the country assessing property and collecting taxes. They are "tax collectors," resident in one place, to whom people come and pay their taxes, or who operate the toll booths or customs offices on the frontier.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Burton Scott Easton, *The Purpose of Acts*, Macmillan, 1937, on the apologetic purpose and motive of Luke-Acts.



Or take Luke 2:7. The newborn babe is not wrapped in "swaddling clothes" (there is no such "clothing"), but in swaddling—or swathing—"cloths," long pieces of soft fabric that wrap it tightly. Nor in the case of the Babe of Bethlehem and his mother was it true there was no "room" for them in the inn, as in a hotel where all "rooms" have been taken, but there was no "place" (τόπος) for them, so Mary laid her child "in a manger."

Or take Matt. 23:24, which for generations has puzzled its readers: "You blind guides, straining out (διυλίζοντες: not 'straining at') a gnat and swallowing a camel." The figure is perfectly understandable now. It is not the religious formalist choking over an insect in his cup of wine, and straining as he swallows it, but the same formalist carefully straining out the gnat, with a spoon or a skimmer, but swallowing down the camel without hesitation. The figure is one of our Lord's characteristic exaggerations: his humor was Gargantuan, the kind Abraham Lincoln and many another "man of the people" has enjoyed—as have the common people (who "heard Jesus gladly," Mark 12:37) from time immemorial.

Or take I Cor. 13:1, where "sounding brass" and "tinkling cymbal" have become "a noisy gong" and "a clanging cymbal"—quite properly! Who ever heard a "sounding brass" or a "tinkling" cymbal? Cymbals are used at the end and climax of some great orchestral movement, where tremendous, crashing chords bring it to a thunderous close. Paul's point is certainly not that a man may be like a "tinkling" cymbal, gently tapped with one's finger and faintly ringing in the silence—but a blustering bravado, all "front" and "side" and no depth, like the ancient charlatan Salmoneus with old hides and bronze kettles tied to his chariot and pretending to be Zeus with his thunders.<sup>3</sup>

Or take Luke 2:14, the angels' *Gloria in excelsis*.

Glory to God in the highest,  
and on earth peace among men with whom he is pleased. (R.S.V.)

Some Greek manuscripts and early versions read "peace, good-will among men"; some read "peace on earth, good will to men" (or "among men"); others read "to men of good will" or "of good pleasure"; still others, with A.R.V., "on earth peace, good pleasure among men" (R.V., mg.) or "peace among men in whom he is well pleased" (R.V., text). To be quite accurate, these last few translations are not so much reflections of different Greek readings as they are different renderings—i.e., interpretations—of that text. Basically, the only important variants are *ἐν* before *ἀνθρώποις*

<sup>3</sup> Apollodorus I:9, 7.

(which some retain and others omit) and the alternatives for the final word, εὐδοκίας—OR εὐδοκία.

If there is one rendering, of all these, which will simply never do, it is the popular modern one: "Peace on earth to men of good will"! Of course, peace will come in this "one world" when men of good will prevail, or are in the majority; but it is scarcely needful that angels in the skies should trumpet this platitude as a message from heaven! The whole point of the angelic proclamation—one may say, of *all* angelic proclamations—is concerned with God's attitude, not men's. In either case, whether εὐδοκία is in the nominative or the genitive, it means God's good pleasure, good will, benevolence. Either God favors men (a meaning that Luke may well have preferred; the song reads almost like the imperial inscriptions in Proconsular Asia, making Augustus' accession the beginning of a new era and his birthday the New Year's Day!)—or else peace comes to men of God's good pleasure (which ought to be τῆς εὐδοκίας αὐτοῦ)—or else it comes to men in whom, i.e., with whom, he is pleased, i.e., who are the objects of his gracious favor or good will. In a word, the "good will to men" or "among men" is God's good will, not merely human, as in some political "era of good feeling" like the Augustan age. And so, to tell the truth, the older English version, still found in the Prayer Book, is quite correct:

"Glory to God in the highest,  
And on earth peace,  
Good will toward men."

—provided it be understood, as the dative preposition "toward" guarantees that it will be understood, as *God's* "good will" revealed to men.

## II

There are two or three great passages where the exact meaning of the words used, and the precise reading of the underlying Greek, are enormously important, not only for technical exegesis but even for popular preaching and religious instruction. Take, e.g., Acts 17:22. Did Paul begin by complimenting his hearers, "Men [or, "Gentlemen"] of Athens, *I perceive that in every way you are very religious*" (R.S.V.)? Or did he disregard the orator's rule to begin with a point of contact and a *captatio benevolentiae*, and tell them the bitter truth from the outset: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious . . ." (A.V.). One wonders how such a speech would ever have got beyond the opening sentence! But the truth seems to be that the Greek word δεισιδαιμονιώτερος has a meaning that lies somewhere in between piety and superstition (see

the articles in both Bauer and Thayer). The emperor Claudius ordered the Jews not to show disrespect for the religion (δουσιδαμονία) of other people.<sup>4</sup> But Marcus Aurelius, in his *Meditations* (VI. 30) describes the character of his father, Antoninus Pius, in glowing, ever memorable words in filial admiration, whose final climax is: "he revered the gods without being superstitious" (καὶ ὡς θεοσεβῆς χωρὶς δουσιδαμονίας.)<sup>5</sup>

What Paul meant, it would appear, was a compliment—but not a full hundred-per-cent commendation: "You are extremely observant of all matters relating to the divine, such as portents, omens, dreams, and signs. The very altar I came across, a day or two ago, with its dedication, ΑΓΝΩΣΤΩΙ ΘΕΩΙ, is an example of this: Someone had a dream, saw a vision, heard a voice, and knew there was a god in the place ['like Jacob,' he might have added—see Gen. 28:16] and so set up the altar—but the god's name he [unlike Jacob] knew not: hence the phrase, 'To a God unknown.'" This seems to be a far more probable interpretation of the scene and its setting, and to fit the background of first-century Hellenism (as we know it from Pausanias and other sources), as well as the background, the life, mind, and character of Paul himself.

Or take John 1:18, where I am sure that the original text read, "*The only Son . . . has made him known*" (R.S.V.). This, rather than the later theological μονογενὴς θεός (easily growing out of μονογενὴς υἱός, especially in abbreviated uncials: ΘΞ from ΥΞ), is consonant with John's theology, and with the very tenor of the verse before us. "God, no one has ever seen; the only begotten God . . . has made him known"—this might do in the Hermetica or in some Gnostic writing, but not in the New Testament. Christ the Word, the Logos, is "God," certainly (John 1:1); but a god does not reveal a god, say a lower god a higher one, in the New Testament—that is mythology! I am glad to observe that the latest Roman Catholic editor, Fr. Joseph Bover,<sup>6</sup> prefers υἱός, not being under the spell of Hort's views. The choice may be influenced by the Vulgate; but does anyone suppose that the Vulgate was necessarily wrong?

Another example of textual improvement is in Matt. 5:22. "Everyone who is angry with his brother [without cause: ἐκτῆ] shall be liable to judgment." Surely the word ἐκτῆ is a gloss!—just as the word "openly" (ἐν τῷ φανερῷ) has been added to the end of 6:4, 6, and 18. Like some of the "tags" added to the dominical sayings in the Didache (e.g., 1:3, 4) and

<sup>4</sup> Josephus, *Ant.* XIX. 290.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *De Superstitione*, 171f and 165b; qu. in Farquharson's edition of Marcus Aurelius, 1944, Vol. II, p. 699.

<sup>6</sup> *Novi Testamenti Biblia Græca et Latina*, Madrid, 1943.

elsewhere, as if to reinforce what needs no support—pedestrian moralizings that weaken rather than strengthen the teaching—so *δει* weakens the saying here. Who was ever angry with his brother “without a cause”? This opens the door to every alibi that was ever offered by an angry man! And here, if you will, is a sermon in a nutshell for you.

Or take the great definition of faith in Heb. 11:1. What in the world is the “substance” of things hoped for, the “evidence” of things not seen? Surely faith cannot be these, but rather the apprehension of these invisible realities, thus substantiated or suggested, either proved or intimated. But the Greek is clear: the words are *ὑπόστασις* and *ἔλεγχος*—why should the English not be equally clear? “Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (R.S.V.). “Hope that is seen is not hope” (Rom. 8:24), and the same is true of faith. No amount of

unfaith, clamoring to be coined  
To faith by proof

can take its place: nor will such faith turn out to be a “conviction of things not seen.” If it relies on proofs, evidences, logical demonstration or factual realization (take, for example, faith in eternal life), then it is no longer faith at all, but mere logical inference. And here is another sermon, if you will!

### III

There are other passages where improvements have been made, which have long been needed. In Mark 9:42 (R.S.V.), “*Whoever causes one of these little ones . . . to sin*” (or “stumble”), the traditional English rendering, “Whosoever shall offend,” is simply impossible, and has led to some very bad pedagogy and religious nurture! Or in Mark 10:14, “Suffer the little children to come unto me” is easily misunderstood—as by a cartoonist during the Italian War in Ethiopia, when Mussolini’s sons were bombing African villages and writing home to describe the beautiful purple bloom that rose in the air from the blood of little black children blown to bits: the cartoonist captioned his drawing, “Suffer, little children, and come unto me.” Of course, it is “permit,” “let,” or “don’t forbid.”

Another and most interesting word which should be properly transliterated, as in the best Greek manuscripts (but not B), is *Beelzebul*—not Beelzebub, Beezebul, or whatever (Mark 3:22, R.S.V. mg). What lies behind it is apparently the story of a “faded god”—once “Lord of the Mansion” (sky? earth? underworld? or all of them taken together?) in Ras Shamra times (ca. 1400 B.C.), but now only a powerful local demon,

like many another demoted or degraded pagan deity. That this is the proper clue to the name—and therefore its proper spelling—seems clear from Matt. 10:25, "If they have called the master of the house 'Beelzebul,' how much more will they malign those of his household!" "Master of the house" is what Beelzebul means: it is a play upon words—another touch of the profound humanity and even humor of the Man of Galilee, who was no long-faced Puritan, even in answering his enemies. (Unfortunately, however, the R.S.V. has retained "Beelzebub.")

There is, of course, a negative preaching value in the omission, bracketing, or relegation to footnotes of material that does not belong to the original text, e.g., the two endings of Mark, and the woman taken in adultery (John 7:53—8:11)—the former with the wholly undesirable encouragement of snake-handling, practiced today in backwoods "revivals" in West Virginia and Tennessee (Mark 16:18), the latter with its intolerably sentimental "Neither do I condemn you" (John 8:11) and its cynical "beginning with the eldest" (v. 9). The whole scene is misconceived—e.g., the Jewish penalty of stoning, as if this were inflicted by "casting" stones at the condemned. That was true of mob violence (e.g., Acts 7:58), but not of the execution of a judicial sentence.

There are several passages that have been improved by viewing them as questions rather than affirmations. The most ancient manuscripts, of course, had no punctuation, no question or quotation marks; and often the word order in a statement was the same as in interrogation. The wonderfully dramatic account of Gethsemane, in Mark 14:41, is obscured in the old version: "And he cometh the third time, and saith unto them, Sleep on now, and take your rest: it is enough, the hour is come; behold, the Son of Man is betrayed into the hands of sinners." Only long familiarity with this archaic version has obscured for us its impossible lack of continuity, its total blunting of the dramatic turning point—as Jesus ended his prayers, and turned to face his captors. Once one has read the verse as a question, as in R.S.V., it will be impossible for him to go back to the old version: "*And he came the third time, and said to them, 'Are you still sleeping and taking your rest? It is enough; the hour has come; the Son of Man is betrayed into the hands of sinners.'*" The fact that Luke takes the words as a question (Luke 22:46, "Why do you sleep?") and that Mark's first question (14:37) cannot possibly be an affirmation—unless it is an exclamation of surprise: "Simon, you are sleeping!"—should have warned us long ago that 14:41 is also a question.

An equally striking improvement, made by taking a sentence as a



question, is found in Matt. 26:50, the words addressed to Judas: "*Friend, why are you here?*" (R.S.V.)—also a powerfully dramatic line, which is totally lost and smothered in the traditional "Do that for which you have come" (cf. A.R.V.), or the A.V., "Friend, wherefore art thou come?" It is clear that R.S.V. and A.V. are both closer to the Greek, *ἑταῖρε, ἐφ' ὃ πάρει*, than is the A.R.V.<sup>7</sup>

Still another improvement of the same sort is to be found in John 14:1-2. "Let not your hearts be troubled; believe in God, believe also in me. *In my Father's house are many rooms; if it were not so, would I have told you that I go to prepare a place for you?*" (R.S.V.) This is far superior to the older version: "Ye believe in God . . . many mansions: if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you."—As if they are to believe that there are many "mansions" in the Father's house for the reason that our Lord has not said anything to the contrary! Surely the new version is to be preferred.

Another important passage whose meaning is rendered clearer by improved punctuation is John 7:37-39. "*If any one thirst, let him come to me, and let him who believes in me drink. As the scripture has said, 'Out of his heart shall flow rivers of living water.'*" Now this he said about the Spirit, which those who believed in him were to receive." (R.S.V.) In other words, the great passage in Isaiah 55:1, found by the Christians in their Bible, the Old Testament, is to be interpreted of the Messiah. It is not out of the believer's "belly" (or "heart") that "rivers of living water" are to flow, but out of Christ, the Fountain of Living Water, the Water of Life, the Lord from whom comes the Spirit which is likewise "the Lord, and the Giver of Life." The "preaching value" of this profound idea is obvious. Here is another sermon for us—all but ready-made!

#### IV

Time fails me—as it did the author of the early Christian homily known as the Epistle to Hebrews (11:32), and I can scarcely do more than list the remaining texts I wish to call to your attention. By the way, the title of Hebrews is not "Epistle to the Hebrews," any more than John Cournos's open letter was "An Epistle to the Jews and the Christians." The book—or homily—was certainly addressed to Christians, not Jews: but it was certainly not addressed to *the* Jews, as if to all. More likely the "Hebrews," as understood by whoever gave it that caption, must have

<sup>7</sup> Not only Tischendorf, but Mill, Wettstein, Griesbach, Lachmann, Baljon, Vogels, and Bover punctuate with a question mark. Hort is almost alone in punctuating with a period.

been like the "Hebrews" (in Alexandria?) among whom "The Gospel according to the Hebrews" circulated—by contrast with the other group, whose gospel was that "according to the Egyptians."<sup>8</sup>

In John, chaps. 14-16, the Paraclete is the Helper, Counselor, Advocate of believers. The term has a long and interesting history, illustrated in the Egyptian papyri.<sup>9</sup> In an ancient Egyptian court, a παρακλητός was a person called out (κλητός) to stand beside (παρά) the accused, lend him support and counsel, or act as a character witness on his behalf. From this, presumably, it was only a short step to the term as applied to the Holy Spirit, the "Counselor" of Christians (John 14:16, 26, etc.). The superiority of this term to the older term, "Comforter," is obvious at once. The A.R.V. wrestled with the translation, kept "Comforter" in the text, but gave "Advocate" or "Helper," "Greek Paraclete" in the margin. The good old English "Comforter"—still used in the Prayer Book—has now lost its force; its roots go back into medieval Latin, Old French, and even into later classical Latin: *con-fortar*, to strengthen, encourage, uphold—but now it is even used of a bed quilt. Since we do not find "Paraclete" in current religious use in American English (unlike French), we must turn to "Counselor" or "Advocate"; of the two, the former is far the more inclusive—for it means both "Advisor" and "Champion," while "Advocate" means only the latter.

Before we leave the Gospels, there are one or two more passages whose translation needs improvement, and has found it, to some extent, in the R.S.V. One is the expression, "unprofitable servants," in Luke 17:10. The R.S.V. has "unworthy," but that also is overdoing it. ἀχρεῖοι can mean useless, or even miserable, but here it must mean "mere slaves," not deserving thanks or earning any reward. The parallel in Pirke Aboth 1:3 shows how genuinely Jewish the expression was, and even the idea: "Antigonus of Socho . . . used to say, Do not be like servants [slaves: *abhdim*] who minister to the master on condition of receiving a reward; but be like servants who minister . . . without the condition of receiving a reward; and let the fear of God [Heaven] be upon you." Slaves do not earn money; they are slaves, not free men. Hence the adjective, as Bauer notes, can be omitted—and many modern exegetes have omitted it, as the Sinaitic Syriac did.<sup>10</sup> Others retain it, as Bauer also notes, in the

<sup>8</sup> See W. Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum*, 1934, pp. 54-57.

<sup>9</sup> See the articles in Bauer's *Lexicon* and in Moulton and Milligan's *Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament*; also see Deissmann's *Light from the Ancient East*, pp. 340f; 4th ed. (Doran, 1927), p. 336f.

<sup>10</sup> For example, Easton, Moffatt, and J. Weiss omit it; Zahn recognized that it was superfluous.

more or less proverbial sense of "miserable," "unworthy," "undeserving."<sup>11</sup> This is, of course, a far cry from the neo-orthodox, Barthian, Kierkegaardian, Augustinian interpretation which takes it as an expression of "Original Sin, the Corruption of Man's Heart."<sup>12</sup>

Another Gospel passage to be noted in this connection is Matt. 7:11 (Luke 11:13). "If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will . . . [God] give good things [Luke: the Holy Spirit] to those who ask him?" (R.S.V.) This is somewhat better than the old version, "If ye then, being evil . . ." But it is a question how much weight should be given the *ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε ὄντες*. When one considers that *πονηρός* can be applied to trees, fruit, slaves, men in general, a whole generation of men, demons, angels, rulers, counsel and advice, thoughts in the mind, teaching, desires of the heart, works of the hands, treasures, a road, the eye, a scheme, the conscience, words, lies, the names of Christians (in the eyes of their unbelieving neighbors or enemies), gossip, and the devil,<sup>13</sup> it turns out to be rather difficult to say in what sense the term is applied here. The context would seem to favor a milder rendering: these are men who love their children and give them good things, not evil—only an unbalanced mind would think of giving a child a stone for a bun or a serpent for a fish. "If you then, bad as you are [but not as bad as the devils incarnate who deceive and disappoint little children for the fun of it], if you know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more" will God give to those who ask him! This is not a paragraph in neo-orthodox psychology—nor orthodox nor liberal!—but only a clear and penetrating comparison, pivoted on the great Jewish homiletical principle, "from less to greater." *How much more!*—And there is another sermon, if you will.

## V

We come now to certain passages of even greater moment for pure theology. The first is the opening verse of Mark's Gospel (1:1), perhaps its title: "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." So the A.V., A.R.V., and also the R.S.V. Some of the modern editors of the Greek text (e.g., Nestle) have omitted the words, "the Son of God." But the omission is easily explained, when the abbreviation of the *nomina sacra* is taken into account.<sup>14</sup> Here were six masculine (or neuter) genitives

<sup>11</sup> See also Adolf Jülicher, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, II, 2, especially pp. 21ff.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Browning, "Gold Hair," *ad fin.*

<sup>13</sup> See the article in Bauer.

<sup>14</sup> See E. Maunde Thompson, *An Introduction to Greek and Latin Palaeography*, 1912, pp. 77f.

in a row, all ending in OU, and some of them abbreviated with horizontal lines drawn above them: IOU XOU UOU OOU. The omission of the last two ("Son of God") by oversight is far more probable, I believe, than their absence from the original title, considering the importance which the term "Son of God" had for the early Gentile church in general, and for St. Mark's Gospel in particular. Mark's Christology is a combination of the Son of Man concept of the early Palestinian church with the Son of God concept of the early Gentile church; and the importance of it for his Gospel is clear from the great climax of his Passion Narrative (15:39), "Truly this man was a Son of God" (R.S.V.). The heathen centurion (perhaps later to become a Christian?) used the highest title known to Gentile piety, the noblest term in contemporary Hellenistic religion. It seems most improbable that the title of this Gospel, written for the Gentile church, omitted the term "Son of God."

As we turn now to the weightier theological passages, it becomes evident that a large part of the task of the modern translator—or interpreter—is to neutralize the undue influence of systematic theology as exerted in the past, and even, to some extent, in the present. As the history of exegesis is the record of a long struggle, at the end of which the plain, literal, historical meaning won out over allegorism, "mystical" interpretation, and the "manifold senses" of Scripture, so the history of the translation and homiletical explanation or use of Scripture reflects a similar process.<sup>15</sup> The Christian Scriptures are no collection of occult, obscure, oracular deliverances, requiring a specially skilled class of hereditary exegetes. The plain sense comes first—though, as Augustine long ago noted, in Book III (c. 29) of his *Doctrina Christiana*, the Bible is full of "tropes" and figurative language. But the Scriptures have not yet been freed from the strong pressure of certain groups, chiefly of systematic theologians, who arrive at the text with strongly held preconceived ideas of what the Scripture ought to say, and therefore must say: and so they force it to stand and deliver.

Hence a real part of the present-day translator's task is to render the Scripture, freed from such bias and preconceptions, and let it speak for itself. The preacher's task is the same. And some of the great "preaching values," for our time, will be found in this very process of getting at the true meaning, regardless of what Barth or Kierkegaard or St. Thomas or St. Augustine or Richard Hooker or Martin Luther or John Calvin—or Walter Rauschenbusch—or any other interpreter has thought about it.

<sup>15</sup> See my article, "Exegesis," in the new edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1950.

Take the verse on which Dr. Karl Barth rests his notion of "beyond history," the verse in Rev. 10:6, "There should be time no longer!" As Oscar Cullmann points out,<sup>16</sup> Barth insists that as *we* view τὸ ἔσχατον it receives a quality of *Nachzeitlichkeit* ("beyond-time-ness"), where "time shall be no more"—as we used to sing in a "gospel hymn." But surely the Book of Revelation, the Apocalypse of John, is not interested in the metaphysical question of the relation of Time to Eternity—a problem which many philosophers, from Plato and Augustine to the present, have wrestled with. Instead, the angel's proclamation announced that "*there should be no more delay*" (R.S.V.)—the end was at hand, and the things foretold by God to his prophets were about to be "fulfilled." Instead of a metaphysical question, we have the eschatological one—which is still the great question of all religion, all faith in God: If God reigns, why the evil in the world, why the delay in his justice, why the perennial postponement of the Judgment? And there is another sermon; in fact, many sermons!

Another eschatological passage is I Thess. 2:16, which used to be translated, "for the wrath is come upon them to the uttermost." But this is, for one thing, "anti-Semitic" in tone, and attributes to Paul the attitude which many pagans, and many Christians in the Dark Ages, and some persons even today share, *viz.*, the view that the Jews are "under a curse" for their "rejection of Christ." This interpretation overlooks the fact that Paul himself was a Jew (Rom. 11:1), and that although he said he would be willing to be accursed for the sake of his brethren (9:3) he never suggested that either he or they actually were under such a curse. It is unfortunate that some of the systematic theology of today, and much more of it in the past, has been motivated by anti-Judaism.<sup>17</sup> Surely the phrase was overtranslated! Plenty of times it means simply "at last," and why should it not mean that here? Punishment has overtaken them, and "*God's wrath has come upon them at last*" (R.S.V.), even as it has overtaken many another nation, people, city, or group in the past, and in the present—and will continue to overtake them, so long as men sin and usurp God's prerogatives of judgment. And here is another sermon.

Still another eschatological formula—but one different in kind—is found in I Cor. 15:28, where the old, familiar, mystical, even pantheistic "that God may be all in all" has had to stand for many generations for

<sup>16</sup> *Christus und die Zeit*, 1946, p. 57. (*Christ and Time*, Westminster Press, 1950.)

<sup>17</sup> We see it even in such otherwise excellent works as Ethelbert Stauffer's *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, 1941 (1945 reprint, p. 169 and n. 640); and the article in Bauer dealing with the phrase *eis τέλος* also has it (col. 1348).



the Greek *ὅτι ὁ θεός [τὰ] πάντα ἐν πάντων*. But St. Paul was no pantheist—though he certainly was a mystic! <sup>18</sup> And although “all in all” may seem to mean *something*—it means something in Hinduism, for example, or in Mahayana Buddhism, where Nirvana has a positive content, and all reality is finally absorbed into God or the Absolute (the One Reality)—in truth it means very little to the reader of St. Paul, and it seems much more likely that he wrote—or meant—“*that God may be everything to everyone*” (R.S.V.). We think at once of St. Francis’ most frequent ejaculatory prayer, “My God, my all”—words we inscribed upon one of the halls of Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, a hall given by a devotee of St. Francis, to whom this prayer was very real.

## VI

The remaining passages to which I wish to draw your attention are all likewise Pauline. Take Rom. 8:28, for example. The old translation was good—and was certainly more readily understandable than the last passage from the A.V. “For we know that all things work together for good to them that love God”—a text that has “stood by” many a valiant soul in the midst of hardship, persecution, frustration, and defeat. But is that what Paul wrote? It sounds very much like the teaching of the Book of Wisdom (16:17), “The world [or ‘nature,’ R.V.] fighteth for the righteous.” And we strongly suspect, from chaps. 1-2 of the Epistle to Romans, that Paul had recently been reading this important religious “best seller” of Hellenistic Judaism. But the question rests upon the text. Some manuscripts read “all things work”; others read “God works all things,” and the ayes seem to have it. P 46, B, A, the Sahidic Version, and Origen read “God works,” and the expression is so Pauline, so “theistic,” so Hebraic, that one can hardly question its authenticity. Moreover, between ΓΕΙ and ΕΙΣ, written in uncials (as in all early New Testament manuscripts), ΘΕΣ might perhaps get overlooked in an old, faded, battered copy of the epistle.

At any rate, it seems much more probable that Paul wrote, “*In everything God works for good with those who love him*” (R.S.V.), or perhaps even “he works” (omitting *ὁ θεός*), than that Paul believed in a kind of universal *nisus* toward good, the

one far-off, divine event  
Toward which the whole creation moves

<sup>18</sup> Cf. F. C. Grant, “St. Paul’s Mysticism,” *Biblical World*, XLIV (1914), 375-387.

described by the modern poet. For Paul, nature was under a curse (man's sin), "groaning and travailing . . . in pain" (Rom. 8:22); it was hardly the automatic instrument of inevitable progress toward good which some modern philosophers have imagined it to be. For Paul, the Jew, the Christian, it is *God*, not man, not nature, who works all things in heaven and earth. His theodicy involves the divine sovereignty, wherever he touches the problem. He is, in fact, almost a Calvinist at this point!

It is all but impossible to conceive how students of St. Paul could have accepted the reading of Rom. 5:1 proposed by certain commentators and editors of the New Testament: "Since we are justified by faith, let us have peace with God . . ." <sup>19</sup> Surely St. Paul never wrote that! "Let us have peace" is an admirable sentiment, fitly inscribed, e.g., over Grant's Tomb on Riverside Drive. The words were spoken in conciliation by the great general who won the Civil War and then matched his sentiments with deeds, for he told the Southern cavalymen to keep their horses for the spring plowing, and refused to accept the officers' swords—you can see them still, hanging on the walls of beautiful old Southern homes. "Let us have peace" is a wonderful sentiment—from man to man. But we do not lift up our little faces to God, and say, "Let us have peace"! Moreover, this is not the tone or the content of the great Pauline proclamation, which rings through the Epistle to Romans, and through all his epistles. "Being justified by faith, we *have* peace with God" (R.S.V.). That is the authentic, joyful, overwhelming good news that lay at the heart of Paul's gospel. And here, too, we find many a sermon!

This brings us to the outstanding, central affirmation of the doctrine of "justification by faith only, apart from works of the law" (Rom. 1:17; cf. Phil. 3:9; Gal. 3:11). There can be little question that the Old Testament prophet meant (Hab. 2:4), "The righteous shall live by his faithfulness" (*be-ēmūnathô*), and ride out the storms of the hard times to come. But the A.V. translated this, "The just shall live by his faith." Moreover, there can be little doubt that when Paul quoted the prophet he adapted his language to suit his (Paul's) idea of the relation of faith to justification, to acquittal at the bar of God's justice, to the new life in Christ which is for Paul the transforming center of the Christian experience of salvation and grace. So that what Paul wrote was not quite what

<sup>19</sup> So A.R.V. mg. and R.S.V. mg., following the Hesychian revision, D, K, L and many other uncials, the Latin and Syriac, and Marcion; among modern editors, Hort, Tischendorf, and therefore Nestle. These all read *ἔχωμεν*, the subjunctive; the alternative is the indicative *ἔχουμεν*—pronounced the same as the subjunctive, and looking almost like it in *ms.*, since the only difference is between *Ω* and *Ο*—supported by B<sup>3</sup>, S<sup>1</sup>, the later uncials, G, and some others.

Habakkuk meant: ὁ δὲ δίκαιος [μοῦ?] ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται. "He who through faith is righteous [or who is righteous through faith] shall live" (R.S.V.). Only, it must be clear that "through faith" goes with "is righteous," in the Pauline understanding of the Christian salvation—not with the verb "shall live." The problem is complicated, in English, by the necessity of a paraphrase, saying "he who is righteous," whereas the Greek has only an article and a noun—or adjective: ὁ δίκαιος. Here is wisdom, if a man will gather everything Paul wrote on the subject (so far as his epistles have come down to us), and interpret the verse in the context of Paul's whole theology, i.e., his total understanding of the way of God, the mystery of God's saving work.

There are two more passages of immense importance for Paul's theology, and they are closely related, both standing in the Christological passage in II Cor. 5:16-21. The old rendering, "though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more" (v. 16), gave rise, once upon a time, to grave doubts of Paul's interest in the "earthly" or "historical" Jesus—his sole concern was said to be the heavenly Christ. Hence the "Christ Myth" school that flourished about 1910; hence the famous *Hibbert Journal Supplement*, "Jesus or Christ," in 1909; hence many a strange, perverse theory of Paul's view of Christ, the surviving influence of such views being with us still. But what did Paul really say? "From now on, . . . we regard no one κατὰ σάρκα—from a human point of view; even though we once regarded Christ from a human point of view (κατὰ σάρκα), we regard him thus no longer" (R.S.V.). In a word, the old Jewish Messiahship, the earthly kingship of Christ, has faded away: the eternal Lord Christ, the Son of the Father, the Redeemer of all mankind has taken his place.

But this is not to say that Paul has forgotten all about the earthly life of Christ. How can he—when the Cross is so vividly real to him? But Paul himself has been transformed, and everything is new. "If anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation"—or "a new creature"—καινὴ κτίσις is almost an exclamation; as if to say, "there is the beginning, the fresh start, of the new creation which is to supplant the old!" "The old has passed away, behold, the new has come. All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and gave us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself . . ." (R.S.V.). Or better, "in Christ God was reconciling"; "in Christ," v. 19, parallels "through Christ" in the verse preceding. Although it is often taken the

other way, thanks largely to the unfortunate comma after "Christ," in the A.V.; and even though it provides the title of a valuable recent theological book (by D. M. Baillie), the expression "God was in Christ" simply cannot be reconciled with Paul's Christology as a whole. Where it is squared with his other utterances, this mistranslated verse usually provides the norm to which the other expressions are adjusted—the final blow of systematic theologians who care more about the consistency of their systems than about the correct historical exegesis of the New Testament.

## VII

There are a few passages of some importance which I would like to list as a kind of appendix to this paper, passages where the R.S.V., good as it is, could be improved. John 17:3, "That they might know thee . . ." (A.V.) is impossible English idiom. Even R.S.V., "that they know thee," is bad, and ambiguous (indicative? or subjunctive?). English idiom requires, "This is eternal life, *to know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.*" And many a sermon still lies hid in that verse.

Luke 7:39 must surely mean, "If this man were a prophet, he *would know* [not 'would have known'] who . . . this is." There is a good text for a good sermon. And so is v. 47, where love is the proof of a forgiveness *already* experienced, not the ground or basis of forgiveness! Repentance is the ground; love is the flowering proof that forgiveness has followed repentance—though the miracle of it is that God's forgiveness, and man's repentance, and man's grateful love, do not always get stated, or even started, in logical sequence: "For the love of God is greater than the measure of man's mind." Some interpretation along this line is necessary, if the truth of the Gospel is to be preserved, and Luke is not to be misrepresented; he is very human, to be sure, but he is no modern sentimentalist.

Acts 26:28—"And Agrippa said to Paul, Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian!" (A.V.) If that is what the Jewish king said, it must have been with genial irony, even good humor. But the Greek hardly bears that meaning: *ἐν δέλω*. Perhaps the R.S.V. is closer to the meaning: "In a short time you think to make me a Christian"; but it is not impossible that the late Prof. J. E. Harry of St. Stephen's was right, and that the phrase meant, "You would make me something of a Christian"—to which

Paul replied, "Not something, but altogether what I am, except for these chains."

Finally, I wish something could be done for the petition in the Lord's Prayer, "Lead us not into temptation" (Matt. 6:13). Fortunately, we have got away from "Deliver us from the evil one" (A.R.V.), and have returned to the Authorized Bible and the Prayer Book, "Deliver us from evil"—i.e., from the evil (or the evils) in life, which are objectively real, and "tempt" men to forsake God and to give up faith in his goodness, his wisdom, or his justice. As in a related Jewish prayer, these evils include sickness, misfortune, "an evil neighbor," oppression, and in general "all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune"—by no means understood as machinations of Satan or the devil. But the very parallelism leads us to reconsider v. 13a: "Lead us not" (*μὴ εἰσενέγκης*): "lead" is scarcely strong enough! <sup>20</sup> Something like "force us to submit to," "compel us to face," "submit us to," is needed.

And "temptation" is scarcely the word, either. As the Epistle of James insists (1:13), "Let no one say when he is tempted, 'I am tempted by God'; for God cannot be tempted with evil and he himself tempts no one" (R.S.V.)—though many read (or recite) the Lord's Prayer with this covert meaning in mind! But *πειρασμός* is a regular and common ethical term in Graeco-Jewish literature, and it is also taken over by the apocalyptic writers. In Sirach 2:1 we read, "My child, if you come to serve the Lord, prepare yourself to be tried" (Goodspeed): *ἐτοίμασον τὴν ψυχὴν σου εἰς πειρασμόν*. This is certainly "trial" or "testing," not "temptation." The great "hour of trial" (Rev. 3:10), coming on the whole world, is not an hour of temptation (as in our wholly individualized hymn, "In the hour of trial, Jesu, plead for me") but the final onslaught of the forces of evil against those of good, the hour that will "try men's souls."

Albert Schweitzer was not far wrong in his ultra-eschatological interpretation of the petition: "Lead us not into tribulation." The reference is to the Messianic woes, the *khebbhlê ha-Mashiach*, when many will be led astray, when the hearts of many will fail them, and apostasy abound; when men simply will not be able to face the fearful odds which will confront believers in God. Only the true believers, only the elect, will survive—as in Mark 13:14-23. At least the word means "testing," not seduction to sin. God is no jealous pagan god who sets traps in men's ways,

<sup>20</sup> See Luke 5:19; 1 Tim. 6:7; Luke 12:11; cf. Bauer, Col. 386.



tricks them into sin and then into destruction. Even the devil does not do that—he is only the public prosecutor, as in Job, or the “accuser of our brethren,” as in Revelation! <sup>21</sup>

Perhaps this is the real meaning:

*Do not subject us to trial* [i.e., persecution, illness, oppression, war, famine, martyrdom—whatever tempts men to give up their faith in God],

*But deliver us from evil* [i.e., the evil in the world, or the evils in life that force such trials upon us]. Here is a “preaching value” not yet realized—for the true meaning of this petition in the Lord’s Prayer, for Christian devotion and also for Christian living, needs to be made clear. But before it can be made clear, it needs to be thoroughly understood—and that is something not yet attained.

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<sup>21</sup> See the article in Bauer, and add to the bibliography the article by Mary Andrews, “Peirasmos,” which I published in the *Anglican Theological Review*, July, 1942.

## Book Reviews

**The Christian Doctrine of God.** By EMIL BRUNNER. Translated by Olive Wyon. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950. pp. xi-361. \$6.00.

This is a translation of the first volume of Professor Brunner's *Dogmatics*, of which the second volume has already appeared in German and others are promised. Until quite recently no important textbook of dogmatics had been produced for more than half a century, but now we are once again being well supplied. Apart from single-volume works like that of Bishop Aulén, we have had six installments of Dr. Barth's work, and now this from Dr. Brunner. The Zürich theologian has planned his work on an altogether more modest scale than that of his colleague at Basel. Indeed one guesses that, when both are completed, it may run to hardly more than one tenth the number of words contained in the other. Yet the measure offered is sufficiently generous, and the work might have been more serviceable to students, had it contained less. This first volume is swollen in size by the inclusion of no less than twenty-three appendices on specialized topics, most of them historical; and though each of these is most interesting and valuable in itself, it is a question whether such material is not better published in monograph form, thus reducing the general textbook to more manageable dimensions. To which suggestion, however, our author may well reply, "In the name of all that is just, say this not to me, but to him of Basel!"

Taken all in all, it is probable that this will turn out to be the most generally serviceable dogmatic text that is available to us for seminary purposes, or indeed that is likely to be available for some time to come. It is essentially irenic and mediating in temper, avoiding the extremes of current controversy, yet is everywhere as robust and downright in its teaching as could be desired. From the beginning, and especially at the beginning, Dr. Brunner's name was associated in the English-speaking theological world with the revolt against liberalism, and yet this is a book in which many who call themselves liberals should find themselves thoroughly at home. The truth is that liberalism may mean either of two things, which do not necessarily go together. On the one hand, it may stand for a certain freedom of inquiry, a certain tolerance, a certain willingness to rethink our positions in detachment from traditional settlements, and perhaps above all a changed attitude toward the authority of Scripture. On the other hand, it may mean one particular and supposedly improved version of the Christian gospel which was widely current in the latter half of the last century and the first decades of this one, which dominated the German theological faculties up to the beginning of the First World War, and which was rapidly spreading in the American seminaries until shortly before the beginning of the Second World War. Dr. Brunner is a staunch defender of liberalism in the former sense, but as staunch an opponent of it in the latter.

No small part of the ground covered in the present volume has already been dealt with by the author in earlier and more specialized works. This is particularly true of the first hundred pages, which treat of many of the same topics as his book, *Revelation and Reason*. Not only, however, is it useful to have at hand this more compressed treatment, but the whole is enlivened by something of a fresh approach. Our interest is caught and held throughout. We are impressed by the author's range

and learning, but even more by his theological acumen and by the breadth and balance of his understanding of gospel truth. In a brief general notice such as alone is here permitted, it is impossible even to illustrate this impression by one or two specific instances of Dr. Brunner's Christian wisdom. It must suffice to say that he has put us all deeply in his debt, and to wish him all success in the completion of the task he has set himself.

The translation, from the practiced hand of Dr. Olive Wyon, will be found easily readable. Occasionally a rendering strikes us as misleading, e.g., "intellectual science" or "the humanities" for *Geisteswissenschaft*. But it would be churlish to complain.

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**The Classical Tradition; Greek and Roman Influences on Western Literature.** By GILBERT HIGHET. New York: The Oxford University Press, 1949. pp. xxxviii + 763. \$6.00.

Here is a book which emphasizes the fact that "Civilization is the life of the mind," and gives a penetrating analysis of the continuous contribution made to the life of the mind in the countries of Western Europe by Greek and Latin literature from the Dark Ages on to Eliot and Anouilh. This is an ambitious undertaking in which only a scholar of Professor Highet's eminence with a command of both the primary and secondary sources and a gift for organizing a vast amount of material could succeed.

In the twenty-four chapters the author appraises various literary genres and examines the most important periods of culture as an introduction to the evaluation of individual authors. Among the great writers who appear before us in Professor Highet's panorama are Boethius (through his *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, translated by King Alfred, Chaucer, and Queen Elizabeth) calling us to contemplate the stars above keeping their ancient peace and noble men on earth meeting the tyrant's persecution with steadfast moral courage; and Dante led by his beloved Virgil from Hell to the threshold of Paradise, where he is welcomed by the choir of the Blessed with mingled strains of the *Benedictus qui venit*, which greeted Christ on his entry into Jerusalem, and the *Manibus date lilia plenis*, moving words of pity and hope spoken by Anchises over the spirit of the young Marcellus; and Shakespeare converting the sensational elements of the plays of Seneca into the "sombre fury of his tragedies" and enriching his poetry with classical reminiscence.

"Every age finds what it wants in the classics"—and we may add, every writer, too. Thus in the Renaissance Boccaccio discovers in the Greek and Roman authors a basis for his preference of paganism to Christianity, while Petrarch records on a blank vellum leaf of his manuscript of Virgil the words of Seneca to express his belief that Laura's soul has returned to heaven whence it came. And from contemporary literature Professor Highet cites Joyce drawing upon the classics in order to make (by way of contrast) the vulgar present more sordid still, and Lauro de Bosis employing an Ovidian legend in his drama, *Icaro*, both to glorify "the creative mind of man" and to voice our hope that the airplane may serve to unite the nations into *una famiglia* living in unbroken peace. Not only in Italy but especially in France does the author find dramatists making use of ancient symbols to interpret the present.

For instance, Anouilh in 1942 retells the myth of Antigone to strengthen his compatriots in their defiance of the tyrannical German invaders.

One of the most stimulating chapters of Professor Highet's study is that in which he discusses the long-continued conflict between tradition and modernism, an aspect of which he summarizes in the words of Gilbert Murray: "We think that we are better than the Greeks, because, although we could not write the superb tragic trilogy, the *Oresteia*, we can broadcast it." No less important a phase of "The Battle of the Books" was the struggle between Christianity and Greco-Roman paganism. The uncompromising point of view of many extremists in both camps is opposed by the author who reserves the palm for "those who have taken the best of paganism and transformed it by the admixture of the highest Christian thought." How many churchmen have deemed Virgil an *anima naturaliter Christiana*!

Professor Highet must of necessity be selective in surveying so wide a field. To some significant authors only a brief word could be given—to Catullus, for example, whose importance in the literary tradition from the poets of the *Pléiade* to Edna St. Vincent Millay we trust Professor Highet is planning to treat elsewhere. May we also hope that he will give us a supplementary synthesis of the classical influences on the literature written in Latin, the international language, from Augustine, let us say, to Milton?

The decline of interest in the classics during the last century the author attributes in part to the dull and deadly methods of teaching so often employed both in preparatory schools and in higher institutions of learning. To study the Greek and Latin writers under Professor Highet's guidance must be, on the contrary, an exciting adventure; for he makes vital whatever he touches and seems to be ever mindful of the appeal in a Shakespearean prologue:

". . . think ye see  
The very persons of our noble story  
As they were living."

This volume characterized by maturity of scholarship and charm of style should find a place in the library of every one interested in the making of the Western mind. *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.*

HERBERT C. LIPSCOMB

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**The Idea of Usury.** By BENJAMIN N. NELSON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. pp. xxi-258. \$3.00.

The thesis of this book is indicated in its subtitle: *From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood*. According to Professor Nelson, the development of the spirit of capitalism represented a "transvaluation of values" and not, as has sometimes been held, a departure from an ethic of brotherhood. In presenting this thesis the author limits himself to tracing the vicissitudes of the Deuteronomic commandment on usury which prohibited loans at interest to brothers but permitted such loans to strangers (Deut. xxiii:19-20). Thus his survey revolves around the problem of "the Brother and the Other." Capitalism, Professor Nelson maintains, in permitting the taking of interest from both brothers and others, cleared the ground for the establishment of a new sort of brotherhood, universal rather than tribal, competitive rather

than co-operative. "We have adopted the word *Otherhood*," he states, "precisely because we mean to imply that modern liberalism, at its best, looks, at the very least, to the advent of a certain kind of Brotherhood, a Brotherhood in which all are brothers in being equally others" (p. 81).

The story falls readily into four parts, as the Deuteronomic commandment is viewed respectively against the backgrounds of the Middle Ages, the German Reformation, Calvinism, and the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Essentially the conflict over the Deuteronomic passage was twofold, revolving around the ambiguity in the meaning of "brother" and "stranger" and the applicability of the text to a world that was rapidly developing toward capitalism. Moralists of the Middle Ages, aspiring to universalism, rejected the Deuteronomic discrimination against the alien as anachronistic and obnoxious, and proposed transcending the morality of the clan by joining the "other" to the "brother." There were casuists who hedged, but all clung to the myth of universal brotherhood and none called in question the historic assumption that the taking of usury was antithetical to the spirit of brotherhood.

The German Reformation, which the author refers to as the time of "Deuteronomy's crisis," showed how embarrassing that myth could be. The revolt against Deuteronomy was set in motion by the fact that Luther's left-wing followers pressed the long obscured premises of the inherited communalistic ethic to the ultimate conclusion. As is well known, conservative Reformers took this program to be an invitation to social revolution and met the challenge head on, accusing the extremists of seeking to pervert the spiritual message of Christian liberty for the sake of their own material advantage. While not expressly departing from the ethic of brotherhood, the Reformation leaders helped encourage the conviction that Christian Europe was not bound to emulate the fraternalistic institutions of the Hebrew Commonwealth. This action of itself did not constitute an authorization of usury; but the insistence that a tribal ethic could not be the basis of civil society, Professor Nelson states, aided the advent of the new order of "Universal Otherhood."

It was Calvin, however, who charted the path to the new order by exploiting the ambivalence of the Deuteronomic text in such a fashion as to prove that it was permissible to take usury from one's brother. Professor Nelson is at his best in tracing the development over two hundred years and within Catholic as well as Protestant circles of an exegesis, stemming from Calvin, under which both the discrimination against the alien and the prohibition of usury was sloughed off—the first by appealing to Christian brotherhood, the second by invoking the Deuteronomic exception. How serviceable such an exegesis was to the development of modern capitalism is apparent when it is recognized that one tenet of the Deuteronomic law had hitherto hampered the accumulation of capital and the progress of the capitalist spirit within the circle of the in-group—while the other tenet, by assuming hostility against the alien, had implied a world perpetually at war, in which respect for the rights of property did not extend beyond the borders of the in-group. Under neither condition could capitalism mature.

Even though Calvin's exegesis spelled the demise of the Deuteronomic law of usury, the text continued to lead what the author calls "a kind of spectral existence." Chapter four in his book follows the fortunes of the text and its use during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a crux of contention between apologists for and opponents of capitalism. He concludes with an Epilogue which



restates his thesis: "A society which embodies recognizable norms for people in general is ethically superior to one in which there are privileges for the insiders, temporary concessions for good neighbors and strangers, and no obligations at all toward distant 'barbarians'" (p. 137).

This monograph on the fortunes of the Deuteronomic passage on usury is admirably executed. So carefully traced are the changing interpretations of the passage, so meticulously documented is the research, that one can safely say Professor Nelson's book will prove indispensable to students of the historical influence of religious thought on social issues. Although the book does not have the scope of such earlier studies as those of Max Weber, R. H. Tawney, or Troeltsch, its careful scholarship reminds one of these men.

The limited length of this review permits only one question regarding the thesis developed in the book. This question is: "Does 'Universal Otherhood' chart the path to the Brotherhood of Man? No more than Professor Nelson would this reviewer hold that the history of moral development in the West can be described as "a simple passage from darkness to light or from light to darkness" (p. 138). He would, however, maintain that the medieval ideal of joining the "other" to the "brother" by extending in-group relations outward is more in accord with the Christian ethic than is the ideal of a brotherhood "in which all are brothers in being equally others." Admittedly, a policy of special privileges for insiders cannot be granted high ethical status. But is the ideal of brotherhood advanced by applying to the "brother," as in the controversy over usury, treatment originally reserved for the "other"? Does this not result in diluting the meaning of "brother" to "other"? Certainly this is what happened historically, and an ethical principle should be judged by its consequences as well as its intent.

CYRIL K. GLOYN

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**The Dilemma of the Idealist.** By DAVID BRYN-JONES. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1950. pp. xv-278. \$3.00.

Dr. Bryn-Jones, professor of international politics at Carleton College, does not invite the Christian pacifist to insulate his witness from world affairs by going off into a monastic retreat where, like the contents of a thermos bottle, the faith will be surrounded with a vacuum. "The ideal is always relevant even though it is at a given moment, and in certain conditions, impossible." "The ideal has authority even where it lacks power; it demands recognition even when it cannot enforce obedience. This, of course, is the assumption on which the concepts of International Law have been based since the days of Grotius. It is still valid."

"The dilemma of the idealist," as the author seems to see it, is this. To the degree that the idealist would bring his dream down to earth, to that degree he must be willing to have his dream "dyed with the substance it deals in." Dangerous as the process is, he *must* compromise. The question is, how far? "Can we draw the line between what is justifiable compromise and betrayal or denial, so clearly that it may serve to determine conduct and policy?"

There is such a line, Dr. Bryn-Jones suggests, and we are more likely to discover it if with Schweitzer we keep reminding ourselves that "an easy conscience is the invention of the devil." Humility is essential. Of one thing he is sure: you can't do right by doing what you firmly believe to be wrong. No man "can serve

Society or the State by doing what his conscience really and finally forbids, for in doing so he would be denying the validity of the moral law and leave for Society no firm foundation whatsoever. . . .” In the final court of appeal, it is Socrates who is acquitted and approved, and it is Athens that stands condemned. . . . The nonconformist may be the salt that saves Society from the decay which must ever threaten a society of ‘yes-men.’”

This is the urbane but honest effort of an experienced interpreter of international affairs to come to grips with the Christian’s obligation to be *in* but not of the world.

The book, from the reviewer’s point of view, would be stronger were there more emphasis on the possibilities of taking the peacemaker’s initiative of Level Three. On Level One people lie down and accept evil, timidly, irresponsibly. On Level Two, less infantile, one slugs it out with evil while kneeling in obeisance to evil methods. On Level Three, far more realistic and practical than some statesmen seem to think, evil is faced creatively and not with the paralyzing despair that can think of nothing but bombs. Here one stands up to evil but does not kill the evildoers. That is what Gandhi did, and it is what we can train to do.

The commitment now is to overcome totalitarianism by relying on the spirit God poured through Jesus, which he would also pour through us. The center of reference is not the Gallup Poll which seeks safety first, but the will of God whose concern is the redemption of everybody involved. Level Two has its risks. One, as Einstein points out, is the possible “annihilation of any life on the planet.” Level Three offers no guarantee of success either. There might be some dying. But this is one “idealist’s” deep confidence in his dilemma: the dying would be in the right direction.

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**The Individual and His Religion.** By GORDON W. ALLPORT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. pp. xi-147. \$2.50.

The most remarkable fact about this book is that it was written at all. “Among modern intellectuals—especially in the universities—the subject of religion seems to have gone into hiding,” the author begins. A few sentences later he says, “. . . psychologists write with the frankness of Freud or Kinsey on the sexual passions of mankind, but blush and grow silent when the religious passions come into view. Scarcely any modern textbook writers in psychology devote as much as two shamefaced pages to the subject—even though religion, like sex, is an almost universal interest of the human race.”

If this book does nothing more than remind psychologists that religion is a respectable subject for their scientific attention, it will have been worth while.

This reviewer still remembers his own long embarrassment and hesitation before finally deciding to write about psychology and religion fifteen years ago. And yet, though public response to such treatment has grown tremendously, the interest of psychologists has grown very little. This is all the more surprising because psychologists, without conscious intent, have discovered important facts which confirm certain religious concepts. Both in existing results and in existing methods of research, psychology has much to contribute to a better understanding of religion.

*The Individual and His Religion* is a step toward bridging the present gap.

"Mature religious sentiment" the author defines "as a disposition, built up through experience, to respond favorably, and in certain habitual ways, to conceptual objects and principles that the individual regards as of ultimate importance in his own life, and as having to do with what he regards as permanent or central in the nature of things." This is language which the psychologist will understand. However, the analytically minded layman will find plenty of substance here of an intriguing and stimulating nature, ending with the author's final sentence and definition of "a man's religion" as: "his ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs."

The author's treatment of his subject is a logical outcome of his earlier writings on the nature of personality. Therefore it has both the strength and the weakness of his basic concept of personality. Its strength lies in his emphasis on religion as a subjective and personal matter. He stresses the uniqueness of religious experience and its many varieties. Its weakness lies in the lack of emphasis on the social aspects of religion, that is to say on any pattern of ethics or morality. He discusses faith, doubt, conscience, maturity, and mental health but has little to say about the common elements which make a religious social order better than one without religion. About the relation between personal religion and organized religion or the church he says practically nothing.

Nevertheless, his concept of religion is dynamic. He sees religion as having an important impact on life. "The chief shortcoming of American psychology up to now," he concludes, "is its poverty in representing the future. While most people are absorbed in planning for, working for, dreaming for the future, psychology for the most part is busily engaged in tracing their lives backward. Most psychologists see behavior as pushed 'from behind' by goads that prod us out of our past." This criticism applies, of course, to all the social sciences—economics, sociology, anthropology, and political science—but it is well to have the author make it of psychologists in particular. It is a good way of saying that religion, no matter how personal, repudiates the concept of determinism and acts on the belief in self-determination; that it denies the finality of inherited drives or instincts and asserts the power of sentiments and ideals in the achievement of a better life.

HENRY C. LINK

Author of *The Return to Religion*, *The Rediscovery of Man*, and *The Rediscovery of Morals*. New York City.

**The Meaning of Anxiety.** By ROLLO MAY. New York: The Ronald Press, 1950. pp. xv-376. \$4.50.

Most observers would agree with Rollo May that anxiety has emerged as the most significant phenomenon and the predominant mood of our time. W. H. Auden has called one of his latest poems *The Age of Anxiety*, and Leonard Bernstein has written a symphony based upon it. The concept of anxiety is basic in the writings of such men as Niebuhr, Tillich, and Heidegger. It accounts for much of the present interest in the writings of Kierkegaard, one of the first of modern students of human nature to admit the concept of the irrational into his thinking in an age which has been rationalistic.

In this book the author brings together the theories of anxiety that have been developed in the fields of modern philosophy, biology, psychology, and cultural studies. He then attempts to weld them into a synthesis which in turn is tested clinically on a

group of persons in an anxiety-producing situation. This survey of theories in itself is worth the price of the book.

He defines anxiety as "the apprehension cued off by a threat to some value which the individual holds essential to his existence as a personality. The threat may be to physical or psychological life (death, or loss of freedom), or it may be to some other value which the individual identifies with his existence (patriotism, the love of another person, 'success,' etc.)." (p. 191.) Anxiety is differentiated from fear inasmuch as fear is a "reaction to specific danger, while anxiety is unspecific," characterized by feelings of uncertainty and helplessness in face of danger. It is not less painful than fear or more generalized in feeling, but represents a threat on a more fundamental level. In human development anxiety is experienced before fear.

Anxiety may be avoided, but only at the cost of impoverishment of personality, surrender of freedom, distortion of reality, or escape through some form of narcosis. The alternative is to work through anxiety which may stimulate creativity, which is the capacity to see the gap between possibility and actuality and to bridge it. The greater the capacity for creativity the more susceptible one is to anxiety. "Availing oneself of possibilities, confronting the anxiety, and accepting the responsibility and guilt feeling involved result in increased self-awareness and freedom and enlarged spheres of creativity. . . . In fine, the positive aspects of selfhood develop as the individual confronts, moves through, and overcomes anxiety-creating experiences." (p. 234.) This emphasis upon the positive aspects of anxiety is one of the most valuable contributions of the book to the field of therapy.

He carefully distinguishes between normal and neurotic anxiety; the latter is an attempt to avoid anxiety by distortion of reality. "Normal anxiety (1) is not disproportionate to the objective threat, (2) does not involve repression or other mechanisms of intrapsychic conflict, and (3) does not require neurotic defense mechanisms for its management, but can be confronted on the level of conscious awareness or can be relieved if the objective situation is altered." (p. 194.) Anxiety becomes neurotic when the cleavage between expectations and reality cannot be surmounted because one threat is in juxtaposition with another threat in such a way that avoidance of one involves being confronted with the other. Originally this cleavage occurs in a person's relations with his parents.

One of the most stimulating and insightful portions of the book, in keeping with the trend toward a field approach to personality, is an analysis of our culture from the standpoint of its relation to anxiety, both as cause and result. The individualism and freedom of modern culture produced excessive anxiety because it isolated men from each other in a ruthless competitive struggle. The rationalistic attempt to solve the problem of man helped in a measure and for a time to allay anxiety, but because it did not admit the irrational elements in human nature it represents a distortion of reality which does not permit man to face his total situation. The collapse of rationalism as a solution now threatens the basic assumptions underlying our culture, which the individual as a participant in that culture has identified with his own existence. In despair many have surrendered freedom and espoused irrationalism, as Fromm has pointed out. The man of religion will ask what the creative solution may be and what the Christian gospel can contribute to it.

Rollo May is well qualified to write this book. He was trained at Union Theological Seminary where he came under the influence of Paul Tillich. He had considerable experience as a Congregational minister. He has a doctorate in psychology from Columbia University and had psychoanalytic training at the William

Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, where he has been greatly influenced by Erich Fromm. Thus he combines in his own training and experience the two interests of psychology and theology in a most creative way. This is certainly one of the most significant books for a clergyman to read that has been published in a long time.

This is not a self-help book or a description of therapy. Rather it presents the kind of basic understanding which underlies sound therapy and an effective ministry. It is a book which will remain a useful reference work for a long time. It is not an easy book to read, but the clergyman will want to ponder long over it, for it probes at the source of the disease of our time, and at the roots of "the human predicament."

PAUL B. MAVES

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**Resolving Social Conflicts.** By KURT LEWIN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. pp. xviii-230. \$3.50.

"At the other extreme is the individual who refuses to think in a time perspective of less than a thousand years. He thinks in terms of 'what ought to be'; his goals as such are frequently excellent, and he refuses to take any action which might run counter to his principles. In so far as his goals are characterized by a high discrepancy between 'what is' and 'what should be,' between the wish level for the future and the present reality level, his time perspective is opposite to that of an individual who is satisfied with the status quo. But the very weight which the distant goal has for the individual who takes it seriously, the very fact that he is dissatisfied with the present situation, make it difficult for him to give sufficient consideration to the actual structure of the present situation, or to conceive realistically what step in the present world can be taken to achieve this end. For one growing into problems which deal with a new scope of time perspective, it is difficult, at first, to distinguish between the cynic, who is ready to use any means to his ends, and the person of high morale, who takes his goal seriously enough to do what is necessary to change the present state of affairs."

This book is full of just such statements, which might almost be said to be directed to the clergyman, although it is doubtful if the author had any such thought.

Since the first World War, American churchmen have moved in two directions that have brought new resources and emphases to their programs—pastoral psychology and social action. Sometimes individual pastors have combined an intense interest in both fields. There has at all times, however, been a big gap between them. The social actionist has been interested in changing circumstances here and now. The pastoral psychologist has been interested in transforming the personalities of maladjusted individuals. In the meantime the whole vast field of social psychology and the psychology of personality has been developing outside these two fields, and the clergyman has been almost completely unaware of it.

Among the most potent of influences in the development of this new field has been Kurt Lewin and his "field theory." A fugitive from Nazi Germany, he developed about him an enthusiastic body of followers who are even now implementing many of his theories. More than any other recent psychologist he has been able to test social theories in the laboratory. As Gordon W. Allport says



in his foreword to this book, "Better than any other investigator he has succeeded in adapting experimentation—the preferred method of scientific inquiry—to the complex problems of group life. His ingenuity is striking. Problems that might seem utterly inaccessible to experimentation have yielded to his attack. . . . He boldly created an authoritarian and a democratic group structure for eleven-year-olds and carefully recorded the consequences." Several of the papers in this collection refer to this experiment and its successors.

A mere listing of the titles of the various papers (published in different journals from 1935 to 1947) suggests something of the richness of the book. They include "Social-Psychological Differences Between the United States and Germany," "Cultural Reconstruction," "Conduct, Knowledge, and Acceptance of New Values," "Experiments in Social Space," "The Background of Conflict in Marriage," "The Solution of a Chronic Conflict in Industry," "Psycho-Sociological Problems of a Minority Group," "When Facing Danger," "Self-Hatred Among Jews," and "Action Research and Minority Problems." The extra concern about Jews is understandable in Lewin's own flight from Nazi Germany because of his own membership in the Jewish group, but these analyses are always made applicable to the problems of other minority groups.

The book is full of sermonic suggestions. "The findings of the physical and the social sciences can be used by the gangster as well as by the physician, for war as well as for peace, for one political system as well as for another." "Moses led Israel through the desert for forty years, until the generation that had lived as slaves might die, and the rest learn to live as free people. Perhaps there are still no faster or better methods for the permanent cultural re-education of a nation."

More than all else the book is an assembly of "field theory" material in which, both by reason and experiment, Lewin shows that the individual is imbedded in his culture and that one can deal with him only as he understands the complex of forces in which he is enmeshed. There has not as yet been a systematic presentation of this field theory approach to social problems, but this collection should be a good introduction to the clergyman desiring to implement his social action program with scientific methodology.

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**An Introduction to New Testament Thought.** By FREDERICK C. GRANT.  
New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950. pp. 339. \$3.75.

The title of this book is somewhat of a concession to those who hold that biblical teaching is merely a transcript of so-called "religious experience." Professor Grant, however, earnestly argues that the content of Scripture exhibits an underlying "pattern or arrangement of ideas," a "basic set of convictions," beneath the religious experience and presupposed by it. "Hence," he writes, "a New Testament theology may be *implied*, though not stated in so many words" (p. 20). To all intents, therefore, the work under review is a New Testament Theology. And its author writes a quite stimulating section on its "Variety" and "Growth," in which he argues with Canon Streeter for a large number of "incipient 'theologies'" (p. 21) to be found in the New Testament according to the geographical, chronological, and religious areas in which they arose.

Against much that passes for a *biblical* approach to the problems of theology today, both on the Continent and in this country, Professor Grant writes of "the

danger of treating that body of thought which we find in the Bible as if it were unrelated to history and were somehow suspended in thin air" (p. 27). While he grants that Biblical Theology must be allowed "its own new, fresh, distinctive task of correlation, insight, and interpretation," yet he is equally clear (in opposition to the type of thinking above indicated) that "it cannot dispense with . . . textual criticism, lexicography, exegesis, literary and historical criticism, source analysis, tradition criticism," *et al* (p. 26).

In taking his stand squarely on History and in favor of the techniques by which it is legitimately probed, the author has succeeded in aligning himself with the realistic position of the prophetic Scriptures throughout. He is keenly alive to this fact and he finds it possible, therefore, to make the following comparison between two religions: "The line of development followed by first-century Judaism was still the old line of national cult; the line followed by Christianity was the critical, prophetic one, for which the national cult was of minor and passing importance" (p. 13).

Professor Grant is also aware that in taking this line he is more than breaking a lance with those who look to "Jewish apocalyptic" as if it were the *omnium gatherum* adequate to account for everything" (p. 25). In his judgment, "the Old Testament is even more important than the apocalyptic literature" for arriving at an understanding of New Testament positions; "one might almost take a book on Old Testament theology and merely substitute New Testament references and illustrations for those which it cites" with a view to setting forth those positions (p. 17). And again, "one thing is certain—the New Testament writers presuppose the Old Testament pattern of thought, phraseology, and conceptions a dozen times for every reference or allusion to apocalyptic. Even the apocalypse of John is far more dependent on the Old Testament than upon the 'apocalyptic literature' of the period" (p. 17).

This realistic, historical-prophetic approach to the study of the Scriptures and of the subject matter of Biblical Theology is, of course, a *minority* position at the moment. It is quite taboo for all those who have been tinged with the millenarian or "consistent eschatological" views (the latter is a misnomer, as the Johannes Weiss-Albert Schweitzer school should be labeled the "school of *uncritical apocalypticism*")—and these views by and large hold the field in theological circles. But one who holds with Professor Grant both to the "actuality of history"—to use Wheeler Robinson's expressive phrase—and to the existence of a substratum of "prophetic" teaching (the product of a genuine revelation from the true and living God) running beneath all that is in the Bible, cannot but be grateful for so doughty a champion to the cause.

At the same time, the present reviewer could wish that Professor Grant found it less incumbent on him to concede so much to negative criticism, particularly with reference to Jesus' so-called "messianic consciousness" (and I would agree with him in preferring a better term for what is intended by that phrase—see p. 22). It seems to me that such continuity of thought and action on our Lord's part is nothing more nor less than what one with our author's viewpoint would expect of a Jesus who took his place consciously within the prophetic stream. Is it not simply unthinkable that Jesus should "fulfill" (to adopt the prophetic term) the highest prophetic concepts without either intending to do so or being aware of the fact that he was accomplishing their fulfillment? Professor Grant finds it possible to adopt this position only because he has conceded so much to the left wing of Form Criticism in the way of allowing that the church was "reading back" much into Jesus' mind and that it had "edited and revised" his teachings to a far greater extent than a reasonable criticism would allow.

But I would not close on a critical note. This book is an excellent statement of many of the positions taken today among biblical theologians. It will be found a quite adequate guide for those who wish to discover what the problems are with which we are currently faced.

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**The Praises of Israel: Studies Literary and Religious in the Psalms.** By

JOHN PATERSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. pp. x-256. \$2.75.

Professor John Paterson, to whom already we are indebted for his *The Goodly Fellowship of the Prophets*, has now given us a very readable, scholarly and helpful book on the Psalms. Its main purpose, we are told, is to show the enduring vitality of the Psalter and to make the innermost meaning of the Psalms clear to the average Bible reader as well as to the preacher. The author has done his work *con amore* and he has done it well.

The book is in three parts. The first contains a critical introduction to the Psalter as a whole. The author inclines to a conservative position respecting the dating of the Psalms, assigning many of them to the pre-exilic period and rejecting the position of Duhm and Pfeiffer who prefer the late post-exilic and the Maccabean era for most of them. He also favors the view that the Psalter is mainly a song-book rather than a manual of personal devotion and instruction, portions of which were used liturgically, and even refers to Psalm 1 which was written in prose as a song (p. 193). The second section consists of an exposition of certain typical psalms (103, 46, 44, 2, 51, 23, 15, 90, 124, 82). This reviewer was gratified to find Psalm 23 interpreted as pastoral throughout (pp. 111-112), but regretted that the conventional interpretation of verses 3-4 in Psalm 8 was adopted (pp. 173-174). The whole psalm is a paean to the significance of "weak, creaturely, earth-born" man of whom God is mindful and whom he has visited, as contrasted to the vast, impersonal universe which he has only created and ordained. And this truth is exultantly hymned in the verses that follow.

The third section discusses the religious teaching of the Psalter, and this is perhaps the most valuable part of the book. The chapter, "God's Revelation in History," is particularly illuminating. The reader should not fail to note what the author writes (pp. 211-212) about the imprecatory psalms, to Bible readers the most puzzling and disturbing element in the Psalter. The effort is made to find in certain psalms (notably in Psalm 73) a clear expression of faith in a personal immortality. Yet even 73:23-26 may refer to fellowship with God in this present life. It seems most likely that George Adam Smith (*Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, 2d edition, pp. 186-7) is nearer the truth when he writes that in none of the psalms can we find a reasoned confidence in a future with God. "At best they are but cries flung out in revolt from the thought of the future without him, or in passionate confidence that in death he cannot desert the soul which he has favored with his grace."

The volume is provided with a short bibliography (in which one misses mention of Dr. Elmer A. Leslie's *The Psalms Translated and Interpreted in the Light of Hebrew Life and Worship*) and excellent indexes.

RAYMOND CALKINS

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**The Heritage of the Reformation.** By WILHELM PAUCK. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950. (Chicago: Free Press, text edition.) pp. 312. \$4.00.

This is the second volume in a series called *The Phoenix Series*, under the general editorship of James Luther Adams. The first volume was *The Directive in History*, by Henry N. Wieman, and the next to appear will be *Reality as Social Progress*, by Charles Hartshorne.

Professor Pauck teaches Historical Theology in the Federated Theological Faculty at the University of Chicago. By birth and training German, he is equipped to write of the Reformation. Conversant both with modern liberal thought and with the school of Karl Barth, he possesses some perspective for the task. The book consists of three parts, of unequal length and treatment.

Part I discusses the Reformation from the point of view of historical explanation and analysis. Luther and Calvin are ably presented, and considerable freshness comes from Dr. Pauck's desire to give to Martin Butzer a position of larger influence than he has often been accorded. In line with the general thesis of the work which is to assist the growing understanding of the ecumenical movement, Luther's sense of the Christian community is highlighted and the great doctrine of faith set forth as inherently communal. Yet the affirmation on page 28 which tries to line Luther up with Cyprian's "Outside of the Church there is no salvation" carries it a little too far. Valid Protestantism could hardly grant that. A minor criticism on the entire book, namely that there is repetition, can be illustrated by reference to pages 16 and 42.

Part II sets forth the essential nature of Protestantism. It is a good section and should be read by every churchman and every statesman in America. Yet I venture to suggest that the antithesis drawn between Christian and non-Christian democracy is too strong. It seems to me that non-Christian leadership often gives nobler form to democracy than this thesis recognizes. But Dr. Pauck rightly shows the roots of democracy as firmly fixed in Protestant Christianity. I am reminded of a sentence I heard long ago: Protestantism and Democracy were married in Geneva, and John Calvin performed the wedding ceremony. One of the best definitions of Protestantism that this reviewer has seen comes on page 142. "Protestantism is a spiritual attitude, grounded in the living faith that God has made himself known in the person of Jesus of Nazareth and expressing itself ever anew in ways of life and thinking which reflect this faith as a proclamation of the glory of God transcending all human limitations and sufficiencies. The Protestant spirit is a spirit of prophetic criticism. Its norm is the gospel of the God of love who liveth in a light no man can approach unto and yet is nearer to us than breathing, closer than hands or feet, and who has disclosed himself in Jesus who was born in a manger, had no place to lay his head, and died on a cross."

Part III concerns itself with a critique of "Liberalism." Actually this section of the book is the one thing that matters, since the material of the preceding pages has been set forth again and again. Liberalism is vital to the thought of this day, yet Dr. Pauck gives only some sixty pages to it, and some of those are devoted to a consideration of a book by another man, Dr. Clarence Bouma. Dr. Pauck should now proceed to a volume freed from history and from answering the positions of other men, and develop more fully the basic thought of these pages. For I find here a new and heartening defense of the now thoroughly awakened "Liberalism" in which alone our safety and our future as Christians lies. Dr. Pauck's closing section gives a defense of and explanation of the way in which Protestant Theology should move forward from the Reformation inheritance into the ecumenical fellow-

ship. It is of so clear and cogent a nature, yet so filled with respect for the positions of other schools of thought, that I would hope every theologian in the land would give it a careful reading. He rightfully claims our Luther-Calvin heritage for modern progressive humanistic Theism. The book justifies for the sons of the Reformation the same right of progress and freedom which Luther and Calvin claimed for themselves. Instead of the cry that calls the church back to the past—a past glorious in its own day—this book is a plea to reconstruct theology with full acceptance of the values of the past, with wide and serious knowledge of the living present, and with confidence in man's mind and will for the future.

It is a welcome book, a thoughtful book, a book thoroughly grounded in history and warm with hope for the future.

EDWIN P. BOOTH

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**A History of the Baptists.** By ROBERT G. TORBET. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. pp. 538. \$6.00.

It is almost half a century since the publication of any considerable history of the Baptists (Newman, Vedder). Dr. Torbet's work therefore is an essential contribution not only to the Baptist churches and schools, in which chiefly it will circulate, but also to all students of the religious history of our time.

Setting aside any notion of the Baptist movement as being synchronous with the Christian story from New Testament times, Torbet frankly and reasonably begins his account with the sixteenth century. The first date in his Chronological Table, for example, is 1525, marking the break between the Swiss Anabaptists and Zwingli.

Roughly two fifths of the volume is devoted to the old world, three fifths to Baptist activities in the western hemisphere. This is by no means disproportionate, for (omitting the unknown number of Baptist faithful who may be surviving under Soviet control) approximately five out of six Baptists of today are residents of the United States.

Dr. Torbet, as a professor in the Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary at Philadelphia, presumably belongs to the conservative wing of his fellowship. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to convict him of any special pleading, whether for Baptist views within Protestantism, or for particular positions within the wide ranges of intra-Baptist controversies. His statements of differences among Baptist believers are restrained and rigidly factual, with evaluations almost entirely absent.

Positively, the factor that stands out most clearly is the vital contribution that the Baptists throughout four centuries have made to the cause of religious freedom. Their insistence upon separation between church and state may seem to members of other groups to have been now and then extreme; but it exhibits itself as deeply honest, and guaranteed by refusal to accept special advantage even when it was available.

The particular Baptist witness to the responsibility of the individual believer, symbolized by believers' baptism, is another element of primary importance. Here the individualism of the Reformation period reached its apogee; and the mood of course fitted readily into that of the American frontier.

On the negative side, a non-Baptist is troubled by the long and involved story of schism. The dual insistence upon New Testament authority and individual



freedom has led inevitably to clashes which became separations; and the decentralization which forbids one's speaking of a "Baptist Church" except in local terms has produced frequent and sometimes violent changes in organization.

Even today there are fourteen independent Baptist bodies in the United States, varying sharply as to degrees of internal co-operation and control, which have memberships large enough to be significant statistically; and there are ten other groups, presumably still in existence, for which Torbet gives no membership figures. (Nine of these latter reported statistics for the *Yearbook of American Churches* of 1945, as transcribed in the *World Almanac*, but their total membership was only about 22,000.)

The recent trend inevitably has been toward centralization, especially in the larger groups. Yet resistance continues in terms of the early Baptist tradition of freedom, and there is reason to share Torbet's apparent judgment that such resistance has a healthy character. As the Baptists were in the forefront of the fight for religious freedom for us all, they may now warn us usefully against concern with ecclesiastical machinery at the expense of the free spirit in the individual Christian and in his chosen free associations.

GEORGE HEDLEY

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**The Admonition Controversy.** By DONALD JOSEPH MCGINN. Rutgers Studies in English No. 5. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1949. pp. xii-589. \$6.50.

This carefully arranged, conveniently indexed, and well-documented volume supplies a fair and objective picture of an important controversy of which no other satisfactory or adequate account exists. The first Puritan attack upon the foundations of the Anglican Elizabethan Settlement of religion has been overshadowed by its more spectacular successor in the days of the early Stuarts. Nevertheless, here in the Admonition Controversy the basic positions of the Puritans against the Established Church were drawn. Here, too, the first defenses of the Anglican citadel against Geneva were thrown up. For nearly a century to follow, the ecclesiastical history of England is outlined in the struggle which followed the appearance of the *Admonition to the Parliament*.

The attack of the Puritans upon the liturgy, ministry, and structure of the Tudor State Church, which followed the Vestiarian Controversy over the remaining externals of Catholic worship, was the most serious threat to the Elizabethan ecclesiastical policy of comprehension. The leader of the Puritan party was Thomas Cartwright, a compelling preacher and an able controversialist. The chief defender of the Establishment was John Whitgift, Master of Trinity, and destined to succeed Grindal as Archbishop of Canterbury. Provoked by the inflammatory Puritan *Admonition* in 1572, the literary controversy between Cartwright and Whitgift continued through several long tracts by each man. Cartwright attacked what the Puritans commonly called the "partial reformation" of the English Church, demanding the introduction of the "pure doctrine" and "right discipline" of Geneva, while Whitgift laid down the main lines of the classic defense of Anglicanism which would later be followed by his younger and abler contemporary, Richard Hooker.

It is this conflict which is presented to us in Dr. McGinn's volume. The author divides his book into two unequal parts: first, a clear, succinct analysis of

the background of the controversy, in which fair treatment is given both sides. Dr. McGinn is at pains to correct a number of misrepresentations concerning the integrity and motives of Whitgift. The second and much longer part of the book is an abridgement of the writings of Cartwright and Whitgift, its selections judiciously chosen and admirably arranged. The reader has before him the important sections of Whitgift's *Answer* of 1572, Cartwright's *Replie* in the next year, and Whitgift's *Defense* of 1574. Here may be seen at a glance the Puritan objections to the Book of Common Prayer, the Ordinal, the use of vestments and the externals of Catholic worship, the episcopal ministry, the government of the Establishment and its connection with the State, the ancient canonical discipline—in brief, all "Popish remnants both in ceremonies and regiment." Here, too, may be seen, paragraph for paragraph, the answers of Whitgift which anticipate so much that appears later in Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*.

Dr. McGinn undertook this volume to provide students of English literature with the basic facts of the Puritan Controversy, the better to guide them through the maze of tracts and pamphlets which form such a great bulk of Elizabethan literature. It will undoubtedly be useful to them, but it will be indispensable to students of English ecclesiastical history.

POWELL MILLS DAWLEY

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**Conrad Grebel, c. 1498-1526, the Founder of the Swiss Brethren.** By HAROLD S. BENDER. Volume VI, Studies in Anabaptist and Mennonite History. Goshen, Indiana: The Mennonite Historical Society, 1950. pp. xvi-326. \$3.50.

Rufus M. Jones, who himself was one of the leaders in the rediscovery of the significance of Anabaptism, once made this evaluation of the movement: "Judged by the reception it met at the hands of those in power, both in Church and State, equally in Roman Catholic and Protestant countries, the Anabaptist movement was one of the most tragic in the history of Christianity; but judged by the principles which were put into play by the men who bore this reproachful nickname, it must be pronounced one of the most momentous and significant undertakings in man's eventful religious struggle after the truth. It gathered up the gains of earlier movements, it is the spiritual soil out of which all nonconformist sects have sprung, and it is the first plain announcement in modern history of a programme for a new type of Christian society which the modern world, especially in America and England, has been slowly realizing, an absolutely free and independent society, and a State in which every man counts as a man, and has his share in shaping both Church and State."

And now, at last, a spiritual descendant of the Swiss Brethren, Dr. Harold S. Bender, founder and editor of the *Mennonite Quarterly Review* and Professor of Church History at the Goshen College Biblical Seminary, has given the world of church history the long-awaited biography of Conrad Grebel, the founder of the Swiss Brethren or Anabaptist movement. In this work, translated from Professor Bender's German doctoral dissertation at the University of Heidelberg, we get for the first time the complete story of the young and tragic figure of Grebel, who died after imprisonment for the faith just as his movement was beginning to spread through German Switzerland.

Born of a patrician family of Zürich, Grebel had every advantage that wealth,

position, and education could bring. In several interesting chapters we watch him as a student at Basel, Vienna, and Paris, and catch glimpses of the rather rough but rewarding student life of the period—the fights with the Paris bandits, the inspiring humanist teachers, the friendships, and the love affair and marriage of the young humanist.

The conversion of Grebel from a thoroughgoing humanist—who spoke of the “gods” and the “fates” in his Latin letters—to the purpose-filled biblical Christian that he became as he returned to Zürich and joined the inner circle of the reformer Zwingli’s disciples, is seen in Bender’s quotations from Grebel’s original correspondence.

Although for some time Grebel followed the rising star of Zwingli, about 1523 one notices in his letters a tone of growing disappointment in regard to Zwingli’s promised reforms. Their ways parted when Zwingli assigned to the civil state the carrying out of the Zürich Reformation. As Bender pictures this watershed of Protestant history, “The two men made opposite decisions and from here their ways separated. In fact it is from the decision on this point that two major roads branch off in church history. One road led by way of Zwingli into the state church, while the other road led by way of Grebel and the Swiss Brethren into the free church.” The end of the story was the triumph of the state-church ideal, and for Grebel imprisonment and death as an exile from Zürich.

“But the end is not yet,” for out of this tragic drama have come some of modern Protestantism’s lasting contributions. In two splendid chapters—Ch. IX, “Things Most Surely Believed: Conrad Grebel’s Theology,” and Ch. X, “The Significance of Conrad Grebel and the Swiss Brethren in the History of the Church”—Bender has traced the widening influence of Grebel and his movement, which has enriched the world not only directly through the Mennonites and kindred groups, but indirectly through the Anabaptist influence upon Pietism, Puritanism, and Non-conformism in Germany, England, and the United States.

DON YODER

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**Basic Issues in Christian Thought.** By ALBERT C. KNUDSON. New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950. pp. 220. \$2.75.

Professor Knudson’s Quillian Foundation lectures at Emory University add to the growing criticism of the “religious revolt against reason.” However, the author’s primary purpose is to present “a general introduction to some of the basic problems of the Christian faith,” which will meet “the religious questionings of the present day.” Issues discussed are the personality of God and the freedom of man, natural and moral evil, Christology, the relation of the divine and the human in Christian experience, and some conflicting theories in Christian ethics. Professor Knudson expresses concern to state the Christian faith in terms intelligible and meaningful to modern men and free from outworn terminology.

Though the author intends to be primarily constructive and not critical, his ideas are set forth in opposition to the main emphases of neo-orthodox theology and of contemporary positivistic naturalism. The antirationalism and irrationalism of these two oppose the use of empirical and rational processes in the support of religious faith—neo-orthodoxy intending thereby to make its faith stronger, and positivism to make faith impossible. The antirationalism of positivism is expressed in its limiting knowledge to “events, qualities, relations and process,” and in this it falsely assumes the

support of science. The irrationalism of neo-orthodoxy is based upon the false assumption of a radical dualism between faith and reason and between revelation and knowledge. Both positivism and neo-orthodoxy ignore the doctrine of divine immanence in recent Christian thought. "A sharp antithesis between the natural and the supernatural" is assumed by positivistic naturalists and neo-orthodox theologians. The former assume that they have put an end to religious faith when they have shown the untenability of a dualistic view of the relation of God to the world. The dualistic theologians assume that religious faith is strengthened by separating God from man so that Christianity is thought of as absolutely unique and not dependent in any way upon human wisdom and experience.

Professor Knudson has no place for any of the sharp dualisms of much contemporary theology. God is immanent as well as transcendent in his relation to the world and man. The moral and spiritual qualities of Christian faith are possible only when the human and divine are not radically contrasted, but are seen to be reciprocally interactive.

Reason and faith are interdependent, reason being both practical and theoretical and dependent upon faith in all its activities (p. 45). "The two most fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith" are "the personality of God and the freedom of man" (p. 51), freedom being defined as "the power of contrary choice." Any stress upon divine sovereignty or grace which violates man's freedom is rejected as antithetical to genuine Christian faith and experience which are rooted in man's free response to God. A limited degree of freedom "does not make us independent of divine grace or encourage Pharisaic pride" (p. 162).

The author's theory of the divinity of Christ is nondualistic in relating the human and the divine. The unity of Christ's personality is safeguarded. In Christ there was a "unique metaphysical dependence on God and a unique reciprocal interaction with the divine Spirit" (p. 148).

Neo-Calvinistic conceptions of sin stem from a radical contrast between the human and the divine. "Sin, guilt, and freedom go together" (p. 113), says Professor Knudson, who has no patience with current necessitarian and paradoxical ideas of sin.

In line with the rejection of a radical contrast between God and man, and between faith and reason, he holds that the Christian ethic rests upon "the foundations of natural morality" (p. 186) and that its uniqueness depends upon "the central place accorded the principle of love" and "to inward purity or moral perfection," to "the religious grounding of the Christian ethic," and to "the emphasis on the example of Christ and on personal loyalty to him" (p. 181). Nineteenth-century secular social philosophy and the totalitarianisms of the twentieth have made it inevitable and imperative that Christians be concerned with redemption of society as well as individuals.

The reviewer's main criticisms relate to Professor Knudson's theory of knowledge, which is dualistic and subjectivistic. The claim is made that our ideas are wholly distinct from their objects (p. 69), that there is a "mental series" and a "thing series" wholly separate from each other (p. 70). It follows then that "it is personality in its human form with which we are alone acquainted" (p. 76). The validation of judgments must depend upon *a priori* elements. "Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof" (p. 46).

Such epistemological foundations for Christian faith and ethics fall short of satisfying the rational and spiritual needs of man. A critical monistic theory of religious knowledge would supply a more adequate foundation for the Christian faith and be a more attractive alternative to contemporary antirationalistic and authoritarian theology. It would also fit well with Professor Knudson's concern to reject any sharp dualisms between God and man.

RUSSELL J. COMPTON

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**Eternal Values in Religion.** By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. pp. viii-162. \$2.00.

An unexpected delight gives even more pleasure than one expected. It was to this reviewer great good news that James Bissett Pratt had left among his papers the completed manuscript of a book which only now, five years after his death, is published. A unified collection of seven essays, all concerned with religious worship, knowledge and experience, from one of the truly great minds and spirits of the first half of the twentieth century in America is a treat that all ministers and many ordinary worshippers can enjoy with profit.

*Eternal Values in Religion* is the kind of book which those privileged to have known Dr. Pratt both personally and in his earlier writings would expect from him. It is scholarly and simple; it breathes the tolerant and kindly spirit of a man who was a student of psychology, philosophy, and religions, as well as a humble worshipping Christian.

The reviewer may perhaps be pardoned for this personal reference. At Williams College, where Dr. Pratt taught for many years, he was one of the most faithful attendants at the College Vesper Service. His being there was itself a benediction on the visiting preacher. To have his warm and kindly presence in the pew was both a stimulus and a help to doing one's best.

To have from such a man a matured and careful discussion of the subjects included in this new book makes it a rare event. A listing of some of the chapter headings will suffice to interest many in reading it: *The Psychology of Worship*. *The Justification of Worship*. *The Mystic's Sense of Presence*. *The Nature of Christianity*. *Faith, Worship and Sincerity*.

In each of these essays there is included both a very practical discussion of the real issues in language and concepts which the layman can understand, plus a psychological and philosophical treatment which students in these fields will find rewarding.

This reviewer was specially struck (being a pastor in a nonliturgical church) with the fine understanding and appreciation revealed by Dr. Pratt for the values of nonliturgical worship, together with his full appreciation and personal preference for more catholic forms.

To any man who wants to understand more fully the rationale and justification of the practice of worship by religious men, this book will be a delight. To people who do not worship themselves and who suspect its foundations and techniques, this book may be an eye-opener.

The appreciative foreword by Dean Willard L. Sperry makes the volume a fitting memorial and testament to a great and humble man of God.

EUGENE CARSON BLAKE

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**Nicolas Berdyaev: Captive of Freedom.** By MATTHEW SPINKA. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950. pp. 220. \$3.50.

As the years pass, Berdyaev's contribution to the solution of the spiritual problems of our time is becoming more and more obvious. Dr. Spinka's book bears witness to the late Russian religious thinker's importance in the shaping of the Christian mind in our contemporary world: "I owe to Nicolas Berdyaev a great debt of gratitude. For almost thirty years I have read his writings with increasing profit. . . . I was drawn to him by the attractiveness and force of his thought, for he spoke to my condition." A Professor of the Hartford Theological Seminary, the author is well qualified to undertake such a definition and analysis. And he has excellently stated in his preface what Berdyaev meant to several generations: to his contemporaries and immediate followers, and to the young men and women who have matured after his death, yet still give thanks to him.

Not only did Berdyaev "speak to each condition," but his message was uttered with force and clothed in an attractive, one might even say, a fascinating form. All those who had the privilege of knowing Berdyaev personally will recall his peculiar *charm*, the charm of a man both courteous and kindly, radiating extraordinary warmth and enthusiasm (though he could be ruthless toward his ideological opponents, and even violent, as he himself admits in his autobiography). Berdyaev's charm flowed from his very being, inasmuch as he was in his entire person and way of life a true representative of the Russian spiritual elite, from Dostoyevsky to Vladimir Solovyev. But Berdyaev's attraction reached out, of course, far beyond the circle of his friends and disciples. We can state with certainty that many of those who only knew him through his books felt his radiation even more than those who met him personally.

With all this, Matthew Spinka, who absorbed Berdyaev's teaching for thirty years, does not approach his writings with indiscriminate and biased admiration. He declares in his preface that he does not accept all his views. For instance, he tells us in one of the chapters devoted to Berdyaev's metaphysics that the idea concerning "uncreated freedom" as formulated by Berdyaev raises serious criticism in the minds of theologians—Protestant, Russian Orthodox, and Catholic alike.

Dr. Spinka is extremely cautious not to classify Berdyaev in any category; he emphasizes the bold and sometimes puzzling originality, the unprejudiced search for truth, the freshness of these works, bearing such titles as *The End of Our Time*, *The Worth of Christianity and the Unworthiness of Christians*, *The Destiny of Man*, *The Fate of Man in the Modern World*, *Slavery and Freedom*, *The Origin of Russian Communism*. Berdyaev was no blind imitator of the masters he loved best, including, of course, Dostoyevsky. He was their *continuator* and their brilliant commentator, as manifested in *The Russian Idea*.

Dr. Spinka offers a penetrating discussion of Berdyaev's various spiritual and philosophical angles: he recognizes the extreme complexity of his topic, and seeks first of all to prove this complexity to his readers. In spite of Berdyaev's "attractiveness," his appeal to the man of his time, he is not an easy writer and cannot be an object of vulgarization. The study of his books requires an effort—not only intellectual, but spiritual. Spinka's book offers a key to such a task. He has added to a profound discussion a great deal of factual material, as well as a series of notes and an excellent bibliography. Research on Berdyaev is still far from completed, and requires considerable clarification: as, for instance, from the point of view of Russian

Orthodoxy, to which Berdyaev remained faithful throughout his life. He is not the unorthodox thinker often represented. On the other hand, Berdyaev can in no way be linked with Russian Orthodoxy of the traditional, reactionary, or narrowly nationalistic brand. He was first of all a true Christian, and as such in tune with the ecumenical movement. In his own church, he was the champion of spiritual freedom, of humanist and social Russian Christianity, of what he himself called "the white flame of Orthodoxy." Of this, perhaps, Matthew Spinka's book does not speak sufficiently. Nevertheless, his work will figure, no doubt, among the most serious and inspiring endeavors to initiate and guide Berdyaev studies.

HELENE ISWOLSKY

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**Parables of Crisis.** By EDWIN MCNEILL POTEAT. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. 255. \$2.75.

It is good to have a new book by Dr. Poteat in one's hands. As I begin this review, I recall other times and places when *Thunder Over Sinai*, *The Social Manifest of Jesus*, *These Shared His Cross*, *Over the Sea, the Sky* were new; and I waited to begin them until just the right moment, the uninterrupted evening. Everyone has his favorite authors, I suppose; Poteat is one of mine. I was sure I knew him from reading his books; and when I met him, I found I did!

In this book we go straight to the "parables of crisis"—those stories Jesus told in that terribly tense period which began with the Mount of Transfiguration and ended with the Crucifixion. The author uses only those parables which are to be found in Luke's record. It is the thesis of the entire volume that the truths illustrated by these stories are particularly meaningful to these present-tense times, providing we have the wisdom to confine the application of the parables to the truths Jesus intended to illustrate. It goes without saying that they have been distorted, misused, and misunderstood by those who would (to quote one of Poteat's crusty epigrams) "look for a mole in a mountain as readily as they would make a mountain out of a molehill." But if they are read and interpreted within the framework of a world that was tense with expectancy, fear, and mounting crisis, their meaning becomes as clear and pointed as if they were told yesterday and pointed at us.

For example, read Chapter II: "Small Barn, Big Fool"—and then reflect upon the 120,000,000 pounds of butter stored in American warehouses while the world starves. Or read Chapter X: "Three Prodigals"—and get new insights into our shallow appraisal of human conduct. In the interpretive genius of Poteat, the man who went into the temple to pray becomes the Snob, whose righteousness turned into self-righteousness; Dives becomes the pattern of the modern Sensualist; the rules Jesus suggests for modesty in choosing one's seat at a banquet suggest an imaginary pompous figure, "The Man Who Came to Dinner."

It is significant and helpful that the author recognizes that tension in human life does its greatest damage when it is felt primarily on the lower levels of consciousness. When the storms of human passion broke over the Master and swept him to Golgotha, the story took on dimensions of epic power that paralyzed the will. But in the earlier days, when the tensions are still confined to dread and inner turmoil, they have a groundwork of common experience that make them personal and real. The rich fool, unprepared for sudden wealth; the torture of loss—sheep, coin or

father; the cynic judge and the desperate widow—these are the stuff of which tension is made in the parish where I minister; and my people need to understand more clearly the tension between judgment and redemption.

*Parables of Crisis* teems with new insights into New Testament situations grown overfamiliar; sharp, clear interpretations of present tensions in the light of the way the Master would have us resolve them.

EUGENE M. AUSTIN

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**More Than Bread.** By FRANK BENTON HERZEL. Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1949. pp. 280. \$2.50.

In 1914, Harlow S. Mills, a Congregational rural pastor in Michigan, wrote a most helpful book entitled, *The Making of a Country Parish*. Then Arthur Hewitt contributed a series of most interesting books written in a Methodist rural parsonage in Vermont. In 1940, George Gilbert, an Episcopal pastor in Connecticut, wrote *Forty Years a Country Preacher*. Most of the other two hundred books on the rural church written during the past thirty years have been by rural secretaries in national church Boards or by teachers of rural subjects in theological seminaries. Mr. Herzel, the author of *More Than Bread*, is a rural pastor in Pennsylvania, and writes with a lift and a freshness that can come only from a man who is immersed in the daily lives of rural people.

The book contains three parts. The first part deals with the constructive forces in rural America. Herzel gives his Christian philosophy of rural life here. He shows the contribution that rural people are making to America in providing neighborliness, co-operation, patience, and a sense of God's presence in our daily creative work on the farm.

Part Two treats of the destructive forces in rural life, such as tenantry, soil erosion, inadequate medical and educational facilities, and the new trend toward commercialized farming. Mr. Herzel emphasizes the need for the rural church to help solve these national rural problems. In Parts One and Two the author seems to present a prophetic view of rural life in America. Any young rural pastor would be given a sense of direction in reading these pages.

Part Three deals with "The Task of the Church." The reader gets the impression that the rural prophet he has been reading is now simply a typical good Lutheran pastor repeating the accepted pattern of church administration. No one would disagree with what he says here, but one might wish he had given more emphasis to the adaptation of the church program to some of the national rural questions described in the earlier part of the book.

Mr. Herzel has made a rich contribution to the literature on the rural church. Young rural pastors should not miss this new book, *More Than Bread*.

RALPH A. FELTON

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**These Sought a Country.** By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. 156. \$1.75.

"O God, do it again!"

No man is better qualified today for the writing of this book than Kenneth Scott Latourette. In these chapters, which comprised the Tipple Lectures at Drew in 1950, he offers three significant contributions: First, excellent summaries of the

lives of five great men of God with evaluations of their work that are noteworthy for fairness and competency; second, through those summaries a remarkably adequate picture of the sweep of the foreign missionary movement from the Anglo-Saxon countries; and third, some valuable data in answer to the timeless question of what human lives given to God can accomplish in this earth. If his records of these men seem dry as compared with the pulsating drama of their lives, the loss is regained in the way the scholarly treatment makes possible those second and third contributions.

Dr. Latourette's invaluable ability to vignette vast movements is evident in his outline of the world setting of these lives. He makes excellent use of that background again in the definitive evaluations of their work. Five men are presented: *William Carey*, who "gave the greatest single impulse to world-wide Protestant missions from the British Isles"; *Samuel John Mills*, "a man of mediocre native talents (who) through his commitment was the means of accomplishing many times more than scores of his brilliant contemporaries"; *Hudson Taylor*, who won over ill health and civil war to penetrate China and to establish the China Inland Mission, the first organized movement there and the one which sent to China more missionaries than any other one agency; *Timothy Richard*, another giant figure in the westernization and Christianization of China; and *Joseph Hardy Neesima*, whose life shows vividly the place of "national" leaders in foreign missions.

Two facts about these lives stand out with particular meaning in the mind of this reviewer. One is the enormity of the difficulties which these men confronted. These difficulties included lack of formal education, persistent illness, crudity of manners, resistance of governments, inadequate financial support, persecution by those for whom they gave their lives in service, opposition by their own churches, physical privation, rejection by other missions, and even doubts as to their own personal salvation which with two of these men did not cease until death. Yet these men were in New Testament terminology "light" and "salt." The second fact is the clarity with which they saw the real issues of their day, and the way that subsequent years have vindicated their vision. Mistakes there were, of course. Yet the basic strategy which these men developed, in the main, was that of high statesmanship.

Many other lessons emerge from reading this book. For example, if the materialistic side of Western civilization has permeated the Orient more than the Christian faith, the tragedy is not unrelated to the fact that Christian missionaries have been such a small minority compared to the merchants, soldiers, sailors, diplomats, colonial officials and tourists who so often have been missionaries of our materialism. Other examples of such lessons could be given, but they will mean the more to the reader if he will turn to the book itself.

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**What Would You Do?** By DANIEL J. FLEMING. New York: The Friendship Press, 1950. pp. 183. \$2.25.

The subtitle of this volume indicates its nature: *When Christian Ethics Conflict With Standards of Non-Christian Cultures*. Here we have another of Dr. Fleming's thought-provoking volumes for Christians with a world point of view. He has a knack of writing books on worth-while subjects about which most of us merely think.

The author has a threefold purpose: "to widen the range of our ethical concern," to show how ethically sensitive one must be in Christianity's world work, to consider concretely ethical problems peculiar to certain areas. It is refreshing to find that the work does not deal in generalities but is illustrated by actual cases ranging throughout the major mission lands.

A glance at the table of contents reveals something of this range. Various chapter headings are: "Marriage Customs," "Sunday Observance," "Funerals, Portraits, and Tablets," "Christians as Employers," "Population Problems," and "Overstepping for the Cause." These might suggest academic exercises but, as one who has been a missionary and is in mission administration, the reviewer can testify to their pertinence to the everyday task of Christian workers abroad. The raising of such questions is valuable, for a missionary under pressure is likely to become insensitive to them. By the very nature of his task, a missionary is constantly tempted to be an opportunist.

Dr. Fleming is not dogmatic but fair-minded in his approach. He cites various attitudes which have been taken in concrete instances with relation to the questions he raises. He realizes that there are no short cuts or cut-and-dried answers to problems which arise in the contact of differing cultures. He does, however, maintain that there are Christian principles which can shed light on the manifold ethical problems which are raised. He pleads for the separation of secondary considerations from primary ones. He warns against the temptation of the Westerner to assume that the answer of his cultural background to a problem is the right answer and the only answer. He suggests as aids in making decisions our Lord's teaching and example, the Bible, the ethical heritage of Christian history, the enlightenment by the Spirit of the submissive will of the Christian, and prayer.

A provocative chapter deals with the ethical issue in transferring a full-blown doctrinal structure from the Older to the Younger Churches. Involved is what he calls "an unconscious spiritual imperialism" which becomes a "Saul's armor" for these churches. We have often expected new converts boldly to confess to doctrines which we in the West only half believe. Thus has the church lost some thoughtful potential leaders in the mission lands.

In a final chapter Dr. Fleming pleads for an Ecumenical Ethic, and indicates a number of features which he feels will be helpful. This will be necessary if the world is to become anything like the neighborhood spiritually that it is geographically.

Some Mission Boards adopt the practice of sending to their missionaries and national leaders books useful to their work. It is hoped that this policy may be followed in the case of the volume under consideration. It will be invaluable to Board Executives, professors of Missions, and missionary candidates. Further, for ministers and keen laymen it will prove useful in enlarging their range of understanding of problems which missionaries are confronted with overseas. At the same time it may make us all more sensitive to moral issues in our society at home.

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**Basic Christian Ethics.** By PAUL RAMSEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. pp. xviii-404. \$3.75.

What is sound Christian ethics? Is it the bourgeois type of morality so frequently found in modern Christian utterance or conduct? Is it humanitarian phi-



lanthropy parading as Christian virtue? Or the condescending behavior of those who have toward those who have not? How does the idea of the gentleman square with that of the Christian disciple? Is Christian morality a code morality, or dare we compound it with current usage, tribal custom and contemporary secular mores? What really is distinctive in Christian ethical perception and outlook? Wherein does Christian ethics differ from that of Aristotle, the ancient Stoics or modern self-realizational morality? Why did men like Nietzsche violently reject Christian morals as the morality of slaves?

This reviewer ventures to state that these and similar questions find discerning analysis and constructive answers in the work under discussion. In ten well-balanced chapters Dr. Ramsey, Associate Professor of Religion at Princeton University, deals with the major crucial issues of Christian ethical theory. While he has constant recourse to the classical writers in the field (Paul, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Kierkegaard), the author yet maintains a wholesome independence of judgment and reveals keen spiritual insight.

In Chapter I, the two sources of Christian love, namely, God's love and the Kingdom of God, come under review. Ramsey is deeply convinced that Christian ethics cannot be separated from its religious, that is, its biblical foundation. The roots as well as the fruits of Christian ethics derive from the revelation of the unheard-of justice (*mishpat*), righteousness (*tsedeq*), and mercy (*chesed*) of God. These elements of God's covenant love, though distinguishable in the biblical account, still form an integral and integrating whole of God's redeeming activity on behalf of sinful men. Man's response to God's demand and God's justice must ever tend to express itself in wholesome, loving, and redemptive behavior toward those in need. Jesus Christ exemplifies the righteousness of God that ever is bent redemptively toward the lowest and the least of God's creatures. His character is exemplary for all Christian thinking about justice, a justice that should prevail in the "world of systems," in this world and not some other (p. 17).

Chapter II presents an illuminating analysis of the mooted problem of Christian liberty. Ramsey first presents a description of code morality as found in contemporary Jewish ethics at the time of Jesus. Jewish legalism, the author rightly points out, had more concern for a humanitarian softening of traditional code morality than many Christian interpreters have allowed. Where, however, Jesus finally broke with the rabbis of his day was in his radically different conception of the commandment of love. While the rabbis distinguished between doing good and saving life, Jesus conceived doing good to be the equivalent of saving life (p. 55). Because Jesus related his stern teachings to the supernatural measure of morality, God's love, and the Kingdom of God, his ethic represents an ethic of perfection far transcending any possible legal formulation. It could not possibly be captured in a code.

Christian love, to cite our author, has its own self-directive tendency, conformable only to the needs of the neighbor (p. 78). Neither natural law nor conscience are ultimately normative for the Christian, but Jesus Christ alone! To the disciple of Jesus, prompted by disinterested love, "everything is quite lawful, *absolutely everything* is permitted which love permits. . . . Turned around, however, this ethic becomes very grim, very grim indeed. *Absolutely everything* is commanded which love requires, *absolutely everything* without the slightest exception or softening." (p. 89)

In Chapter III, and those that follow, our modern bourgeois conception of Christian obligation receives a severe shock. Christian agape-love, grounded as it is in God's unmerited grace, is a self-forgetful love, hence it has nothing whatever

to do "with feelings, emotions, taste, preferences, temperament, or any of the qualities in other people which arouse feelings or revulsion or attraction . . . in us" (p. 100). The true disciple of Jesus loves men regardless of worth or unworth. He loves them for Christ's sake and because God, while we were yet sinners, sent his Son to die for our sins. In the final analysis, Christian ethics is "a prolongation of the incarnation, incarnation among those in need, not a prolongation of human aspiration even for religious salvation, nor, as Augustine too often supposed, a rebound from incarnation in this world back into the ways of other-worldly ascent" (p. 151).

Space forbids to discuss in detail the other chapters of this valuable work. What Ramsey has to say concerning a Christocentric view of vocation or the problem of Christian virtue and the application of Christian love in community life is full of rich suggestiveness and constructive insights. It is evident that our superficial notions of the "Christian gentleman" need critical revision in the light of a Christ-inspired ethic. Christian faith implies something utterly different from the mere extension or improvement of man's natural capacities. It demands repentance and a complete reorientation in terms of faith and loving obedience centered on Jesus Christ.

We commend this book to all serious students of Christian ethics. It is heartening to think that a book of this avowedly Christian and evangelical viewpoint has issued from a man teaching in one of our great universities. The fact that it is being used in teaching Christian ethics to undergraduates speaks high for the university.

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**The Apostolic Fathers: An American Translation.** Edited by EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. xi-321. \$3.75.

These "additional epistles of the New Testament," some of them older than the later New Testament books, and some believed to have been written by disciples of the original apostles, are here translated from the Greek into modern everyday English. Each of the twelve extracanonical books has a preface dealing with the book's authorship, date, occasion, and purpose. For the study of early Christianity these books serve as an important supplement to the New Testament itself, besides containing passages of considerable devotional value.

We see, here and there, how the teachings of Jesus, remembered quite faithfully, were transmitted and adapted to the Gentile churches. "Do not be stretching out your hands to take, and closing them when it comes to giving," says the *Didache* with an authentic Christian accent. Reminiscent of the Sermon on the Mount, yet amusingly recast, is the following: "Your fasts must not be on the same days with the hypocrites, for they fast on Monday and Thursday, but you must fast on Wednesday and Friday." We read the epistle of Clement of Rome to that repeatedly troublesome church, the Corinthians; and those of Ignatius of Antioch to all the leading churches while on his way to martyrdom. The longest book included is *The Shepherd of Hermas*, akin to the apocalyptic literature and dealing in visions and parables—vouchsafed apparently to a man not intellectually gifted, habitually weighed down by his wayward family and his own sense of sin, but never backward in begging for revelations and explanations from his supernatural Shepherd.

Dr. Goodspeed has given us a work both of scholarly value and human appeal.

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The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

**A Critical Study of Primitive Liturgies.** By K. N. DANIEL. Tiruvalla, India, 1949. 2d ed., pp. 267. 8 Rupees. (Obtainable from the author, at the Abraham Mar Thoma Bible Institute, Tiruvalla, Travancore, South India.)

This unusual book is an enlarged edition of a work first published in 1938. It is produced with immense industry and devotion, painstakingly authenticated by quotations in Syriac, generously illustrated with more than twenty photostats of manuscripts, luminous and accurate in its typography, and poorly printed on cheap paper at a modest price.

But it must be said that while a great deal of buried ore has been mined, it has not been smelted. A book can hardly call itself "a critical study" which cites side by side Dr. Neale's so-called "Clementine" liturgy and the liturgy of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, as if they were two authorities, instead of one and the same; or similarly with the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus, the Ethiopic rite which incorporates Hippolytus' text, and *The Testament of Our Lord*, which is only an interpolated version of it. And a purely internal comparison on the same level of liturgical texts of every date and from every region cannot do more than display the author's original preconceptions, unless it is constructed on the basis of external historical facts.

Yet the book is readable, being written with a sort of passion which makes it interesting to others than specialists in this rather obscure field. It is strongly recommended for those not concerned in the technical subject, but capable of taking an interest in the over-all picture which it gives of the extraordinarily "evangelical" character of the basic rites of the Separated Eastern Churches in such matters as the ideas of Priesthood, Sacrifice, Real Presence, and Consecration, in the Eucharist.

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**Religion and the New Paganism.** By JOHN PITTS. London: Independent Press, Ltd., 1950. pp. 273. 8/6.

This British author has been a Presbyterian minister in this country for some years past, has written for *RELIGION IN LIFE*, and is now located at Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The present book grew out of a series of lectures at a Summer School for Clergy held in Montreal in 1942, under the auspices of McGill University. The manuscript, submitted as an essay in Moral and Political Science, was awarded one of the annual "David's Awards" from the Quebec Government; it is said to be the first religious book written by a Protestant to receive such an award.

It is to be expected that a book thus heralded will deal with one or more central issues of the day. Actually it deals with several: the relation of Christianity respectively to "the new psychology," "the new morality," "the new politics," and "the new humanism"—all of which are brought under the rubric, "the new paganism." Dr. Pitts points out that the old paganism, which early Christianity had to meet, was itself a religion; but neopaganism is antireligious. Yet "both the old and the new paganisms have one common objection to Christianity—its refusal to make terms with political absolutism."

Modern psychology claims to show that the idea of God is a "projection," religion is an infantile escape mechanism, or a disguised expression of the sexual instinct, prayer is autosuggestion. While not blind to the partial truth in these positions, Dr. Pitts skillfully exposes their fallacies. "The new morality," especially with relation to marriage and sex, eventuates in failure because of the hedonistic paradox.

Our author points out that it has been proved unworkable, both on a large scale in the early days of Soviet Russia and in the experience of individuals elsewhere in the world. In the field of politics, he shows the unprecedentedly great power for evil which belongs to modern totalitarian states with their ruthless techniques, while not forgetting to admit the positive social accomplishments which have made their propaganda plausible. But Christianity "is a genuine universalism" and "cannot make terms with any form of group morality." He closes with a presentation of "the Christian view of the world," which involves a concept of God "finally and completely satisfying" and a concept of the world "which finds room for *all* the facts of life, however distressing and unpleasant some of them may appear to be."

Dr. Pitts' style is concise, his argument admirably organized, and while he does not pretend that none of these things have been said before, he says them with a new incisiveness. The book deserves a wide audience. The present reviewer feels, however, that this fencing off of Christianity from the various aspects of the temper and experience of modern man can sometimes become too neat. There is also a type of Christian thinker who bears the "cross" of coming close enough to modern paganism to understand and be swayed by it, to feel within himself the sort of spiritual search that is hidden within it, even though his consistency and orthodoxy be endangered. But both types have their place; and in an age of too much fuzzy and confused thinking, such a book as Dr. Pitts has written is genuinely helpful.

E. H. L.

**A New Book of Meditations.** By TOYOHICO KAGAWA. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. 101. \$1.25.

This new book, like all of them, will be welcomed by the many who admire and love Kagawa. It contains 101 meditations, one to a page, each with a correlated suggested Scripture reading—though not arranged in the usual manner of devotional manuals according to days of the week, month, or year. They do not center around any one theme (as in the former work on the Cross).

Certainly no stranger to suffering ("I have spent much of each day for half a lifetime in tears"), Kagawa has found that "the Cross is our pathway, too. Nobody can enter into eternal life without passing through it." But it is in this *present* life that he has already passed through it. He also tells us that it is merely a partial Christianity that preaches the Cross only and prays only for forgiveness of sins. By a career in the slums, "I have followed the example of Jesus, seeking after his secret and bidding farewell to the winter of sorrows. I have enjoyed a perpetual springtime."

We are pleasantly surprised now and then by his individual turns of expression. "Theology is but an appendix to love, and an unreliable appendix!" "Jesus decided on the Cross rather than on a revolution. Nowadays the choice of revolution has become familiar and its results well known. . . . Can a cross possibly compete with revolution?" "My God heats the sun to the temperature of 6,000 degrees. He causes the earth to rotate in twenty-four hours. My God is busy. He observes the laws that govern His creation. God is punctual. God is needed by every businessman. A god who is of value only in churches and cathedrals is of no use to me." "God has made me into a bullet and is aiming to shoot it at a certain target." "Love is identical with activity. Love is the explosion of a soul!"

E. H. L.